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1. Understanding social enterprises 
Social enterprises combine business and social welfare logics to tackle societal challenges 
such as starvation, inequality, unemployment, poverty and poor health care (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2010; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013). These organizations span institutional 
boundaries by combining characteristics from the for-profit and non-profit sectors 
(Tracey, Phillips, & Jarvis, 2011). Management scholars theorize social enterprises as 
hybrid organizations, positioning them midway betwixt for-profit and non-profit 
organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013; Jay, 2013; Battilana & 
Lee, 2014; Doherty, Haugh, & Lyon, 2014; Ebrahim, Battilana, & Mair, 2014). For profit 
organizations are typically guided by market principles, they mostly aim at maximizing 
shareholder wealth through the generation of economic value, i.e., profits (Friedman, 
1970; Godfrey, 2005). Shareholders, otherwise called residual claimants, receive profits 
after all commitments are paid. By contrast, non-profit sector organizations pursue a 
philanthropic mission, primarily aiming at environmental and social value creation (Dees, 
1998).  
Social enterprises supply goods and services that satisfy basic human and environmental 
needs unmet by social, market and governmental institutions (Seelos & Mair, 2005). They 
integrate logics and help create public goods (Peredo & McLean, 2006). In sum, social 
entrepreneurship can be viewed as “entrepreneurial activity with an embedded social 
purpose” (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei‐Skillern, 2006, p. 1). By definition, social 
enterprises have three salient dimensions: social purpose or mission, business objective, 
and hybridity. In the following, we delve deeper into each of these dimensions. 
1.1 Social purpose or mission 
According to Peredo and McLean (2006) and Seelos and Mair (2005), the commitment 
to a social purpose is the common denominator of all social enterprises. The large 
research network, Emergence of Social Enterprises in Europe (EMES), emphasizes that 
the goal of social enterprises is to benefit the society (e.g., Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). 
Social enterprises pursue developmental initiatives that satiate the unmet needs of 
disadvantaged people and protect the environment; including poverty eradication, food 
security, recycling, access to potable water, among others. Unmet social needs, or 
institutional voids, are often the consequences of government or market failures (Austin 
et al., 2006; Santos, 2012). The emergence of social enterprises is sometimes regarded as 
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an innovative response to funding challenges in non-profit organizations facing 
difficulties in soliciting grants and donations (Defourny, 2001; Dees, 1998). While 
sharing the social ideals of non-profits, social enterprises tap the innovation, efficiency, 
resourcefulness and operational effectiveness of the for-profit sector in the design, 
production and delivery of products and services that are better adapted to societal needs 
(Smith et al., 2013).  
“Social” is an equivocal term that conveys different meanings and connotations 
depending on cultural background and life experience (Young & Lecy, 2014). It becomes 
further complicated considering the possibility of ranking social needs to inform the 
allocation of scarce resources. Seelos and Mair (2005) maintain that setting the 
boundaries and the scope of social enterprises is required to unpack their unique features, 
which distinguish them from other enterprises. They argue that social mission ambiguity 
can be solved by conceptualizing social enterprises from the lens of universally adopted 
sustainable development goals, which incorporate environmental concerns and the basic 
needs of the current and future generations.  
Because of the centrality of social mission, organizations that fall short are accused of 
what the literature calls “mission drift” (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Armendariz & Szafarz, 
2011). Mission drift is said to have occurred when social enterprises move away from 
their social mission in pursuit of financial goals (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 
2007). Grimes, Williams, and Zhao (2019), view mission drift as organizational actions 
that are inconsistent with its identity and image. Mission drift is a grave concern for social 
enterprises because it poses a severe risk that threatens their legitimacy as pro-social 
ventures (Ebrahim et al., 2014). Thus, organizations that are set up to satisfy the unmet 
needs of disadvantaged people may end up sacrificing their social goals in favour of 
profitability. But to Grimes et al. (2019), mission drift is not necessarily negative, 
especially if it is a response to external demand or if it is combined with skillful execution.  
Studies have linked mission drift to several factors such as excessive commercialization 
(Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010), volatility of subsidies (D’Espallier, Hudon, & Szafarz, 
2017) and unfavourable macroeconomic conditions (Xu, Copestake, & Peng, 2016). 
Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) maintain that separating mission drift from cross-
subsidization can be difficult due to the multidimensionality of social missions. 
Consistent with this view, Varendh-Mansson, Wry & Szafarz (2020) posit that mission 




The difference between the social mission of social enterprises and the corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) of capitalistic firms is rather intricate. Here, I front two perspectives. 
First, the two concepts may differ based on their degree of centrality to the corporate 
strategy. Social mission is conceptualized as a core element of corporate strategy and is 
deemed central to the raison d'être of social enterprises (Peredo & McLean, 2006). Social 
value creation is proactive and woven into the fabric of these organizations. For this 
reason, social value is regarded as the principal outcome of social enterprises’ endeavour 
(Perrini, Vurro, & Costanzo, 2010; Wilson & Post, 2013). In contrast, CSR, or corporate 
philanthropy, is often secondary and discretionary to capitalistic firms, as their ultimate 
goal is encapsulated in shareholder wealth maximization (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). 
Put differently, CSR is subordinated to the main objective of maximizing shareholder 
value. To expound, some CSR initiatives are reactive responses to community pressures 
and stakeholder activism. For instance, the government of India enacted a legislation that 
required all large companies to commit a minimum of  2% of their annual profits into 
CSR actives.1 In some other instances, companies engage in CSR activities to build 
legitimacy (Groza, Pronschinske, & Walker, 2011). Whether CSR is compatible with 
shareholder wealth maximization is inconclusive as available evidence is mixed 
(Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Servaes & Tamayo, 
2013). According to McWilliams and Siegel (2000), the inconsistent findings may be 
attributed to misspecification errors, especially the failure of researchers to account for 
the effects of investments in research and development in their empirical models. 
Notwithstanding this difference, the boundary between social mission and CSR blurs 
when one considers mainstream firms that incorporate CRS into their mission, corporate 
strategy and core business model (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Vilanova, Lozano, & Arenas, 
2009). 
The second point of distinction relates to how social mission of social enterprises and 
CSR of mainstream firms are funded. On the one hand, social enterprises harness funds 
from commercial, and sometimes non-commercial sources (Teasdale, 2010). On the other 
hand, capitalistic firms usually finance their CSR activities with a discretionary 
proportion of profits (Godfrey et al., 2009). For social enterprises whose customers are 
distinct from beneficiaries, this difference is less profound as they tend to operate like 
capitalistic firms. For such social enterprises, value is extracted from clients in the form 
 
1  Further information can be obtained from the website of the Indian government: https://www.csr.gov.in/  
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of profits and channeled into the provision of social services for beneficiaries (Ebrahim 
et al., 2014). 
1.2 Business objectives  
Social enterprises are committed to economic value creation, because they need to be 
financially sustainable (Austin et al., 2006; Santos, 2012; Smith et al., 2013). Unlike non-
profits, which are subsidy dependent, social enterprises engage in commercial activities 
to generate revenues (Mair, Battilana, & Cardenas, 2012). Some social enterprises also 
receive donations, either in cash or in kind. Yet, such donations constitute only a fraction 
of their financing mix (Teasdale, 2010). Distinguishing between profit maximization of 
regular firms and the business goals of social enterprises is tricky since both involve 
making business. Yet, for regular firms, there is broad consensus that profits must provide 
sufficient returns to capital providers (Godfrey, 2005) whereas for social enterprises, 
there is lack of consensus on how much profit is admissible, and on which stakeholders 
stand to benefit from it. The discourse of these two issues intertwines with the debate on 
what is considered as moderate, non-exploitative or fair profit in social enterprises 
(Hudon, Labie, & Reichert, 2018). 
Permissible profit levels concern pricing primarily. Whether prices should be set at 
market or below market is contentious and intermingled with ethical considerations 
(Hudon & Ashta, 2013; Hudon et al., 2018). Though economic success is a legitimate 
goal for social enterprises, excessive profits are often criticized and sometimes considered 
as “mission drift” (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Armendariz & Szafarz 2011). However, 
higher profitability is not ruled out if social enterprises deliver on their social mandate 
(Doherty et al., 2014). Furthermore, pricing decisions are tricky in social enterprises 
because prices must be affordable for their low-income clients (Austin et al., 2006) and 
at the same time, they should be high enough for the organization to break-even at least 
(Dorfleitner, Leidl, Priberny, & von Mosch, 2013). To strike a balance, the literature uses 
the phrase “financial sustainability” to convey the notion of generating incomes that 
covers operating costs (Doherty et al., 2014; Mersland & Strøm, 2012; Wilson & Post, 
2013). Notwithstanding, a few social enterprises are profitable, others are about the break-
even point, while many struggle to survive without subsidies (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). 
Yet, to finance sustained growth and expansion, social enterprises ought to look beyond 
breaking even by generating retained earnings (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009).  
The second dimension of profitability relates to surplus distribution among stakeholders. 
Like capitalistic firms, some social enterprises can distribute surpluses to specific 
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stakeholders (Labie & Mersland, 2011) instead of shareholders only (Smith et al., 2013). 
Recognized stakeholders include suppliers, clients, employees, the community and 
shareholders (Freeman, 1984). For instance, surplus can be transferred to employees in 
the form of increased compensation packages, to clients in the form of lower prices or to 
shareholders through higher dividends (Hudon et al., 2018). According to Hudon and 
Ashta (2013), surplus distribution among stakeholders determines whether prices (or 
profits) are fair (see also, Hudon et al., 2018). An example of unethical behaviour is the 
case of a social entrepreneur charging exploitative prices to the poor while generating 
high financial returns (Sandberg, 2012). This is the case of the Mexican microfinance 
organization, Banco Compartamos, which went public in 2007 leading to a handful of 
investors amassing over USD 450 million (Rosenberg, 2007). In the aftermath of its 
successful initial public offering, Compartamos came under intense criticism, with some 
commentators arguing that the value generated could have been leveraged to lower 
borrowers’ interest rate, which at that time stood at almost 100%. In spite of the ongoing 
scholarly debate, there are few practical guidelines on surplus distribution in social 
enterprise, especially in balancing the often-diverging interests of stakeholders. Evidence 
however shows that some social enterprises adopt code of ethics (Kleynjans & Hudon, 
2016). 
In their fair-profit framework, Hudon et al. (2018) add two dimensions regarding pricing 
and surplus distribution: operational sustainability (profitability) and focus on social 
mission (social mission). The authors report that only a few organizations can satisfy all 
the requirements and most of them experience trade-offs between pricing, surplus 
distribution, and social mission. 
1.3 Hybridity 
The final defining characteristic of social enterprises is their hybridity. In natural sciences, 
hybrids are the offspring of two existing species. For social enterprises the corresponding 
“species” are the for-profit and non-profit organizations (Doherty et al., 2014). Hybridity 
means that social enterprises combine dual institutional logics, social welfare and 
business orientation (Mair, Mayer, & Lutz, 2015). Simply put, social enterprises couple 
social and financial objectives. To succeed and survive in the long term, social enterprises 
ought to excel in both objectives (Mair & Marti, 2006; Santos, 2012).  
Hybridity is a source of legitimacy that enables these unconventional organizations to 
obtain resources from philanthropic, private and public sources (Doherty et al., 2014). 
Achieving the twofold objectives is challenging because the social and financial goals 
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can conflict and thereby creating tensions and trade-offs where one objective is sacrificed 
to achieve the other (Reichert, 2018; Townsend & Hart, 2008; Wry & Zhao, 2018). 
Management studies have confirmed the existence of trade-offs between social and 
financial goals (e.g., Hermes & Lensink, 2011; Hermes, Lensink, & Meesters, 2011). 
Wry and Zhao (2018) show that these trade-offs are context-contingent, being moderated 
by institutional factors such as market conditions and inter-group discrimination. 
Sometimes, social and financial outcomes reinforce each other (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, 
& Model, 2015; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Overall, hybridity is a source of both 
legitimacy and tensions (Doherty et al., 2014).  
Tensions are a unifying characteristic of social enterprises (Battilana et al., 2015; Smith 
et al., 2013). These tensions manifest in several aspects of these organizations, ranging 
from governance, human resource practices, performance assessments, among others. 
Building on the paradox literature (Smith & Lewis, 2011), Smith et al. (2013) identify 
four categories of tensions in social enterprises: performing, belonging, organizing and 
learning tensions.  
Performing tensions are linked to the pursuit of divergent goals, the use of qualitative 
non-standard performance metrics, and the need to address inconsistent demands of 
multiple stakeholders. Assessing success across conflicting goals is challenging 
especially when progress in one may result in a failure in the other (Smith et al., 2013). 
Moreover, when tracking performances with competing metrics managers may—
advertently or inadvertently—emphasizes one aspect over the other. According to the 
authors, economic goals dominate when there is a preference for unambiguous 
quantifiable metrics, while social goals dominate when the social entrepreneur shows 
strong passion and commitment to long-term social impact.  
The belonging tensions concern the identity of social enterprises. It a question of “who 
we are”, “what we do” and “what we stand for” (Smith et al., 2013). Because social 
enterprises are hybrids, their organization identity is complicated (Wry & York, 2017). 
Are they “social organizations” or “business ventures”? Managers typically struggle to 
create a common organization identity that balances their plural logics (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010). Belonging tensions manifest when articulating organizational identity to 
and managing relationships with both internal and external stakeholders. Internally, 
employees may distinctively identify with social or business logics depending on their 
backgrounds and previous experiences, thus creating sub-groups and fault lines within 
the organization (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The critical issue here is whether social 
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enterprises should hire people from the social or business sector. External stakeholders 
such as donors align with social welfare logics whiles others, such as commercial 
investors, align with business logics.  
The third type of tensions comes from competing organizational designs and processes 
(Smith et al., 2013; Smith & Lewis, 2011). It involves the choice of a legal form, an 
organizational structure, and routine practices. Regulatory systems for social enterprises 
vary across the globe, therefore the extent of complexity may depend on the country of 
origin (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Kerlin, 2006). While non-profit organizations adopt 
organizational structures that permit participatory governance, regular firms adopt 
structures that are associated with non-participatory governance. The question is whether 
and how social enterprises should create organizational structures that align with one of 
these polar structures or integrate elements of both. 
Lastly, the learning tensions are associated with balancing hybridity across different time 
horizons. Whereas profits are easily measured in the short term, social outcomes are better 
assessed in the long term. Therefore, short term financial goals can conflict with long 
term social goals, thereby resulting in contradictory predictions for strategic action. 
Learning tensions occur specifically during growth and scaling. Smith et al. (2013) argue 
that while social enterprises embark on growth strategies to enjoy scale economies and 
increase social impact, same strategies erode the mechanisms that sustain social mission 
and trigger mission drift. 
2. Three perspectives  
This thesis makes empirical contributions to the understanding of social enterprises and 
their hybridity. These contributions to the literature are documented from three different 
but interrelated perspectives: performance assessment, subsidization, and 
internationalization. Though these perspectives are part of the basic fabric of social 
enterprises, several underlying mechanisms such as diversity and the influence of 
institutional logics are not sufficiently theorized (Beisland, Djan, Mersland, & Randøy, 
2020; Cull et al., 2018; Seelos & Mair, 2005; Zahra et al., 2009). Yet such theorization is 
a needed basis for a broader understanding of social enterprises, their hybridity and how 
they couple logics (Doherty et al., 2014).  Before elaborating on the four studies that 
comprise the dissertation, I reflect on each of the three perspectives.  
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2.1 Performance assessment  
As established earlier, social enterprises must account for both social and financial value 
creation, because of their hybridity. Monitoring and measuring financial success are less 
problematic as metrics (e.g., returns on assets or returns on sales) are well developed, 
more specific, standardized across industries and are primarily used by shareholders and 
other investors who represent a narrower stakeholder group (Smith et al., 2013). Social 
performance assessment on the other hand is more complicated, involving ambiguous 
and less convergent measures (Mair & Marti, 2006). The complexity is further 
exacerbated by the diverse nature of the social enterprise universe as boundaries of 
“social” are hard to define (Seelos & Mair, 2005). Thus, measures for assessing social 
outcomes in one social enterprise may not apply to another if they are involved in 
heterogenous interventions. Even for social enterprises belonging to the same industry, 
specific social interventions pursued by individual organizations can vary. For example, 
in the microfinance industry, some individual organizations may target women while 
others target rural dwellers.  
The challenge of assessing the social performance of social enterprises is also due to the 
presence of multiple stakeholders, e.g., funders, communities, beneficiaries, family 
members and employees, whose expectations may diverge (Doherty et al., 2014). For 
example, a microfinance organization that seeks to empower women may not be 
exclusively assessed on the basis of number of women reached but also on enhancement 
of women’s social status, subjective family wellbeing and income stability (Garikipati, 
2008; Kabeer, 2001). Similarly, the social success of a work integration social enterprise 
may go beyond the number of disadvantaged people employed to include other subjective 
measures such as the self-esteem of those individuals employed (Doherty et al., 2014; 
Smith et al., 2013). These conflicting demands originating from diverse objectives, 
metrics and stakeholder expectations, are what Smith et al. (2013) termed “performing 
tensions”.  
In an effort to understand the coexistence of multiple goals and logics, several studies 
have theorized about tensions and the social performance of social enterprises, including 
how tensions could trigger “mission drift” which is a situation where the dominance of 
economic logic pressure pro-social organizations to move away from their social mission 
(Hudon & Sandberg, 2013). Yet, the underlying social mission diversity that drives these 
outcomes is less theorized and seldom accommodated in existing frameworks, thereby 
resulting in an implicit assumption of a unified social mission, logics and practices across 
organizations. Recent studies have begun to challenge this approach by viewing a social 
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enterprise or a certain homogenous set of social enterprises as a unique institutional 
arrangement where logics and identity vary (Cetindamar & Ozkazanc‐Pan, 2017; 
Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020). Arguably, this approach recognizes and accounts for 
diversity among social enterprises and circumvents normative judgements (Santos, 
2012).  
The first and third chapters of the thesis contribute to understanding the social "lever" of 
social enterprises' hybridity by addressing questions that offer nuanced perspectives. 
Indeed, an objective definition and measurement of "social" is difficult (Beisland et al., 
2020; Seelos & Mair, 2005) and has been at the centre of recent scholarly debates (Grimes 
et al., 2019; Grimes et al., 2020; Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020). Rather than taking a 
unified stance, these two chapters theorize social missions and outcomes and make 
empirical contributions by adopting a variegated perspective which underpins diversity, 
contextual contingencies and plurality of logics and values (Drori, Manos, Santacreu-
Vasut, & Shoham, 2019; Wry & Zhao, 2018). We stress that to understand social 
enterprises and hybridity as their central characteristic, a fine-grained conceptualization 
of their social mission and outcomes is needed.  
2.2 Subsidization 
Hybridity confers legitimacy on social enterprises to attract funding from both 
commercial and non-commercial sources (Doherty et al., 2014). Thus, social enterprises 
construct a financing architecture which consist of equity, commercial debt, public and 
private donations, concessionary loans and internal reserves. To attract external 
resources, social enterprises, leverage their social embeddedness (Kent & Dacin, 2013) 
and maintain stronger ties and engagements with their key stakeholders (such as 
campaigners, charities and customers) (Mair & Marti, 2006). Managing divergent 
expectations of funders is challenging. For instance, the influx of commercial funds 
elevates the market logic in social enterprises and can have disruptive effects on hybridity 
by inadvertently displacing social ideals (Kent & Dacin, 2013). Managers are confronted 
with the tough task of managing the incoherent demands and expectations of pro-social 
and commercial funders.  Yet, Teasdale (2010) claims that SEs exploit organizational 
impression management to balance expectations of resource providers, while resisting 
coercive pressures.  
At early stages, most social enterprises rely on donor funds due to low internal reserves 
and sustainability challenges. Nonetheless, because social outreach is costly, subsidies 
are indispensable for the continuous operation of many of these organizations 
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(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Consistent with this argument, recent studies show that 
subsidies, such as soft loans and donations, are pervasive in social enterprises, regardless 
of their legal form (Cull et al., 2018). Usually, subsidies come from international donor 
agencies, foundations and philanthropic organizations. The rise of social investment 
funds has increased financing opportunities for social enterprises. These funds attract 
investors who are willing to accept below-market rate returns in exchange for the 
opportunity to invest in a social cause (Nicholls, 2010). Yet this market for altruism is 
more dynamic as the fund allocation decisions of the players―private, public, 
foundations and societies―involve a complex blend of logics that are inspired by cultural 
norms and institutional factors, personal values and expected returns (Dorfleitner et al., 
2012; Henderson & Malani, 2009; Nicholls & Emerson, 2015). Subsidy providers 
employ a wide range of instruments, including concessionary loans, donations, 
guarantees, government grants and corporate intangibles (Henderson & Malani, 2009; 
Hudon, Reichert, & Szafarz, 2018). Typically, donors―both public and public―adhere 
to a development or social welfare logic unlike commercial funders who adhere to a 
financial logic (Cobb et al., 2016; Kent & Dacin, 2013). Yet, in the face of uncertainties, 
the practices motivated by the logics adhered to by commercial and non-commercial 
funders tend to converge (Cobb et al., 2016).  
The design and deployment of funding instruments does not only influence the financing 
architecture of recipient social enterprises, but also the blend of logics in these 
organizations and particularly how they balance their social and financial objectives. This 
is a core subject of the crowding-in and crowding-out literature (Andreoni, 1993; Eckel, 
Grossman, & Johnston, 2005). To illustrate, the influx of subsidies from public donors 
can crowd-out (i.e., displace) private donations and equally crowd-in (i.e., attract) 
commercial capital (e.g., equity) and additional donor funds (Hudon et al., 2018; 
Morduch, 2006). Consequently, the logics with which social enterprises operate evolve 
in response to the composition of their key stakeholders such as funders (Kent & Dacin, 
2013). For social enterprises, subsidies seem to moderate the trade-off between their 
social and financial objectives as extensive social outreach is onerous without donor 
support. In fact, in the absence of subsidies, many organizations would be at the risk of 
mission drift as they force to finance their operations entirely from generated profits and 
commercial funds (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; D’Espallier et al., 2017b). Though 
studies have examined the provision of subsidies to social enterprises in relation to 
efficiency, performance and business model (e.g., Cull et al., 2018; Hudon & Traca, 
2011), little is known on the determinants of the giving decision of subsidy providers. 
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The second chapter of this thesis contributes to filling this knowledge gap from a 
governance perspective.  
2.3 Internationalization 
The internationalization of social enterprises is a new topic of scholarly interest (Zahra et 
al., 2009) as evidenced by the forthcoming special issue of the Journal of World 
Business.2 Social enterprises are community-embedded organisations, deeply rooted in 
their political, socio-economic and cultural contexts (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Mair 
& Marti, 2006). This contribute to the sector’s diversity. For example, the social 
enterprise concept differs between one side of the Atlantic and the other side (Kerlin, 
2006). In Europe, the definition of social enterprise reflects the cooperative tradition by 
emphasizing democratic governance and social purpose whereas in the USA, the 
definition is broader, embracing a wide range of social organizations involved in earned 
income generating ventures (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Kerlin, 2006).  
Recent developments in the literature relate to the rise in cross-border activities (Wang, 
Alon, & Kimble, 2015; Xing, Liu, & Lattemann, 2018). International social enterprises 
engage in the delivery of products and services beyond their national borders (Zahra et 
al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2009). Internationalization in the sector also takes other forms, 
including support-based partnerships with foreign organizations, personnel and 
knowledge transfer, foreign funding as well as the spread of social intervention 
programmes from one country to other countries across the globe through replication 
mechanisms (Drori et al., 2019; Golesorkhi et al., 2019a; Golesorkhi et al., 2019b).  
The internationalization of social enterprises can be incremental. For example, the 
German social enterprise Dialogue in the Dark extended its operations to China through 
social franchising, and it is now present in several countries (Wang et al., 2015). The 
process may also be rapid, such as in the case of the Florida-based Lifenet International 
organization, which provides 150 health centres for poor people in East Africa 
(https://www.lninternational.org/). Social enterprises are also exposed to international 
influences (Mersland et al., 2011) through international board directorship, international 
network membership, international initiation, and international funding. Tukamushaba et 
al. (2011) and Zahra et al. (2009) conceptualize international social enterprises.  
 




Being hybrid organizations, the internationalization of social enterprises is not 
straightforward and may involve several considerations. From a macro standpoint, not all 
countries offer the potential to achieve their hybridity. Thus, while some are more socially 
attractive because of the prevalence of societal challenges, others are only financially 
attractive because of their safe investment climate (Edwards & Hulme, 1996; Aidt, Dutta, 
& Sena, 2008; Verbeke & Kano, 2013). As with other trade-off situations, striking a 
balance between countries for investment purposes would be challenging. Moreover, 
social issues are often context specific, and may require tailored offerings that are adapted 
to local norms (Drori et al., 2019). Additionally, the nature of internationalization and the 
extent of resource commitment may require varied degrees of community embeddedness, 
stakeholder engagement and the need to obtain local resources such as socially motivated 
employees (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011). This process is complex and costly due to 
the liabilities of being foreign (see, Zaheer, 1995) and may consequently weaken the 
ability of social enterprises to straddle social and financial goals. For example, in 
developing a legitimizing account of their operations to foreign stakeholders, social 
enterprises may disproportionately draw on only one of their dual logics (Kent & Dacin, 
2013; Smith et al., 2013).  
The internationalization of social enterprises is an incipient phenomenon and the hybrid 
literature is yet to cover many of the complexities that come with it. The third and fourth 
chapters of this thesis contribute to the nascent literature by addressing questing relating 
to how hybridity as a central characteristic of social enterprises impact targeting strategy 
and foreign location selection decisions.  
3. Microfinance 
Our four empirical studies are carried out using data from the microfinance industry. 
Microfinance involves the provision of financial and non-financial services to people who 
lack access to formal banking services. From a small beginning in the 1970s (Morduch, 
1999), the microfinance has grown into a global industry reaching over 211 million 
borrowers (World Bank, 2015). Organizations in this industry are well suited for studying 
social enterprises. First, microfinance organizations (MFOs) are typical social enterprises 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010), which combine the logics of formal banks and the social 
orientation of serving poor people,3 empowering women and financially including rural 
 
3 Millions of people across the globe are stuck in poverty due to lack of access to financial services. Most poor 
people are either under-served or entirely neglected by the formal banking sector. The World Bank's estimates 
show that over 75% of the world's poor are unbanked (World Bank, 2012). Microfinance aims to lift such people 
out of poverty by giving them access to banking services. 
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areas (Kent & Dacin, 2013). Some MFOs complement their financial services with non-
financial services, e.g., financial education and business development services, that are 
meant to empower and develop their clients in a holistic sense (Lensink, Mersland, Vu, 
& Zamore, 2018). The importance of these organizations is evidenced by the United 
Nations’ declaration of 2005 as the year of microcredit and the award of the Nobel peace 
prize to Grameen Bank and its founder, Muhammad Yunus.  
Second, MFOs constitute a group of fairly homogenous social enterprises, which is 
valuable for empirical investigation. Though individual organizations may differ in terms 
of age, size and founder characteristics, they are commonly identified under the 
overarching goal of delivering financial services to disadvantaged people (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010). Their global spread allows researchers to study a large number of social 
enterprises that have a common business model and hence common bottom lines. At the 
same time, there is diversity among MFOs’ missions: while some promote women’s 
empowerment, others target rural dwellers. Likewise, not all MFOs offer “plus” services. 
This diversity offers opportunities for drawing insights that can be generalizable to social 
enterprises. 
The microfinance literature is well developed, offering a rich theoretical outlook to study 
social enterprises. Importantly, the literature has developed an array of metrics for 
assessing social and financial performances of MFOs (D’Espallier & Goedecke, 2019; 
Hermes & Hudon, 2018). 
4. Overview of the chapters 
This thesis aims to add to our understanding of social enterprises from three interrelated 
perspectives: performance assessment, subsidization and internationalization. It 
comprises four papers, each one includes an empirical analysis.  
This first paper, forthcoming in the Journal of Business Venturing Insight, is titled “Do 
Social Enterprises Walk the Talk? Assessing Microfinance Performances with Mission 
Statements” (co-authors: Roy Mersland and Ariane Szafarz) examines whether social 
enterprises stick to the actual mission enshrined in their mission statements by analyzing 
the coherence between their stated mission(s) and social performance. In contrast to 
studies that assume that all MFOs have the same bottom lines, we assess social 
performance of MFOs based on their own stated social mission(s). Our original dataset 
comprises mission statements, social performance indicators, and other organizational 
variables retrieved from the reports of three microfinance rating agencies. We use content 
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analysis performed on mission statements to identify whether MFOs state any of the 
following three standard microfinance social missions: poverty alleviation, women’s 
empowerment and rural financial inclusion. Next, we use one-way analysis of variance 
and regression techniques to match stated missions with corresponding outcome 
variables. The results show a strong coherence between mission and practices, suggesting 
that MFOs tend to fulfil their own stated missions. Specifically, we find that MFOs that 
state a poverty alleviation mission give out smaller loan amounts, serve higher number of 
credit clients and often use group-based lending methods. Those that state a women’s 
empowerment mission have larger share of women among their clients and those that 
state rural mission have more rural clients and are more likely to offer agricultural loans. 
We contend that the findings underlining the diversity among social enterprises should 
be taken seriously in the conceptualization of mission, social performance, and related 
concepts such as mission drift. 
The second paper is titled “Donations, Subsidized loans, and the Governance of Social 
Enterprises” (co-authors: Marek Hudon and Ariane Szafarz), and it investigates the effect 
of corporate governance on the subsidization of social enterprises. The accounting 
literature is our theoretical lens (Harris, Petrovits, & Yetman, 2015; Kitching, 2009; 
Aggarwal, Evans, & Nanda, 2012) and we depart from previous studies in two ways. 
First, we use data on social enterprises rather than non-profits, which is still an 
unchartered territory. Second, we differentiate two major sources of subsidy: donations 
and concessionary loans. Our methodology inspired by Harris et al. (2015) proceeds in 
two steps. First, we employ an exploratory factor analysis technique to summarize 14 
governance variables into five governance dimensions. Next, we use regressions where 
we explain the level of donations and concessionary loans with the five governance 
dimensions. The findings show a positive association between four of the five governance 
dimensions and the level of concessionary loans received by MFOs. In contrast, donations 
are insensitive to the tested governance dimensions, which suggests that donors are 
motivated by other factors than governance, such as social performance. For 
concessionary loan providers, corporate governance may provide cues regarding loan 
repayment. 
The third paper is titled “Gender Discrimination and Lending to Women: The Moderating 
Effect of International founder.” In line with studies exploring how internationalization 
intertwines with societal norms (Drori et al., 2019), we investigate the influence of gender 
discrimination on the women outreach performance of MFOs and tests the moderating 
effect of international founder. In doing so, we revisit the subject of social mission and 
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associated outcomes and investigate the effect of institutional mechanisms. Our MFO 
level data are obtained from both social and institutional microfinance rating reports 
while country level data is obtained from the databases of the World Bank and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The results show that 
outreach to women is lower in countries where women face much discrimination. 
Moreover, gender discrimination interacts with international founder to increase outreach 
to women. These findings suggest that discriminatory societal norms paradoxically 
militate against MFOs’ redress efforts. The findings also highlight the role of 
international actors in driving the women focus in microfinance. 
The fourth paper titled “A Hybrid Approach to International Market Selection: The Case 
of Impact Investing Organizations” (co-authors: Roy Mersland and Amila Buddhika 
Sirisena) is forthcoming in the International Business Review. Though there is increase 
in cross-border operations among social enterprises, little is known about where these 
organizations go and how they choose their markets. As a response, this paper examines 
the international market selection decision of social enterprises based on host countries’ 
macroeconomic conditions. We use data from 41 impact investing organizations listed in 
the 2013 directory European Microfinance Platform as well macroeconomic data on 153 
developing countries. Based on previous literature, we hypothesize that social enterprises, 
in our case impact investing organizations, are likely to expand into countries where they 
have the opportunity to balance the competing demands of their dual institutional logics. 
Supporting this hypothesis, the results suggest that impact investing organizations operate 
in foreign countries that offer a desirable balance between social and financial outcomes. 
Thus, the international market selection of social enterprises is tied to their hybridity, the 
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Do Social Enterprises Walk the Talk? Assessing Microfinance 
Performances with Mission Statements4 
 
Abstract 
We study mission drift in social enterprises by examining whether these organizations 
stick to the actual mission enshrined in their mission statements. We use data from 
microfinance organizations (MFOs), a homogeneous group of social enterprises which 
have been scrutinized—and sometimes criticized—for mission drift. We focus on three 
publicly recognized and non-mutually-exclusive microfinance social missions identified 
by previous studies: poverty alleviation, women's empowerment, and rural financial 
inclusion. Based on hand-collected data from 199 MFOs worldwide, our results suggest 
strong coherence between social missions and actual practices. Hence, we argue that, with 
respect to MFOs’ own stated social missions, mission drift is no serious concern. The 
trustworthiness of social mission statements makes them suitable evaluation tools for 
social enterprises.  
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Social enterprises (or hybrid organizations) couple logics from conventional business and 
social welfare (Pache & Santos, 2013; Stevens et al., 2015; Zahra et al., 2009). Recently, 
scholars have raised concerns that social enterprises can experience “mission drift” by 
losing sight of their social mission in pursuit of financial sustainability or profit 
(Cetindamar & Ozkazanc‐Pan, 2017; Ramus & Vaccaro, 2017). Mission drift poses a 
severe risk to the fulfillment of social enterprises’ raison d’être of creating social value 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014). In this paper, we focus on a unique and relatively homogeneous 
set of social enterprises: microfinance organizations (MFOs) (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
MFOs seek to pursue developmental goals by providing financial services to poor and 
marginalized populations (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Morduch, 1999). The 
microfinance industry provides an interesting setting for examining mission drift in social 
enterprises.  
The topic of microfinance mission drift is still controversial. It can be understood in two 
ways. The first is when MFOs diverge from desired social outcomes over time. They 
become increasingly commercial and serve less-poor clients (Augsburg & Fouillet, 2010; 
Hermes et al., 2011). 5  Previous studies tackle microfinance mission drift from this 
standpoint (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 2007; Copestake, 2007; D’Espallier et 
al., 2017a; Beisland et al., 2018). The second interpretation of mission drift is when MFOs 
deviate from their own stated mission(s). This bottom-up approach is new to the 
microfinance literature and has the merit of being aligned with the literature on mission 
drift in social enterprises (Cetindamar & Ozkazanc‐Pan, 2017). Thus, contrary to the 
frequent assumption that all MFOs pursue the same mission(s), we argue that inquiry into 
mission drift starts with an examination of what MFOs themselves advertise as their main 
mission and continues with an examination of whether MFOs “walk the talk.” 
Accordingly, we test for the occurrence of microfinance mission drift by comparing the 
content of the mission statements of MFOs with their actual social performances. 
Evidence abounds on the diversity of MFO characteristics, including size, location, 
clientele, products, and legal status. This paper argues that the one-mission-fits-all 
approach to mission drift is unsuitable for MFOs. Like other social enterprises (Bagnoli 
& Megali, 2011; Kaplan, 2001), MFOs should be judged by their accomplishments of 
 
5 It is commonly argued that commercialization infuses market logics and projects’ economic rationales and 
subsequently break down the social ethos by which MFOs operate (Kent & Dacin, 2013). This argument is tied 
to the conflicting relationship between social enterprises’ social and financial objectives (Gamble, 2018; Peredo 
& McLean, 2006; Wry & Zhao, 2018). Other studies, however, contend that commercialization is compatible with 
the social mandate of MFOs (Mersland & Strøm, 2010). This standpoint supposes that the objective of reaching 
financially excluded people is constant over time (Schreiner, 2002). 
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their mission(s) as mentioned in their mission statements. This approach to mission drift 
acknowledges that MFOs pursue social objectives for which they have the resources and 
strategic competence (Roberts, 2013; Bart & Baetz, 1998).  
A mission statement defines the purpose of an organization. It represents the most 
symbolic enunciation of organizations’ raison d’être, as it “distinguishes one organization 
from other similar enterprises” (David, 1989, p. 90). As such, it is an important tool for 
targeting a market, planning, setting financial priorities, and assigning tasks (Moss et al., 
2011; Palmer & Short, 2008). Mission statements drive organizational processes and 
outcomes, including strategy (Bart, 1997), performance (Bartkus et al., 2006; Bart & 
Baetz, 1998), stakeholder management (Bartkus & Glassman, 2008), and corporate ethos 
and identity (Williams, 2008). Although Armendariz and Szafarz (2011) provide some 
examples of missions claimed by MFOs, microfinance mission statements are still largely 
uncharted both in the social-enterprise literature and in the microfinance literature. To 
address the topic, we rely on the assumption that, like other organizations, MFOs craft 
their mission statements to reflect what they consider important principles to guide their 
actions (Peyrefitte & David, 2006). Thus, we assert that an MFO is at risk of mission drift 
if it significantly deviates from its stated social purpose in its mission statement. On the 
other hand, we assert that if an MFO remains loyal to its stated social mission(s) it cannot 
be justifiably accused of mission drift. By the same token, we refrain from criticizing 
MFOs for not doing something they did not set out to do.  
We use a cross-country dataset comprised of 199 MFOs from 59 developing countries. 
Based on standard procedures, the content analysis of the mission statements focuses on 
the three social missions most commonly reported in the microfinance literature 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; D’Espallier et al., 2013b; Gutierrez-Nieto & Serrano-
Cinca, 2018): poverty alleviation, women’s empowerment, and rural financial inclusion. 
We gain statistical robustness by matching—when feasible—a single mission to multiple 
outcome variables, which leads us to estimate six models. The results show a significant 
coherence between what MFOs say in their mission statements and what they do in 
practice, suggesting that the social missions of MFOs are trustworthy. This is good news 
for donors and subsidy providers. Our findings dispel existing fears of mission drift in 
MFOs. From a methodological perspective, this study broadens the existing theoretical 
framework on microfinance mission drift.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data, methodology, and 
hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the empirical findings and Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Data, Methods, and Hypotheses 
We benefited from access to original data on MFO social ratings supplied by specialized 
rating agencies: MicroRate, Microfinanza, and Planet Rating. These independent 
agencies offer MFOs an opportunity to undergo an assessment of their social performance 
management. While data from rating agencies may not perfectly represent the whole 
microfinance industry, they do provide a fairly representative picture of the larger players 
in the field (D’Espallier et al., 2013a; Mersland & Strøm, 2009). In contrast to other 
sources of self-reported microfinance data (e.g., MIX Market), rating agencies release 
data audited by third parties (Mersland et al., 2011; Hudon & Traca, 2011).  
Our unique dataset covers 199 MFOs from 59 countries. The mission statements were 
taken from 2007–2014 rating reports with about 84% of them relating to 2008–2011. All 
performance and control variables relate to this eight-year period. We focus on the 
fulfillment of the three most commonly claimed microfinance missions: poverty 
alleviation, women’s empowerment, and rural financial inclusion (Armendáriz & 
Morduch, 2010; Gutierrez-Nieto & Serrano-Cinca, 2018). Figure 1 shows the standard 
proxies used in the literature to test the fulfillment of these missions, and so provides the 
hypothesized relationship between the missions contained in the mission statements and 































The first column of Figure 1 lists the social missions: poverty alleviation, women’s 
empowerment, and rural financial inclusion. The second column of Figure 1 shows the 
associated proxies, and the third column cites previous studies that use these proxies. 
Poverty alleviation is typically assessed by average loan size (scaled by GNI per capita), 
number of credit clients, and group-based lending methods. Average loan size is 
commonly used by scholars and donors to approximate clients’ poverty levels, also 
known as the depth of outreach (Xu et al., 2016; D’Espallier et al., 2017b).6 The number 
of active credit clients is a proxy for the breadth of outreach of MFOs (Schreiner, 2002; 
Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). The last proxy for poverty alleviation is the use of group-
based lending methods (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Using these 
variables, we hypothesize that: 
 
6 Even though a small average loan size might be driven by specific lending practices such as cross-subsidization 
and progressive lending (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011), it is still a standard measure of the social performance 
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Hypothesis 1: MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to 
alleviate poverty if they give out smaller average loans, have a higher number of 
credit clients, and are more likely to adopt group-based lending methods, 
compared to their counterparts without this mission.  
The next social mission of interest is women’s empowerment, which is accomplished by 
giving priority to female borrowers. The percentage of females in the MFO’s clientele is 
the corresponding proxy (Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015; Hermes et al., 2011). We therefore 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to 
empower women if they serve a higher percentage of females, compared to their 
counterparts without this mission.  
The third social mission is rural financial inclusion. The literature supplies two 
measurable proxies for this orientation: the percentage of rural clients and the supply of 
agricultural loans (Mersland et al., 2011; Hishigsuren, 2007). Since most rural people rely 
on agricultural activities for livelihood (Berhane & Gardebroek, 2011), agricultural loans 
are more likely targeted at rural people (Hishigsuren, 2007). We therefore hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 3: MFOs do not deviate from their mission statement claiming to 
foster rural financial inclusion if they have a higher percentage of rural clients 
and are more likely to offer agricultural loans, compared to their counterparts 
without this mission.  
To analyze the MFOs’ mission statements, we followed the standard content analysis 
procedures used in previous studies (Williams, 2008; David, 1989; Pearce & David, 
1987). Content analysis involves the use of systematic qualitative procedures for making 
inferences from a given text by identifying specific characteristics. Extant studies apply 
content analysis to mission statements to draw inferences on corporate identity (Moss et 
al., 2011; Williams, 2008; Leuthesser & Kohli, 1997), stakeholder management (Bartkus 
& Glassman, 2008), and strategy (Bart, 1997). Other studies such as David (1989), Pearce 
and David (1987), and Williams (2008) rely on content analysis methods to determine 
whether mission statements exhibit characteristics of certain key components (e.g., 
products and services). Their coding technique involves assigning a value of “1” if the 
mission statement demonstrates a given component and a value of “0” otherwise. We 
followed a similar methodology. Each mission statement was independently read and 
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classified by two human coders who are microfinance experts. The two experts evaluated 
the mission statements to assess if they were aligned with any of the three microfinance 
missions. We employed Cohen’s kappa (Landis & Koch, 1977) to assess inter-coder 
reliability. Since we were dealing with three missions, we inferred inter-coder reliability 
by calculating a pooled kappa instead of simply averaging the individual kappas. 





where ?̅?O is the average observed agreement between the independent coders for all 
missions and ?̅?E is the average agreement expected by chance. The observed pooled 
kappa was 0.7125 (p<0.01), indicating significant nonrandom agreement between the 
coders and hence the coding was reliable for valid inferences (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
After this procedure, the coders conferred about the incongruities and resolved them 
together. 
 
Figure 2: Share of MFOs that State Each of the Social Missions in Their Mission Statements  
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of MFOs that subscribe to each of the social missions or none at 







































Table 1: Breakdown of the Mission Statement Components  
Missions Percentage of MFOs Subtotal (%) 
One mission only   
Poverty 23.6  
Women 6.0  
Rural 12.1 41.7 
Two missions    
Poverty + Women 10.1  
Poverty + Rural 7.0  
Women + Rural 2.5 19.6 
All Three missions   
Poverty + Women + Rural 3.0 3.0 
No social Mission 35.7 35.7 
Grand total  100.0 100.0 
 
The content analysis shows that 43.7% of the MFOs claim to alleviate poverty, 21.6% 
claim to focus on women, and 24.6% claim to have a rural mission (see Figure 2). Overall, 
64.3% of the mission statements mention at least one of these social missions. Table 1 
shows how different missions coexist in the same MFOs: 41.7% of the MFOs state a 
single mission, 19.6% state two missions, and 3% state all three social missions. A 
strikingly high number (35.7%) of the mission statements are silent about the three social 
missions. 7  These findings alone are of interest, particularly with respect to the 
microfinance literature, which typically measures social performance―and subsequently 
identifies mission drift―based on whether MFOs are strong in reaching out to female 
and rural customers. In fact, our results show that most MFOs do not give priority to these 
customer groups.  
3. Empirical Results 
To assess the coherence between mission statements and actual practices of MFOs we 
proceed in two steps. First, we run a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare 
the social performances of the MFOs stating a given mission simultaneously to their 
counterparts with either other social missions or with none of them. Second, we use either 
a linear or a probit regression model depending on the nature of the explained variable. 
The idea is to check whether mission statements explain the ex-post performances 
proxied by the outcome variables reported in Figure 1, while controlling for the 
characteristics of MFOs that may influence social outcomes in MFOs, including age, size, 
 
7 The mission statements that exclude the three social missions tend to focus on the type of product and service 
they offer and their target geographical market. Here is an example of such statement: “Our mission is to mobilize 
resources to maximize value by offering services, product and solutions appropriate to the market and to pioneer 
credit technology appropriate to Mozambican entrepreneurs.” 
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portfolio-at-risk, legal status, regulatory regime, and region (Hartarska, 2005; Mersland 
et al., 2011; Zhao & Wry, 2016). We also account for the language in which the mission 




Table 2: Definition of Variables and Summary Statistics      
Variable Definition  Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Independent variables: Social missions      
Poverty alleviation 1 if the MFO has a poverty alleviation mission and 0 otherwise 199 0.437 0.497 0 1 
Women’s empowerment 1 if female focus is expressed in mission statement and 0 otherwise 199 0.216 0.413 0 1 
Rural financial inclusion 1 if MFO has a rural mission and 0 otherwise 199 0.246 0.432 0 1 
No social mission 1 if the MFO states none of the above missions and 0 otherwise 199 0.357 0.480 0 1 
Dependent variables: Outcomes      
Avg. loan to GNI/capita Average loan size relative to GNI per capita (PPP adjusted)  196 0.221 0.306 0.011 2.147 
# Credit clients Total number of active credit clients 198 35739 57303.52 500 352592 
Group-based lending 1 if group lending or village banking and 0 otherwise 198 0.717 0.452 0 1 
Female clients (%) Percentage of female clients 165 0.643 0.232 0.175 1 
Rural clients (%) Percentage of rural clients 151 0.494 0.317 0 1 
Agric. Loan 1 if the MFO offers agricultural loans and 0 otherwise 187 0.642 0.481 0 1 
Control variables       
Age Age since MFO began microfinance activities 199     14.471 7.968 1          47 
Size Logarithm of total assets 199 16.215 1.290 12.736 19.438 
PaR30 Proportion of gross loan portfolio that is overdue for 30 days or more 199 0.052 0.068 0 0.528 
SHF 1 if MFO is shareholder-owned and 0 otherwise 199 0.417 0.494 0 1 
NGO 1 if MFO is a nongovernmental organization and 0 otherwise 199 0.432 0.496 0 1 
COOP 1 if MFO is a member-based cooperative and 0 otherwise 199 0.151 0.359 0 1 
Regulation 1 if regulated by banking authorities and 0 otherwise 199 0.432 0.497 0 1 
LAC 1 if in Latin America and Caribbean and 0 otherwise 199 0.397 0.491 0 1 
SSA 1 if in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise 199 0.246 0.432 0 1 
ECA 1 if in Europe and Central Asia and 0 otherwise 199 0.106 0.308 0 1 
SEAP 1 if in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and 0 otherwise 199 0.186 0.390 0 1 
MENA 1 if in Middle East and North Africa and 0 otherwise 199 0.065 0.248 0 1 
English 1 if mission statement is written in English and 0 otherwise 199 0.437 0.497 0 1 
French 1 if mission statement is written in French and 0 otherwise 199 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Spanish  1 if mission statement is written in Spanish and 0 otherwise 199 0.442 0.498 0 1 
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Tables 3, 4, and 5 provide the ANOVA and regression results for the coherence between 
the proposed missions and the actual practices of MFOs.8 In each table, panel A shows 
the ANOVA results9 and inter-group tests of equal means (Scheffé, 1953; Weerahandi, 
1995) and panel B shows the regression results. In the regressions, the specifications 
denoted by “(a)” include only the tested missions while the “(b)” specifications comprise 
all the possibilities, including the “no social mission” case.  
In panel A of Table 3, the results show that the MFOs that claim to have a poverty 
alleviation mission have a significantly lower average loan size, a higher number of credit 
clients, and a higher propensity to use group-based lending methods―solidarity group 
lending and village banking, than their counterparts that state either other missions or 
none of the three missions. With group-lending, MFOs reach poorer clients than with 
individual lending (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 2007). For all outcome variables, 
MFOs that align with other missions and those that state none of the social missions 
perform similarly. These findings are confirmed by the multivariate regression results 
displayed in panel B. The mission of poverty alleviation is significantly and negatively 
associated with average loan size and is significantly and positively associated with 
number of credit clients and use of group-based lending methods. These results support 











8  Endogeneity arising from reverse causality is not a serious concern in our estimations since the mission 
statements we used predated the performance variables. For each MFO, we only considered performance 
information that related to the (end of the) year of the mission statement and thereafter. According to our checks, 
the mission statements remained unchanged throughout the sample period. 




Table 3: Poverty Alleviation in Mission Statement and Actual Outreach  
Panel A: One-Way ANOVA 
 Multiple comparisons 





















Avg. loan to GNI/cap 0.145 0.285 0.286 6.390*** -0.141** -0.143*** -0.002 
# lnCredit clients 9.979 9.398 9.267 5.983*** 0.581* 0.712*** 0.131 
Group-based lending 0.837 0.585 0.648 5.902*** 0.252** 0.189** -0.063 
 
Panel B: Regressions 












 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Mission statement       
Poverty alleviation -0.101** -0.092** 0.559*** 0.406** 0.194*** 0.249*** 
 (0.047) (0.0469) (0.131) (0.174) (0.067) (0.086) 
Women’s empowerment  0.027  0.205  0.149* 
  (0.043)  (0.140)  (0.077) 
Rural financial inclusion  0.042  -0.155  -0.007 
  (0.041)  (0.163)  (0.092) 
No social mission  0.061  -0.197  0.118 
  (0.069)  (0.219)  (0.107) 
Control variables       
Age 0.001 -0.004 0.007 0.008 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.005) (0.0040) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size 0.015 0.018 0.853*** 0.843*** -0.038 -0.041 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.049) (0.050) (0.028) (0.028) 
PaR30 0.488 0.402 -2.965*** -2.912*** -0.389 -0.292 
 (0.408) (0.400) (1.054) (1.022) (0.517) (0.520) 
NGO 0.003 0.018 -0.130 -0.154 0.010 0.007 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.150) (0.151) (0.097) (0.097) 
COOP 0.149** 0.135* -0.374* -0.449** -0.072 -0.080 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.201) (0.203) (0.134) (0.137) 
Regulation 0.172** 0.152** -0.389** -0.368** -0.108 -0.089 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.178) (0.180) (0.100) (0.098) 
Constant -0.111 -0.126 -4.895*** -4.593*** 2.185 2.064 
 (0.290) (0.297) (0.762) (0.804) (1.497) (1.563) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Model statistics       
Observations 196 196 198 198 198 198 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.204 0.213 0.702 0.709 0.169 0.185 
F/Wald χ2 statistic 4.41 4.27 40.42 33.91 37.78 36.09 
Prob > F/ χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Table 3 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a poverty-alleviation mission really do so in practice. Panel A and panel 
B show one-way ANOVA and regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the definitions of variables. In Panel B, 
specifications (a) and (b) of group-based lending, the reported coefficients are the marginal effects of the probit regressions. 





Table 4: Women’s Empowerment in Mission Statement and Actual Women Outreach 
Panel A: One-Way ANOVA 



























0.805 0.600 0.586 14.473*** 0.205*** 0.219*** 0.014 
 
Panel B: Regressions 
VARIABLES Female clients (%) Female clients (%) 
 (a) (b) 
Mission statement   
Women’s empowerment 0.192*** 0.207*** 
 (0.035) (0.042) 
Poverty alleviation  0.061 
  (0.047) 
Rural financial inclusion  -0.009 
  (0.052) 
No social mission  0.0547 
  (0.058) 
Control variables   
Age -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0022) (0.002) 
Size -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
PaR30 -0.837*** -0.822*** 
 (0.250) (0.245) 
NGO 0.003 -0.002 
 (0.044) (0.046) 
COOP -0.120** -0.117* 
 (0.058) (0.061) 
Regulation -0.067 -0.071 
 (0.049) (0.049) 
Constant 0.551** 0.510** 
 (0.215) (0.224) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes 
Language dummies Yes Yes 
Model statistics    
Observations 165 165 
R2 0.435 0.446 
F statistic 13.92 10.99 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 
Table 4 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a women’s empowerment mission really do so in practice. 
Panel A and panel B show one-way ANOVA and regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the 
definitions of variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 





In Table 4, panel A suggests significant differences between the three groups of MFOs. 
MFOs whose mission statement focuses on women have an impressive 80.5% of females 
in their clientele base. This is 20.5% higher than the share of female clients in MFOs that 
state other missions and 21.9% higher than for MFOs that state no mission. These 
differences are statistically significant at 1%. The figures in panel B confirm the results 
in panel A. The women’s empowerment mission drives an increase in the percentage of 
female clients. A remarkable 19% increase in female clients resists the inclusion of 
control variables, such as geographic dummies, MFO characteristics, and even the other 
mission variables. Altogether, these results suggest that MFOs that claim to target and 
empower women really do so in practice, given their superior women-outreach 
performance. These results validate Hypothesis 2.  
In Table 5, panel A shows that rural-focused MFOs have a significantly higher percentage 
of rural clients in their loan portfolios and are more likely to offer agricultural loans than 
their counterparts with either other missions or none. As much as 59.2% of the clients of 
rural-focused MFOs live in rural areas. Similarly, 83.7% of rural-focused MFOs offer 
agricultural loans, as compared to 61.6% of the MFOs that state other missions and 53% 
of the mission-free ones. Panel B of Table 5 delivers a general picture confirming the 
results in panel A. The mission of rural financial inclusion is positively associated both 
with serving rural clients and with supplying agricultural loans. The results suggest that 
MFOs that claim to target rural populations make every effort to do so. These results 













Table 5: Rural Focus in Mission Statement and Actual Rural Outreach  
Panel A: One-Way ANOVA 
























Rural clients (%) 0.592 0.467 0.444 3.528** 0.143* 0.167** 0.023 
Agricultural loans 0.833 0.616 0.530 5.990*** 0.217** 0.303*** 0.086 
 
Panel B: Regressions 
VARIABLES Rural clients (%) Rural clients (%) Agricultural loans Agricultural loans 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Mission statement     
Rural financial inclusion 0.116** 0.145** 0.249*** 0.294*** 
 (0.057) (0.071) (0.068) (0.113) 
Poverty alleviation  0.112*  -0.049 
  (0.067)  (0.109) 
Women’s empowerment  -0.205***  0.313*** 
  (0.066)  (0.081) 
No social mission  -0.027  0.116 
  (0.092)  (0.139) 
Control variables     
Age 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.005 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size -0.005 -0.0144 0.028 0.032 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.033) 
PaR30 -0.033 -0.269 -0.326 -0.168 
 (0.327) (0.302) (0.505) (0.521) 
NGO 0.095 0.033 0.025 -0.033 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.104) (0.113) 
COOP 0.164* 0.080 -0.019 -0.018 
 (0.091) (0.092) (0.139) (0.143) 
Regulation 0.052 0.042 -0.039 -0.063 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.103) (0.104) 
Constant 0.589 0.689 0.286 -0.313 
 (0.411) (0.434) (1.500) (1.661) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Model statistics     
Observations 151 151 151 187 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.136 0.184 0.136 0.153 
F/Wald χ2 statistic 2.49 0.184 2.49 40.08 
Prob > F/ χ2 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 
Table 5 assesses whether MFOs that claim to have a mission of rural financial inclusion really do so in practice. Panel 
A and panel B show one-way ANOVA and regression results, respectively. See Table 2 for the definition of variables. 
In Panel B, specifications (a) and (b) of agricultural loans, the reported coefficients are the marginal effects of the 
probit regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, 





Overall, the results of the three tables suggest that the actual practices of MFOs mirror 
their stated missions. The estimations of the specifications (b) confer robustness to our 
results. Even though social missions are related since the world’s poor and financially 
excluded populations comprise a majority of women (Agier & Szafarz, 2013; Garikipati 
et al., 2017) as well as a disproportionate share of rural dwellers (Marr, 2012), our results 
show that outcome variables relate directly to their corresponding missions, and less so 
to other missions. There are, however, a few exceptions. First, one proxy for poverty 
alleviation, group-lending, is positively influenced by the women’s empowerment 
mission. Second, the poverty-alleviation mission has a significantly positive impact on 
the percentage of rural clients. Third, women-focused MFOs serve less rural dwellers but 
are likely to offer agricultural loans. 
As Table 1 shows, MFOs actively combine missions. We conduct a further analysis with 
interaction terms to assess whether MFOs can concurrently fulfil dual missions. In the 
new regressions, “no social mission” is the omitted reference variable. The results 
reported in Table 6 suggest that MFOs struggle to excel in expected outcomes when 
pursuing dual social missions. Unexpectedly, the interaction between the missions of 
poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment has a positive impact on average loan 
size. Thus, when MFOs combine these two missions, they may end up serving fewer very 
poor clients. Figure 3 illustrates the interaction effect between poverty alleviation and 
women’s empowerment. In Graph A where the response variable is average loan size, 
MFOs that combine the two missions give out bigger loans than their counterparts do. 
Additionally, Graph B shows that MFOs that combine the two missions reach out to more 
women. Perhaps, there is a trade-off between the two social missions in the sense that 
MFOs focusing on empowering women find it more challenging to reach out to the very 
poor. Serving women is as costly as serving the poorest of the poor (D’Espallier et al., 
2013a; Navajas et al., 2000). To be sustainable, MFOs may be cross-subsidizing between 








Table 6: Combined Missions in Mission Statement and Actual Outreach Performance 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mission statement       
Poverty alleviation -0.171*** 0.607*** 0.571* -0.016 0.179** 0.419 
 (0.063) (0.174) (0.310) (0.045) (0.075) (0.268) 
Women’s empowerment -0.156*** 0.520** 0.476 0.155*** 0.081 -0.472 
 (0.059) (0.239) (0.456) (0.0547) (0.118) (0.472) 
Rural financial inclusion  -0.087 -0.022 -0.658** -0.049 0.200*** 0.732** 
 (0.066) (0.184) (0.309) (0.045) (0.077) (0.347) 
Poverty × Women 0.206*** -0.370 -0.434 0.091 -0.182 0.514 
 (0.073) (0.264) (0.576) (0.073) (0.131) (0.584) 
Poverty × Rural 0.111 -0.015 0.773 0.072 -0.095 0.695 
 (0.080) (0.260) (0.523) (0.077) (0.115) (0.591) 
Women × Rural 0.093 -0.147 0.929 -0.060 -0.190 -0.181 
 (0.101) (0.306) (0.702) (0.095) (0.133) (0.630) 
Control variables       
Age -0.001 0.008 0.048*** -0.001 0.004 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.016) (0.002) (0.004) (0.015) 
Size 0.022 0.840*** -0.128 -0.003 -0.018 0.091 
 (0.020) (0.050) (0.094) (0.014) (0.028) (0.096) 
PaR30 0.547 -2.898*** -0.607 -0.836*** -0.097 -0.532 
 (0.403) (1.043) (1.742) (0.246) (0.315) (1.513) 
NGO 0.019 -0.166 -0.034 0.007 0.051 -0.027 
 (0.048) (0.152) (0.326) (0.046) (0.075) (0.316) 
COOP 0.191** -0.482** -0.396 -0.103* 0.121 0.032 
 (0.081) (0.209) (0.412) (0.061) (0.099) (0.404) 
Constant -0.148 -4.738*** 2.366 0.569** 0.679 0.053 
 (0.292) (0.768) (1.525) (0.219) (0.426) (1.566) 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Language dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics       
Observations 196 198 198 165 151 187 
R-squared 0.231 0.711 0.202 0.454 0.195 0.160 
F/Wald χ2 statistic   3.56 30.32 46.19 10.18 2.92 41.13 
Prob > F/ χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
The regressions assess whether MFOs combining two missions excel in the outcomes relating to the missions. See Table 2 
for the definitions of variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 







Figure 3: Impact of Combined Missions on Poverty Alleviation and on Women’s Empowerment 
Graph A: Average loan size (scaled by GNI per capita) Graph B: Female Clients (%) 
  
 
The coefficients for the interaction terms in the remaining estimations are insignificant 
and have inconsistent signs. Several reasons could account for this. First, subscribing to 
multiple missions could potentially blur the overarching strategic goal of the 
organization. In such a case, the missions may be less useful to garner the commitment 
of organizational members. Secondly, when MFOs multitask by combining missions, 
they may fail to build competence in achieving optimal outcomes in either, thus becoming 
“a jack of all trades but a master of none.” This is more likely to occur when management 
information systems are ill suited to face compelling demands from each of the combined 
missions. 
4. Conclusion  
This study revisits the controversy on mission drift in social enterprises from the novel 
perspective of mission statements. Our bottom-up analysis contributes to the literature by 
dispelling existing fears of mission drift in MFOs (Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Hishigsuren, 
2007; Cull et al., 2007) since our findings suggest a strong coherence between the mission 
statements and the ex-post practices of MFOs. Specifically, we estimate the impacts of 
the three well-recognized social missions of microfinance—poverty alleviation, women’s 
empowerment, and rural financial inclusion—on a collection of outcome variables acting 
as proxies for the fulfilment of a given mission. We obtain uniform consistency between 
each stated mission and its corresponding outcome variable(s). The findings therefore 
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suggest that MFOs strictly observe the social goals they have publicly declared to pursue 
in their mission statements. In short, they “walk the talk.”  
Measuring mission drift is as difficult as measuring social impact (Mair & Marti, 2006). 
But the advantages of using mission statements go beyond the issue of mission 
identification. Perhaps, if policy makers and other stakeholders in the industry would 
eschew unified approaches of “mission” and would focus instead on what MFOs are 
saying in their mission statements, there would be less fear of mission drift than currently 
prevails. This change of attitude through acknowledging that there is increasing diversity 
in the microfinance industry could create a virtuous circle: better-informed stakeholders, 
equipped with trustworthy mission statements, could make wiser decisions—on giving, 
investing, and collaborating—and thereby impose external discipline on MFOs to stick 
with their stated missions.  
Contrary to conventional wisdom, our results show that not all MFOs claim to focus on 
either women or rural people, nor even on poverty alleviation. The low correlations 
between the social missions pinpoint mission heterogeneity. Future studies should 
consider extending our work to other types of social enterprises, such as the Work 
Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) and the Fair Trade Social Enterprises (FTSEs) 
(Battilana et al., 2015; Mason & Doherty, 2016). The universe of social enterprises is 
known to be rife with much complexity. Most social enterprises signal their goals to 
stakeholders by publicizing mission statements. Trustworthy missions are key to 
addressing the informational asymmetries plaguing the socially oriented economic sector. 
Therefore, mission statements of social enterprises are critical for legitimacy and 
accountability purposes. Stakeholders in social enterprises ought to take into account 
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CHAPTER 2:  
Donations, Subsidized Loans, and the Governance of Social 
Enterprises10  
Abstract 
We use data from leading microfinance rating agencies to scrutinize the effect of 
corporate governance on the subsidization of social enterprises. First, exploratory factor 
analysis based on a sample of 250 microfinance organisations (MFOs) identifies five 
major governance dimensions. Next, based on the donor’s demand model, we estimate 
fixed effects generalized least square regressions where we assess whether these 
governance dimensions affect the level of subsidization of MFOs, by differentiating 
between donations and subsidies from concessionary loans. Our results confirm the 
theoretical expectation that the level of subsidies from concessionary loans is positively 
associated with good governance. Surprisingly though, the level of donations is 
insensitive to governance. We suggest interpretations for the facts and open avenues for 
further research on the still little-known philanthropic funding of social enterprises. 
 
Keywords: Subsidies, Donations, Subsidized debt, social enterprises, Governance, 
Microfinance 
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Nonprofits typically publicize their governance mechanisms to signal their commitments 
to transparency and accountability (Harris & Neely, 2018; Maines et al., 2002). By doing 
so, they also attract fresh donations and subsidies. Evidence shows that well-governed 
nonprofits benefit from increased donations (Harris et al., 2015). This paper investigates 
the robustness of the impact of corporate governance on subsidies by focusing on a 
different group of mission-driven organizations, namely social enterprises.  
Social enterprises are hybrid organizations that combine social and financial goals (Pache 
& Santos, 2013; Peredo & McLean, 2006; Zamora, 2012). Typical examples of social 
enterprises include microfinance organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Datar et al., 
2009), work integrating social enterprises (Battilana et al., 2015) and fair-trade social 
enterprises (Mason & Doherty, 2016). Subsidies are a vital component of the financing 
mix of these enterprises (Cull et al., 2018); and in fact, such charitable contributions are 
often indispensable to accomplish their social mission (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). 
The lack of subsidies is suspected to trigger mission drift (Armendariz & Szafarz, 2011, 
D’Espallier et al., 2017b). Yet, the literature is surprisingly scarce on what attracts 
donor’s interest when they compare social enterprises with similar social goals. We fill 
the gap by examining how governance features affect the level of subsidies received by 
social enterprises.  
Social enterprises are located midway between nonprofits and for-profit firms. It is 
therefore worth to examine how governance mechanisms influence the funding of 
capitalistic companies. Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) show that good corporate 
governance enhances both corporate performance and firm value. According to Carter et 
al. (2003), board diversity—representation of women and racial minorities—enhances 
firm value through better understanding of the marketplace, effective problem solving, 
effective corporate leadership and increased innovation and creativity. Al-Akra and Ali 
(2012) document a positive relationship between transparency, i.e. voluntary corporate 
disclosure, and performance. Holt and DeZoort (2009) also show that good governance 
mechanisms, such as board and audit committee independence, can enhance investors’ 
confidence by limiting expected earnings management. In sum, fund providers to 
nonprofits and for-profit firms alike react positively to signals about good governance 
designs. In both cases, corporate governance remedies agency problems stemming from 
information asymmetry between funders and the managers of the organizations they 
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finance (Evans et al., 2010; Dikolli, 2010; Harris & Neely, 2018; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). 
Accordingly, in prosocial organizations, good governance mechanisms assure donors and 
other finance suppliers that resources are used for the intended purpose, especially in 
fulfilling the organization’s social goals (Harris et al., 2015). In well governed 
organizations, the personal goals of managers are aligned with those of the fund providers 
as well as with the mission of the organization they serve, leading to the likelihood that 
commercial funds and subsidies will be used for the intended purpose. Evidence shows a 
positive association between good governance and donations. Extant studies on non-
profits have established this relationship by focusing on governance features such as audit 
quality (Harris et al., 2015; Kitching, 2009), voluntary disclosure (Saxton et al., 2014; 
Blouin et al., 2018), board size (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Olson, 2000), and board 
independence (Harris et al., 2015). In this paper, we extend the argument to social 
enterprises and theorize that well governed social enterprises attract more subsidies than 
their poorly governed counterparts. We argue that governance mechanisms in social 
enterprises are meant to deter managers from wasting, misusing, and diverting donor 
funds and other organizational resources (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Harris et al., 2017). 
Testing this hypothesis is the contribution of this paper. 
We build on two streams of scholarly literature on accounting sciences and social 
entrepreneurship, respectively. The accounting literature pays a special attention to 
corporate governance systems, both internal and external, which contribute to the 
earnings of the providers of funds. Our study is the first to investigate the subsidy-
governance relationship using data from social enterprises. Specifically, we consider 
microfinance Organizations (MFOs) in developing countries, a group of relatively 
homogenous social enterprises (D'Espallier et al., 2013a; Mersland et al., 2011). MFOs 
are established social enterprises, which supply financial services to the unbanked poor 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Battilana & Dorado, 2010). The microfinance industry 
offers a well-suited setting and a good fit to study the subsidy-governance relationship 
due to the pervasiveness of subsidies. About USD 1B of donor subsidy is committed 
annually into microfinance. Cull et al. (2018) show that even commercial MFOs depend 
on subsidies.  
In addition to donations which have been the focus of prior research, the wealth of the 
database we use allows us to investigate separately the effect of governance on donations 
and concessionary loans, also known as subsidized debt. The distinction between the two 
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kinds of subsidies is important. With subsidized debt, the beneficiary organization is 
expected to pay back the principal plus (below-market) interests to the lender. By 
contrast, donors retain no financial interest or stake in the beneficiary organization and, 
in some cases, the relationship between the donor and beneficiary ends after the donation 
is made. Thus, in the case of subsidized loans, the lender retains formal financial stake in 
the recipient organization and has more incentives to care about governance than donors.  
Empirically, governance is multifaceted concept. To grasp its complexity, we follow the 
methodology used by Harris et al. (2015) and conduct an exploratory factor analysis 
based on 14 well-recognized governance variables, which are subsequently summarized 
into five dimensions. We use these governance dimensions to explain the levels of 
subsidy―donations and subsidized debt―in 250 MFOs. Our results show that 
governance factors have little impact on donations while subsidized debt is significantly 
influenced by them. A possible interpretation is that, unlike lenders who require MFOs 
to pay back, donors reap no direct benefit from their philanthropic activities and may 
therefore neglect governance issues. Why do our results contrast with previous findings 
on nonprofits? It could be that in social enterprises, donors track social outreach 
performance more than they track governance since donations are purposed to strengthen 
the social outreach of social enterprises (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). Possibly, donors 
who support MFOs in developing countries have alternative motivations which may 
include seeking elevated status among peers (Glazer & Konrad, 1996) and obtaining other 
utility gains that accrue from the act of giving, such as “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990). 
Hybridity can also significantly affect donors’ perspective toward governance since the 
focus on financial discipline induced by the market logic can act as a substitute for the 
virtuous role of governance principles. Further work is still needed to better understand 
why there is such a gap between nonprofits and hybrids when it comes to donors’ interest 
in governance characteristics.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the theory and formulate 
hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 describe the dataset and methods respectively. The findings 
are presented in section 5 and Section 6 presents our conclusions. 
2. Hypotheses Development and Related Literature  
Social enterprises tackle societal challenges with conventional business models (Luke et 
al., 2013; Nicholls, 2009). As double bottom-line organizations, they pursue both social 
and financial goals (Hamid et al., 2017; Samad et al., 2017). Thus, social enterprises mix 
features of nonprofits and for-profit firms. Owing to their hybridity, these firms receive 
53 
 
financing from both commercial and non-commercial sources. Good governance 
principles assure fund providers—donors, lenders, and equity investors—that their 
resources will be used for the intended purposes, i.e. in line with the organization’s social 
goals (Ebrahim et al., 2014; Harris et al., 2015).  
Available evidence from the non-profit sector suggests that good governance is positively 
associated with donations. Harris et al. (2015) find that good governance practices such 
as formal written policies, independents audit, board independence, review and approval 
of management compensation and accessibility of financial information are positively 
associated with higher donations. Kitching (2009) reports a positive association between 
audit quality, such as use of a Big 5 auditor, and the volume of donations received by 
non-profits. Other governance dimensions that positively impact donations include board 
size (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Olson, 2000), voluntary web disclosure (Blouin et al., 2018; 
Saxton et al., 2014), executive compensation (Balsam & Harris, 2013; Balsam & Harris, 
2018), transparency (Harris & Neely, 2018) as well as average tenure and board members 
with executive background (Olson, 2000). Gaver et al. (2016) document that donors also 
use external governance information such as ratings by specialized third party rating 
agencies (e.g. bond ratings by Moody’s or S&P). Governance information from watchdog 
organization such as the US based Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance is also 
relevant to donors (Chen, 2016). 
In conventional firms, corporate governance addresses agency problems by persuading 
managers (agents) to act in the interest of owners (principals) (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Even in nonprofits that have no formal owners, governance mechanisms are crucial to 
safeguard organization resources from being misused by managers. Without effective 
governance, non-profit managers may pursue selfish ambitions and divert donor funds 
into their self-seeking ventures (Harris et al., 2017). Thus, effective governance is 
relevant for nonprofits, for-profit firms, and hybrids regardless of their legal status. 
Likewise, governance makes sense in any economic framework, be it developed, 
developing or in transition (Bokpin & Isshaq, 2009). Overall, the literature suggests that 
good governance practices are universally useful to align the stakeholder interests within 
enterprises. 
We are unaware of studies investigating the relationship between subsidies and 
governance in social enterprises or hybrid organizations. Given the unanimity in the 
literature on the role of good governance principles in other types of organizations, we 
are left with no other choice than hypothesizing that good governance is interpreted as a 
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positive signal by donors and concessionary loan suppliers alike when assessing the 
potential benefactors of their charitable contributions. Based on these arguments we 
predict that:  
Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive association between governance and the level 
of donations received by social enterprises. 
Hypothesis 1b: There is a positive association between governance and the level 
of subsidized debt received by social enterprises. 
However, for debt providers, governance information should be even more crucial since 
these stakeholders are directly concerned with the repayment capacity of the recipient 
organization (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). This is because defaults stifle their operating 
model, their ability to continue their charitable giving as well as the development goal of 
maintaining a functioning social sector (Cobb et al., 2016). Lenders use reimbursed loans 
to provide new loans to same or different MFOs (Cobb et al., 2016). Thus, as the case is 
for conventional lenders, reimbursement by borrowers is essential to sustain the business 
model of concessionary loan providers and as a result they may increase loans to investee 
organizations that have less risk of default (Cobb et al., 2016; Renneboog, Ter Horst, & 
Zhang, 2008). Evidence suggest that better corporate governance reduces the likelihood 
of default and bankruptcy risk (Cao et al., 2015; Frantz & Instefjord, 2013; Wang & Lin, 
2010). In effect, debtholders may stand to benefit from improvements in the governance 
of their investee organizations (Frantz & Instefjord, 2013). In keeping with these 
arguments, we expect concessionary loan providers to treat governance information with 
higher importance as this information could signal an MFOs commitment and discipline 
to reimburse loans when they fall due (see, Renneboog et al., 2008). In line with this 
argument, previous studies have established that effectively governed organizations 
attract lower lending rates (Lorca et al., 2011). Putting these together, we hypothesize 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: Providers of subsidized debt are more concerned about governance 
than providers of donations. 
3. Data  
Our dataset comes from rating reports released by five leading microfinance rating 
agencies (Microrate, Microfinanza, Planet rating, crisil, and M-Cril). MFOs undergo two 
kinds of ratings: institutional and social. Institutional rating assesses the risks, governance 
and overall financial health of MFOs. Social rating relates to the management information 
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systems used to address the social mission. Data from rating agencies are deemed 
representative of MFOs in the microfinance industry, they have the merit of being 
audited, and therefore less prone to errors than self-reported information (D'Espallier et 
al., 2013a; Hudon & Traca, 2011). Rating agencies are one of the two main major sources 
of microfinance data, with the other being the microfinance information exchange 
(https://www.themix.org/) where MFOs self-report their data. In addition, we compiled 
data on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita and Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) from the World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/), Economic 
freedom index from the Heritage Foundation (https://www.heritage.org/index/), political 
instability from State Failure Problem dataset, and democracy which is obtained from 
Polity IV Project’s Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions dataset 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). Overall, our sample consists of 250 
MFOs from 64 developing countries worldwide. The majority originate from Latin 
America and the Caribbean (33.6%), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (27.4%), then 
Europe and Central Asia (20.7%), South East Asia and the Pacific (12.2%), and Middle 
East and North Africa (6.1%). Our dataset is related to the period from 1999 to 2015. 
4. Method 
4.1 Factor analysis 
Governance is recognized as multidimensional (Harris et al., 2015), involving several 
normative prescriptions and underlying dimensions that are difficult to measure. The 
microfinance literature11 has identified key governance mechanisms for this relatively 
young industry, out of which the major fourteen ones are recorded in our dataset, defined 
and statistically characterized in Table 1. They include: female CEO, female chairperson 
of the board, proportion of female directors, international CEO, proportion of 
international directors, internal audit, board audit committee, big four audit, CEO duality, 
proportion of outside directors, proportion of directors with business education, 
proportion of directors with high education, proportion of directors from the 
business/financial sector, and proportion of directors from the NGO/social sector.  
According to Larcker et al. (2007), measuring governance with a single indicator (e.g. 
capturing board independence with only CEO duality) or with an arbitrary index which 
is generated by naively summing a set of indicators can be misleading as it may result in 
measurement error. Thus, following Harris et al. (2015), we use an exploratory factor 
 
11 See Dato et al. (2018); Galema, Lensink, and Mersland (2012); Hartarska and Mersland (2012); Mersland and 
Strøm (2009); Mori et al. (2013); Mori et al. (2015); Périlleux and Szafarz (2015); Strøm et al. (2014)  
56 
 
analysis to identify latent governance dimensions that underlie the 14 governance 
variables in our dataset. With minimal information loss, factor analysis exploits the 
interrelationship among the governance variables and explains these variables in respect 
of their common underlying dimensions which are called factors (Hair et al., 2010). Each 
resulting factor from the factor analysis represents a separate latent governance 
dimension. 
We assess the suitability of the data for factor analysis by using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure and the Bartlett test of sphericity (Hair et al., 2010). The results show 
that the sample is adequate (KMO = 0.737) and the intercorrelations between the 
variables is sufficient to conduct factor analysis (χ2 = 2687.137; p-value = 0.000)12. 
Consistent with Harris et al. (2015), we include all 14 variables in a principal component 
factor analysis. Following Kaiser (1970)’s criterion, we retain only factors that have an 
eigenvalue greater than 1. The results reported in Table 2a show that the 14 initial 
variables load on five factors, which represent unique latent governance dimensions and 
jointly explain 60.8% of the variation in the original governance variables. One would 
observe that the resulting factors are intuitive, as the governance variables that load on a 
given factor are reasonably related. The factor loading of each governance variable shows 
how the variable correlates with the factor at stake. Loadings below 0.4 are considered 
weak and insignificantly correlated with factors (Ford et al., 1986; Hair et al., 2010). 
Following this generally accepted rule we label factors based on loadings equal to or 
greater than 0.4 (see also, Harris et al., 2015). Consequently, the five governance 
dimensions (factors) are: director skills, gender diversity, audit, internationalization and 
independence (see Table 2b). Below, we elaborate on each governance dimension. 
Guided by our research hypotheses we also provide a corollary on the expected direction 
of the relationship between a given governance dimension and level of subsidy. 
 
12 Factor analysis is suitable for the data when the KMO value is greater than 0.5 and when the Bartlett test of 
sphericity is significant (Hair et al., 2010) 
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Table 1: Definition and summary statistics of governance indicators      
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female CEO “1” if CEO is a woman and “0” otherwise  1,074 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Female chair “1” if the chairperson of the board is a woman and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.198 0.399 0 1 
Female director (%) Proportion of women on the board 1,074 0.236 0.181 0 1 
Int. CEO “1” if the CEO is from abroad and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.112 0.315 0 1 
Int. director (%) Proportion of international directors on the board 1,074 0.135 0.232 0 1 
Internal audit “1” if the internal auditor reports directly to the board and “0” otherwise  1,074 0.466 0.499 0 1 
Board audit “1” if the board has an audit committee and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.473 0.500 0 1 
Big four audit “1” MFO’s external auditor is one of the big four and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.239 0.427 0 1 
CEO duality a “1” if the CEO is the chairman of the board and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.881 0.324 0 1 
Outside director (%) Proportion of outside directors on the board 1,074 0.966 0.106 0 1 
Bus. Edu. Director (%) Proportion of directors with business education 1,074 0.356 0.265 0 1 
High Edu. Director (%) Proportion of directors with higher education (bachelor’s degree and above) 1,074 0.508 0.346 0 1 
Bus. Fin. Director (%) Proportion of directors from the business or financial sector 1,074 0.493 0.356 0 1 
NGO Soc. Director (%) Proportion of directors from non-governmental or social sector 1,074 0.389 0.379 0 1 
a The CEO duality variable is reverse coded so that a value of “1” signifies absence of duality. This is to improve clarity by making it have same expected direction as 







Table 2a: Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix)   
Variable Director skills Gender diversity Audit Internationalization Independence 
High Edu. Director (%) 0.827 0.076 0.126 0.011 0.104 
Bus. Edu. Director 0.686 0.106 0.233 0.195 -0.115 
NGO Soc. Director (%) 0.653 0.105 -0.131 0.196 0.221 
Bus. Fin. Director (%) 0.625 -0.158 0.235 0.229 -0.042 
Female CEO 0.018 0.774 0.119 0.164 0.019 
Female chair 0.017 0.732 0.194 0.076 0.020 
Female director (%) 0.116 0.705 -0.257 -0.093 0.075 
Big four audit 0.033 -0.029 0.764 0.148 0.004 
Internal audit 0.252 0.026 0.674 -0.012 0.079 
Board audit 0.263 0.350 0.596 -0.064 0.119 
Int. director (%) 0.293 -0.046 0.097 0.778 0.002 
Int. CEO 0.019 0.208 0.000 0.754 0.127 
CEO duality -0.056 0.033 0.006 0.253 0.773 
Outside director (%) 0.184 0.052 0.097 -0.129 0.757 
Table 2a shows the results of exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation. Factors are identified with eigenvalues greater than 1. Governance variables 
are defined in Table 1 
 
Factor Proportion Cumulative Mean Q1 Median Q3 Std. dev. 
Director skills 0.231 0.231 0.000 -0.937 0.122 0.833 1.000 
Gender diversity 0.124 0.354 0.000 -0.668 -0.348 0.549 1.000 
Audit 0.094 0.449 0.000 -0.737 -0.258 0.736 1.000 
Internationalization 0.082 0.531 0.000 -0.655 -0.280 0.339 1.000 







The director skills governance dimension increases when there is an increase in the 
proportion of directors with high education, proportion of directors with business 
education, proportion of directors from the business or financial sector and proportion of 
directors from the NGO or social sector. Board members’ skills are important for the 
oversight responsibility of the board (Van der Walt, & Ingley, 2003; Rose, 2007). A board 
with the relevant skill set is equipped to deliver its mandate. Board members with 
business education or high education (such as a bachelor’s degree) are better placed to 
understand the relevant business environment, the activities of the organizations on 
whose board they sit, as well information that is presented to them by management (Rose, 
2007). Practitioner research has stressed the need for diverse skills and experience among 
directors of prosocial organizations’ boards (Campion & Frankiewicz, 1999; CMEF, 
2012). Because social enterprises combine social and financial objectives, it is imperative 
for board members to possess experiences from both business and social sectors. Presence 
of persons with relevant industry expertise is also crucial. For example, since 
microfinance involves the provision of banking services to the poor, it becomes important 
for board members to have financial or banking experience (CMEF, 2012; Hartarska, 
2005).  In sum, diverse skills complement each other to enhance the effectiveness of the 
board in accomplishing its monitoring and advisory roles. To the extent that subsidy 
providers’ confidence is boosted when the governing board is endowed with the relevant 
skills, we expect a positive association between director skills and level of subsidy 
received.  
Gender diversity  
Gender diversity increases when there is high proportion of female directors on the board 
and when there is female board leadership (female chairperson) and female executive 
leadership (female CEO). A number of studies have explored board gender diversity as a 
key predictor of board effectiveness in terms of monitoring management, providing 
advisory services and providing resources (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Gul et al., 
2011). Scholars have advanced several arguments in favour of female board membership 
in fostering good corporate governance. For instance, female directors promote good 
board deliberations, effective communication of board matters, accountability, improve 
board attendance and are better at monitoring managers (Gul et al., 2011; Hillman et al., 
2007). Empirical investigations on prosocial organizations show that female leaders, both 
at management and board levels, are instrumental in advancing the mission of such 
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organizations (Bradshaw et al., 1996; Strøm et al., 2014). For example, female led MFOs 
exhibit high social outreach performance than their male led counterparts. (Mori et al., 
2015; Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015). Because female leadership and board gender diversity 
are associated with better oversight and high social outreach, we argue that such 
governance mechanisms, when present, would attract higher subsidies. Hence, we expect 
a positive association between gender diversity and level of subsidy received.  
Audit 
The audit governance dimension increases when MFOs install an internal audit function 
that reports to the board, when the board has an audit committee that supervises financial 
reporting and audit related matters and when the independent external auditor of the MFO 
is one of the big four global accounting firms (i.e., KPMG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young and 
PwC). Audit provides oversight functions that mitigate agency costs and information 
asymmetry which are often far more complex in prosocial organizations than in regular 
firms. Evidence shows that donors use financial information (Yetman & Yetman, 2012) 
and are responsive to audit quality, therefore nonprofit organizations benefit from hiring 
a high-quality external auditor such as one of the big four (Kitching, 2009). Accounting 
information is accorded high credibility when it audited by a reputable external auditor. 
Thus, an independent auditor provides an external oversight that ensures credible 
financial reporting and thereby reducing agency costs. In a related argument, presence of 
an audit committee, which is usually composed of independent non-executive directors, 
increases the information value of financial statements by providing further oversight. 
Similarly, an internal audit function provides independent assurance services in several 
areas including management controls and risk management (Petrovits et al., 2011). 
Typical internal audit activities include, ensuring operating effectiveness, reliable 
reporting, safeguarding of organization assets and compliance with procedures and 
regulations (Dittenhofer, 2001). Prawitt et al. (2009) report that quality internal audit is 
associated with moderation in earnings management and for that matter increasing 
external financial reporting quality. Most importantly, evidence shows that subsidy 
providers use internal audit information and disclosures (Petrovits et al., 2011). In sum, 
audit fosters accountability, transparency and credible financial reporting as well as 
maintenance of adequate internal controls. Given that these outcomes send positive 
signals to subsidy providers and assure them of judicious use of their funds, we expect a 





The Internationalization governance dimension increases when there is an increase in the 
proportion of foreign directors on the board and when the CEO is from abroad. Findings 
of prior studies suggest that international directorship is associated with better governance 
mechanisms such as independence and reduced managerial entrenchment (Choi & Hasan, 
2005; Gulamhussen & Guerreiro, 2009; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). It is believed that 
international directors often possess requisite expertise and experience that enhance the 
monitoring and advisory function of the board. Moreover, international board members 
may strengthen board effectiveness through the transfer of international corporate 
governance best practices that (Mersland et al., 2011; Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003). Most 
of the arguments for international board members also apply to international CEOs, 
especially in terms of their possession of value enhancing knowledge, experience and 
competence. For example, several scholars have highlighted the positive effect of CEO’s 
international experience on organizational processes and outcomes (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 
2001; Daily et al., 2000; Le & Kroll, 2017; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Based on the 
above arguments, we postulate that subsidy providers will treat international board 
membership and international executive leadership as positive signals. After all, most 
subsidy providers are also international players that originate from the global north 
(Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). We therefore expect a positive associational between 
internationalization and the level of subsidy received. 
Independence 
Higher proportion of outside (non-affiliated) directors and absence of CEO duality 
increases independence. A CEO who doubles as the chairperson of the board becomes 
powerful and solely influences major decisions (Adams et al., 2005). CEO duality can 
negatively affect the monitoring function of boards, leading to less protection of funders’ 
interests (Tuggle et al., 2010). This is because, with CEO duality, the board has less 
incentive to monitor the CEO and the management team, a situation that results in higher 
agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983). In social enterprise research, Galema et al. (2012) 
have shown that powerful CEOs (duality) of microfinance NGOs possess much decision-
making freedom which results in detrimental and risky decisions. Boards are also 
independent when there is limited employee participation (Hartarska, 2005; Linck et al., 
2008; Mori et al., 2013). Outside (non-employees or non-affiliated) directors are deemed 
to be effective monitors because they have no material pecuniary relationship with the 
organization and are less susceptible to conflict of interest (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
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Thus, outside directors are likely to protect organization from financial statement fraud 
as well as the misuse and misappropriation of resources (Beasley, 1996). In line with this 
argument, studies have reported a negative relationship between the proportions of 
employee directors on the board and performance of MFOs (Hartarska, 2005; Mori et al., 
2015). To the extent that subsidies providers would feel confident about the proper use 
of their charitable funds when boards execute their oversight responsibility without 
conflict of interests, we expect a positive association between independence and the level 
of subsidies received. 
4.2 Multiple regression 
In the next step, we estimate regression models explaining the level of subsidies with the 
identified governance dimensions. We adopt the donor’s demand model originally 
developed by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and extensively used in accounting 
research by, e.g., Saxton et al. (2014), Harris et al. (2015) and Yetman & Yetman (2012). 
Following previous studies, we measure subsidies with two variables: donations and 
subsidized debt (Cull et al., 2018; D’Espallier et al., 2017a).13 However, instead of adding 
up the two types of subsidies, as is usually done, we refine the analysis by considering 
them separately. In this way, we will be able to assess and compare the impacts of the 
governance factors on each of them. Our measures for the two kinds of subsidy follow 
the convention in microfinance research. The level of donations is measured by total 
accumulated donations expressed as a percentage of average equity (D’Espallier, et al., 
2017b; Hudon & Traca, 2011). Subsidy from debt is calculated as the difference between 
market rate cost of borrowing and MFO’s financial expenses expressed as a percentage 
of average debt (Cull et al., 2018; D’Espallier et al., 2017a). 
We use the typical control variables listed in the microfinance literature. Table 3 reports 
their definitions and summary statistics. Age measures the experience of MFOs. The 
effect of age on subsidy is ambiguous. On the one hand, young MFOs need subsidies to 
be financially sustainable (Cull et al., 2018). On the other hand, older organizations can 
attract more subsidies by building a reputation over time (Okten & Weisbrod, 2000). Size 
accounts for scale effects (Harris et al., 2015) and is measured with a confirmatory factor 
analysis of three indicators of size; total assets, total number of employees and total 
number of branch offices (Cobb et al., 2016). Regulation and ownership type can 
influence the importance which an MFO attaches to social performance (Frank, 2008; 
 
13 In practice, subsidy providers utilize a wide range instruments, including corporate intangibles, donations, 
procurements, and subsidized debt (Hudon et al., 2018). 
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Hudon, 2010; Roberts, 2013). MFOs’ performance, social and/or financial, could 
influence the level of subsidies they receive (Cull et al., 2018). To account for this, we 
control for MFOs’ social and financial performance using average loan size and 
sustainability respectively. Sustainability is measured using a confirmatory factor 
analysis of operating self-sufficiency, return on assets and write-off ratio (Cobb et al., 
2016). We control for other MFO characteristics such as main lending method (individual 
lending versus group-based lending) (Cull et al., 2007) and savings collection (mandatory 
and voluntary savings) (Cozarenco et al., 2016; Cozarenco et al., 2018). Last, we include 
five variables to control for the investment climate and macroeconomic conditions of the 
countries in which MFOs operate. These include, Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
received (as a percentage of Gross National Income) and GDP per capita from the World 
Bank database, economic freedom from the Heritage foundation, political instability from 
State Failure Problem dataset which was created by the Political Instability Task Force, 
and democracy which is obtained from Polity IV Project’s Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions dataset (Wry & Zhao, 2018). To reduce as much as 
possible the risk of endogeneity, we lag all the explanatory variables by one period. The 
estimated model is: 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑖 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡−1
5
1
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽11𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽15𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽16𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽17𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝑂𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 
Table 4 reports the pairwise correlations between the explanatory and control variables. 
The highest correlation is -0.693 (between GDP per capita and ODA), hence 
multicollinearity would not be a problem to our models given the accepted upper 
threshold of 0.9 (Hair et al., 2010). To confirm that there are no multicollinearity 
concerns, we performed variance inflation factor (VIF) diagnostics. The mean and 
highest VIFs are 1.50 and 3.10 respectively. 
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4.3 Econometric strategy 
We implement generalized least square models to analyze the level of subsidies received 
per MFO per year. We rely on Hausman specification test to formally assess whether 
fixed effects panel data estimation method is preferred over random effects. The results 
show that fixed effects is the suitable method for our data. This holds true whether 
donations (χ2 = 106.78, p < 0.001) or subsidized debt (χ2 = 70.42, p < 0.001) is the 
dependent variable. The fixed effects method, a within effects estimator, allows us to 
control for all unobserved time invariant heterogeneity across MFOs and helps to isolate 
changes in the level of subsidy received by individual MFOs over time and how this 




Table 3: Summary statistics all variables      
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables 
    
Subsidized debt Total subsidy from concessionary loans as a percentage of average debt 1,074 0.099 0.117 0 1.278 
Donations Total donations as a percentage of average equity 1,074 0.367 0.386 0 1.590 
Independent variables     
Director skills Governance factor representing skills of directors 1,074 0.000 1.000 -2.207 2.101 
Gender diversity Governance factor representing gender diversity 1,074 0.000 1.000 -1.477 3.819 
Audit Governance factor representing audit 1,074 0.000 1.000 -2.021 2.473 
Internationalization Governance factor representing internationalization 1,074 0.000 1.000 -1.715 3.711 
Independence Governance factor representing board independence 1,074 0.000 1.000 -7.081 1.181 
Control variables      
Age Age since MFO began microfinance activities 1,074 11.121 7.333 0 46 
Size Confirmatory factor analysis of total assets, total number of employees and 
total number of branch offices 
1,074 -0.035 1.043 -2.859 2.699 
NGO “1” if MFO is a non-governmental organization and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.452 0.498 0 1 
Regulation “1” if MFO is regulated by local banking authorities and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Sustainability Confirmatory factor analysis of operating self-sufficiency, return on assets 
and write-off ratio 
1,074 0.012 0.387 -2.997 1.313 
ALS/GNI per cap Average loan outstanding as a percentage of GNI per capita 1,074 0.373 1.330 0.001 22.929 
Individual lending “1” if MFO uses individual lending method and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.599 0.490 0 1 
Mandatory savings “1” if MFO requires mandatory savings from clients and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.599 0.490 0 1 
Voluntary savings “1” if MFO offers voluntary savings to clients and “0” otherwise 1,074 0.372 0.483 0 1 
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country where MFO operates 1,074 5109.195 3824.128 644.787 20163.590 
(ln)GDP per capita Logarithm of GDP per capita of the country where MFO operates 1,074 8.245 0.802 6.469 9.912 
Economic freedom Heritage index of the country where MFO operates 1,074 57.484 5.478 29.400 72.200 
Political instability A measure of the degree of political instability of the country in which 
MFO operates 
1,074 1.046 0.846 0 3.326 
Democracy A measure of democracy of the country in which MFO operates 1,074 2.278 11.641 -88 10 




Table 4: Correlation matrix          
No. VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Director skills 1 1.05 1.000 
        
Gender diversity 2 1.22 0.000 1.000 
       
Audit 3 1.19 0.001 0.001 1.000 
      
Internationalization 4 1.16 -0.001 0.000 0.001 1.000 
     
Independence 5 1.08 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 1.000 
    
Age 6 1.34 -0.001 -0.091 0.103 -0.220 0.106 1.000 
   
Size 7 1.52 -0.075 -0.369 0.279 0.020 0.044 0.295 1.000 
  
NGO 8 1.72 -0.074 -0.030 -0.089 -0.150 -0.001 0.090 0.054 1.000 
 
Regulation 9 1.54 0.059 -0.055 0.086 0.129 0.113 -0.055 0.125 -0.508 1.000 
Sustainability 10 1.10 -0.083 -0.019 0.028 -0.075 0.003 0.113 0.081 0.054 0.014 
ALS/GNI per cap 11 1.06 -0.027 0.070 -0.008 0.019 -0.071 -0.039 -0.048 -0.136 0.034 
Individual lending 12 1.38 0.100 0.084 -0.033 0.030 0.043 0.023 -0.216 -0.161 0.122 
Mandatory savings 13 1.57 -0.053 0.080 -0.088 -0.105 0.106 0.098 0.040 -0.125 0.076 
Voluntary savings 14 1.81 -0.092 0.168 0.014 -0.023 -0.014 0.131 0.064 -0.407 0.286 
(ln)GDP per capita 15 3.10 0.030 -0.068 0.082 -0.118 -0.030 0.115 -0.013 0.228 -0.190 
Economic freedom 16 1.35 0.085 -0.034 0.116 0.078 -0.018 -0.055 -0.050 -0.074 -0.070 
Political instability 17 1.43 -0.016 -0.083 0.101 0.062 0.004 -0.024 0.202 -0.079 0.037 
Democracy 18 1.44 0.039 -0.047 -0.037 -0.168 -0.035 0.143 -0.028 0.047 -0.100 








No.  11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Sustainability 10 1.000          
ALS/GNI per cap 11 -0.019 1.000 
        
Individual lending 12 0.084 0.014 1.000 
       
Mandatory savings 13 -0.139 -0.023 -0.231 1.000 
      
Voluntary savings 14 0.001 0.124 -0.005 0.362 1.000 
     
(ln)GDP per capita 15 0.078 -0.087 0.170 -0.455 -0.429 1.000 
    
Economic freedom 16 -0.084 -0.009 0.095 -0.173 -0.198 0.078 1.000 
   
Political instability 17 0.063 0.021 -0.222 0.196 0.176 -0.320 0.010 1.000 
  
Democracy 18 -0.055 0.012 -0.024 0.049 -0.048 0.131 0.312 -0.309 1.000 
 













Table 5 presents the results from regressing donation on the governance factors and the 
control variables. We follow the estimation design proposed by Harris et al., (2015). Column 
1 is the base model which includes only the control variables. In columns 2 to 6, we add a 
single governance factor. In column 7, all the governance factors are included 
simultaneously. Surprisingly, all five governance factors are insignificant in all the 
regression results related to donations, suggesting that corporate governance is irrelevant for 
explaining the level of donations. This result contradicts not only our Hypothesis 1a, but also 
the bulk of studies about donations to the nonprofit sector (Harris et al., 2015; Kitching, 
2009; Olson, 2000). We perform additional analyses to dig further into these surprising 
results. While MFOs are established double bottom-line organizations, they may have a non-
profit or for-profit orientation. We split non-profit and for-profit MFOs and re-ran the 
analyses on the sub-samples. Base on the premise that non-profit social enterprises may share 
some commonalities with conventional non-profits, we test whether the role of governance 
in relation to donations would differ between the sub-samples. The results (unreported) are 
qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 5: all governance dimensions were 
insignificant except Board skills which showed moderate statistical significance. Thus, even 
for non-profit MFOs, the level of donations is insensitive to governance. 
Like the governance dimensions, the control variables are mostly insignificant even though 
the coefficients bear the expected signs. A notable exception is average loan size whose 
coefficient is negatively significant in all regressions. This finding suggests that MFOs that 
exhibit higher social performance benefit from higher donations. In a further analysis, we 
test whether this holds when we use alternative measures of social performance; percentage 
of female clients and a categorical variable that indicates whether a given MFO serves rural 
markets. Confirming the results, the coefficients of percentage of female clients and rural 
market were both positively significant (results are untabulated). This insight may help to 
expound the non-significance of the governance dimensions since donors may directly 
observe the social performance of MFOs instead of governance. Stated differently, donors 
may reward MFO for extensive social performance rather than better governance. This 
makes sense as donations support the social mission of social enterprises (D’Espallier et al., 
2013b). The results also show that MFOs that require mandatory savings receive higher 






negatively significant in all regressions, suggesting that MFOs in undemocratic countries 
receive higher donations. 
 
Table 5: Fixed effects regressions for the relationship between governance and donations 
 Dependent variable: Donation 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Board skills  0.013     0.013 
  (0.011)     (0.010) 
Gender diversity   -0.006    -0.001 
   (0.015)    (0.016) 
Audit    -0.014   -0.013 
    (0.013)   (0.015) 
Internationalization     0.011  0.002 
     (0.026)  (0.026) 
Independence      0.012 0.011 
      (0.014) (0.014) 
Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Size 0.004 0.002 0.005 0.012 0.001 0.006 0.011 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
NGO -0.007 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) (0.064) (0.068) 
Regulation -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) 
Sustainability -0.033 -0.031 -0.033 -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 -0.033 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) 
ALS/GNI per capita -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Individual lending -0.042 -0.040 -0.041 -0.041 -0.039 -0.041 -0.037 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) 
Mandatory savings 0.118** 0.115* 0.118** 0.109* 0.115* 0.118** 0.107* 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.058) (0.061) 
Voluntary saving 0.026 0.018 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.025 0.025 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.065) (0.068) (0.067) (0.062) 
(ln)GDP per capita -0.026 -0.029 -0.018 -0.016 -0.025 -0.027 -0.019 
 (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084) (0.085) 
Economic freedom -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political instability 0.333 0.337 0.328 0.344 0.331 0.330 0.343 
 (0.244) (0.249) (0.238) (0.233) (0.243) (0.245) (0.238) 
Democracy -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ODA 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.076 0.081 0.064 0.057 
 (0.323) (0.322) (0.323) (0.320) (0.324) (0.321) (0.316) 






 (0.571) (0.579) (0.584) (0.569) (0.579) (0.571) (0.583) 
Model statistics        
Observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 
Number of MFOs 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 Within 0.0948 0.0973 0.0951 0.0990 0.0956 0.0967 0.103 
R2 Between 1.06e-05 3.82e-05 1.93e-05 6.52e-05 1.92e-05 1.45e-05 0.000134 
R2 Overall 0.00171 0.00168 0.00150 0.00129 0.00148 0.00192 0.00138 
F statistic 6.607 7.429 6.217 6.324 6.197 6.081 5.985 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 5 shows the fixed effects regression results for the influence of governance on donations. Details of the governance 
dimensions are reported in Table 2. Refer to Table 3 for definition of variables of all other variables. The dependent variable 
is measured at time t whiles the explanatory variables are measured at tine t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the MFO level 
and shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
Table 6: Fixed effects regressions for the relationship between governance and subsidized debt 
 Dependent variable: Subsidized debt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Board skills  0.030***     0.023** 
  (0.009)     (0.009) 
Gender diversity   0.070***    0.043*** 
   (0.015)    (0.015) 
Audit    0.043***   0.031*** 
    (0.009)   (0.007) 
Internationalization     0.003  -0.001 
     (0.015)  (0.013) 
Independence      0.022** 0.020** 
      (0.010) (0.009) 
Age -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Size 0.036* 0.033 0.028 0.012 0.036 0.040** 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) 
NGO 0.009 0.008 0.032 0.016 0.009 0.007 0.027 
 (0.033) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.033) (0.036) (0.020) 
Regulation -0.017 -0.022 -0.009 -0.028 -0.017 -0.017 -0.024 
 (0.027) (0.016) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.029) (0.015) 
Sustainability 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
ALS/GNI per capita 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Individual lending -0.020 -0.015 -0.031** -0.024 -0.019 -0.019 -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) 
Mandatory savings -0.022 -0.029 -0.026 0.006 -0.023 -0.021 -0.008 






Voluntary saving 0.028 0.010 -0.018 0.007 0.028 0.026 -0.031* 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.014) (0.029) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
(ln)GDP per capita 0.244*** 0.236*** 0.154** 0.212*** 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.158*** 
 (0.067) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.060) 
Economic freedom -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003* -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political instability 0.058 0.066 0.122 0.023 0.058 0.053 0.073 
 (0.110) (0.098) (0.097) (0.086) (0.111) (0.109) (0.085) 
Democracy -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ODA 0.143 0.136 0.180 0.158 0.143 0.110 0.142 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.158) (0.160) (0.152) (0.151) 
Constant -1.841*** -1.824*** -1.230*** -1.488*** -1.844*** -1.834*** -1.186*** 
 (0.497) (0.473) (0.469) (0.499) (0.497) (0.497) (0.456) 
Model statistics        
Observations 842 842 842 842 842 842 842 
Number of MFOs 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 
R2 Within 0.254 0.279 0.354 0.339 0.254 0.268 0.410 
R2 Between 0.001 0.001 0.00001 0.003 0.001 0.00002 0.0198 
R2 Overall 0.002 0.007 0.015 0.017 0.002 0.004 0.053 
F statistic 11.36 12.68 36.36 16.90 10.72 11.40 14.36 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 6 shows the fixed effects regression results for the influence of governance on subsidized debt. Details of the 
governance dimensions are reported in Table 2. Refer to Table 3 for definition of variables of all other variables. The 
dependent variable is measured at time t whiles the explanatory variables are measured at tine t-1. Standard errors are 
clustered at the MFO level and shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Table 6 shows the results from regressing subsidized debt on the governance factors and the 
control variables. The specifications in Columns 1 to 7 follows the same progression as in 
Table 5. In line with the theoretical expectations, four out of five governance dimensions are 
indeed significant in all the regressions. These governance dimensions include director 
skills, gender diversity, audit and independence. The results suggest that well-governed 
MFOs benefit from increased subsidy in the form of concessionary loans. Unlike donors, 
subsidized debt providers seem to be highly concerned about MFOs’ governance. 
Specifically, MFOs that have highly skilled directors, gender-diversified boards, high audit 
quality and independent boards receive higher subsidies from loans. Internationalization has 
no significant effect on the level of subsidized and the sign of the coefficients is inconsistent 
in (5) and (7). Internationalized boards are costly to MFOs and are associated with poor 
financial performance (Mersland et al., 2011). This might plausibly explain why the subsidy 






results validate both Hypothesis 1b and hypothesis 2 since good governance is found to 
positively influence subsidized debt, a result that which is starkly contrast with the findings 
about donations.  
Like Table 5, most of the control variables in Table 6 are insignificant. Yet, a few 
observations are worth commenting. First, size comes out significantly positive in models 
(1) and (6). This may mean that scale economies could help MFOs to attract larger subsidized 
loans. Arguably, scale advantages could position MFOs to repay their debt more swiftly. 
Second, individual lending has a negative coefficient in all regressions, suggesting that 
MFOs that use this as their main lending model may obtain less subsidized debt. But this is 
only significant in model (3). Third, the GDP per capita of the country where the MFO 
operates has a positive and significant coefficient in all the estimations, suggesting that 
subsidized debt providers target less-poor countries preferably. This fact again can testify to 
the concern of lending to organizations that are more likely to reimburse their debt timely. 
Our puzzling findings about the indifference of donors to governance quality could stem 
from several sources. First, whereas previous studies use data on organizations that are based 
in advanced countries (e.g., USA), the MFOs in our sample operate in developing and 
emerging countries. Plausibly, donors that support organizations in developing and transition 
economies screen their beneficiaries based on alternative criteria, such as social 
performance, rather than governance characteristics (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). 
Considering our finding relating to the effect of average loan size and the outcome of the 
supplementary analysis on female clients and rural market, this position is likely.  This would 
make sense since donations are meant to support the social mission of MFOs (D’Espallier et 
al., 2013b). Second, donors may have private motivations for supporting organizations in 
developing countries. These motivations may include the goal to demonstrate wealth, 
elevated status or keep up with peers (Glazer & Konrad, 1996). Similarly, personal utility 
gains from the act of giving can trigger what Andreoni (1990) calls “warm glow giving”.  
5.1. Supplementary analyses 
In addition to the earlier discussed models, we conduct supplementary analysis to assess the 
robustness of our findings and to rule out alternative explanations. Reported results of the 







Alternative specification: although the fixed effects model controls for time invariant 
heterogeneity across MFOs, it does not fully solve all endogeneity concerns or establish 
causality. In a further analyses we have taken steps to address other potential endogeneity 
concerns by including an MFO’s lagged change in subsidy as a regressor. With this 
procedure, we control for other unobserved effects on the dependent variables and further 
isolate the yearly movements in the level of subsidy received by MFOs. The results shown 
in column 1 of Tables 7 and 8 are consistent with those reported earlier, with the coefficients 
of director skills, gender diversity, audit and independence being positively significant in 
Table 8 but insignificant in Table 7. Also, it is possible that the governance – subsidies 
relationship is dynamic, where current governance structure is influenced by past subsidies 
received by MFOs. Following previous governance studies (e.g., Bennouri et al., 2018; 
Wintoki et al., 2012), we address this potential source of endogeneity by estimating a system 
generalized method of moments (GMM), a dynamic panel data modelling technique. As 
shown in column 2 of Tables 7 and 8, the outcome of this estimation technique confirms 
those reported. Finally, we perform cross-sectional analyses using pooled ordinary least 
square regressions and the results are qualitatively identical to those reported earlier (see 
column 3 of Tables 7 and 8). 
Additional controls variables: we take steps to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias by 
adding additional controls. By doing this, we also lessen endogeneity concerns that may 
result from omission of confounding variables. First, we control for capital structure. 
Previous studies have established links between governance and capital structure (e.g., 
Berger et al., 1997). Similarly, capital structure is linked to the sustainability of pro-social 
organizations and perhaps the extent to which such organizations rely on donor funds 
(Bogan, 2012; Hoque, et al., 2011). Thus, capital structure may be confounder for the 
governance―subsidy relationship. We account for this potential effect using the ratio of debt 
to equity. Our findings remain robust (see column 4 of Tables 7 and 8). 
Secondly, we control for growth. Growth potentially influences the governance set up and 
the financing of organizations. For example, high growth may be associated with presence 
of outside directors (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Hossain et al., 2000). In microfinance, 






2012; Hoque, et al., 2011). Our findings remain robust after including total assets growth in 
the models (see column 5 of Tables 7 and 8). 
Third, we control for market competition. Extant studies have suggested an association 
between market competition and internal governance as well as management decisions 
(Laksmana & Yang, 2015). For example, a strand of the literature suggests a substitution 
effect between market competition and internal governance (Tian & Twite, 2011). It is 
therefore possible that the extent of local competition may be correlated with our governance 
dimensions. To account for this, we include an index of market competition in our models. 
As shown in column 6 of Tables 7 and 8, our findings on the governance dimensions remain 
unchanged.  
Finally, we control for the effect of the last global financial crisis. Though the microfinance 
industry was less affected by the 2008-2009 global financial crisis (Di Bella, 2011), it might 
have possibly influenced the finances of subsidy providers. Thus, the amount of subsidy 
flows into MFOs might have been impacted for the period during and after the crisis. We 
assess whether our findings are robust to the crisis by including a dummy variable which is 
set to “1” for the years after 2007. We also add time dummies to account for possible 
temporal effects (column 7).  Consistent with earlier results, all governance dimensions 
remain insignificant in Table 7 after adding these controls. Again, director skills, gender 
diversity, audit and independence remain statistically significant in Table 8. 
Alternative dependent variables: some studies proxy subsidization with the logarithm of the 
total dollar amount of subsidies received by organizations (e.g., Kitching, 2009; Saxton et 
al., 2014). In this further analysis, we investigate whether our findings hold for this 
alternative dependent variable. The untabulated results match those reported; governance 
influences the dollar amount subsidized debt but not the dollar amount of donations. 
According to the life cycle theory, the financing sources of MFOs follows their development 
trajectory and that MFOs tend to finance their operations through donations at formation 
stage and later use debt and equity as they mature (Bogan, 2012). Though we control for the 
age of the organizations in our models, we take additional steps by measuring the level of 
subsidy relative to the volume assets that an MFO controls (see, Bogan, 2012; D’Espallier 






subsidies (both donations and subsidized debt). The untabulated results validate those 
reported. 
Finally, our measure of donations has limitations in that it is stock and represents 
accumulated donations since inception (Cozarenco et al., 2018; D’Espallier et al., 2013b). 
Hence it does not distinctively capture the actual donations received per year. Moreover, this 
measure excludes unreported in-kind donations such as corporate intangibles (e.g., voluntary 
labour and technical assistance) which are often difficult to value in pecuniary terms (Hudon 
et al., 2018). In a further analysis we use the yearly donations reported in the income 
statement as an alternative dependent variable. Due to several missing observations, this 
analysis covers a reduced sample of 161 MFOs. The results (unreported) confirmed earlier 
findings that donations is insensitive to the governance dimensions. 
 
Table 7: Relationship Between Governance Factors and Donations 
 Dependent variable: Donations 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Board skills 0.004 0.018 -0.014 0.011 0.020* 0.012 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Gender diversity -0.005 0.018 0.005 0.000 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Audit -0.003 0.016 -0.042*** -0.014 -0.010 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.017) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Internationalization 0.006 -0.022 -0.039*** 0.001 -0.013 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.018) (0.033) (0.012) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) 
Independence 0.014* 0.017 0.021 0.009 0.024 0.005 0.010 
 (0.008) (0.039) (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) 
Size -0.002 -0.037 -0.017 0.010 -0.006 0.012 0.015 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.014) (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) 
NGO -0.021 0.171* 0.098*** -0.011 -0.013 -0.037 -0.008 
 (0.047) (0.099) (0.034) (0.069) (0.053) (0.066) (0.068) 
Regulation -0.021 0.014 -0.056* -0.015 -0.012 -0.022 -0.014 
 (0.043) (0.054) (0.031) (0.062) (0.042) (0.062) (0.063) 
Sustainability -0.030 -0.036 -0.217*** -0.022 -0.045 -0.038 -0.030 
 (0.025) (0.046) (0.038) (0.021) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) 
ALS/GNI per capita -0.037*** -0.004 -0.013** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.057*** 






Individual lending 0.002 -0.040 -0.098*** -0.040 -0.010 -0.027 -0.041 
 (0.031) (0.059) (0.028) (0.050) (0.041) (0.048) (0.054) 
Mandatory savings 0.094* 0.170** 0.042 0.108* 0.107* 0.079 0.105 
 (0.057) (0.068) (0.028) (0.063) (0.064) (0.057) (0.065) 
Voluntary saving -0.016 -0.076 -0.146*** 0.027 0.017 -0.010 0.028 
 (0.042) (0.081) (0.034) (0.063) (0.072) (0.066) (0.070) 
(ln)GDP per capita 0.013 -0.016 -0.035 -0.036 -0.023 -0.022 -0.011 
 (0.055) (0.039) (0.027) (0.084) (0.117) (0.086) (0.100) 
Economic freedom -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Political instability 0.136 -0.024 -0.035** 0.348 0.066 0.386 0.360 
 (0.118) (0.021) (0.017) (0.249) (0.128) (0.251) (0.289) 
Democracy -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ODA 0.222 0.282 0.845*** 0.018 0.062 0.107 0.023 
 (0.273) (0.426) (0.299) (0.276) (0.321) (0.317) (0.294) 
Donations 0.518*** 0.645***      
 (0.066) (0.097)      
Debt equity ratio    0.002    
    (0.001)    
Assets growth     0.000**   
     (0.000)   
Market competition      -0.045**  
      (0.020)  
Financial crisis       -0.036 
       (0.220) 
Time dummies No No No No No No Yes 
Constant 0.109 0.072 0.913*** 0.477 0.588 0.585 0.285 
 (0.359) (0.458) (0.277) (0.580) (0.765) (0.641) (0.746) 
Model statistics         
Observations 842 842 842 829 673 827 842 
Number of MFOs 250 250 250 245 226 246 250 
R2 Within 0.291   0.132 0.120 0.119 0.120 
R2 Between 0.572   0.000460 0.00704 2.38e-06 6.65e-05 
R2 Overall 0.594  0.238 0.00236 0.0291 0.00255 0.00110 
Wald χ2 / F statistic 14.87 265.2 17.70 4.927 7.531 5.768 54.31 
Prob > χ2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Method  FE GMM OLS FE FE FE FE 
Table 7 shows the fixed effects regression results for the influence of governance on donations. Details of the governance 
dimensions are reported in Table 2. Refer to Table 3 for definition of variables of all other variables, with the exception of debt 
equity ratio, assets growth, market competition and financial crisis which are defined in the supplementary analysis. The dependent 
variable is measured at time t whiles the explanatory variables are measured at tine t-1. Standard errors are clustered at the MFO 
level and shown in parentheses. GMM statistics: Arellano-Bond AR(1) = -3.31 (p=0.001), Arellano-Bond AR(2)=0.61 (p= 0.545), 








Table 8: Relationship Between Governance Factors and Subsidized Debt 
 Dependent variable: Subsidized debt 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Board skills 0.023** 0.032** 0.030*** 0.023** 0.027** 0.023** 0.023** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) 
Gender diversity 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.035** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Audit 0.031*** 0.033** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Internationalization 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.013) (0.028) (0.004) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) 
Independence 0.019** 0.031* 0.017*** 0.020** 0.023** 0.019** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.018) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Size 0.002 -0.016 -0.008* 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.011 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.005) (0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) 
NGO 0.020 0.051 0.002 0.026 0.031 0.018 0.031 
 (0.022) (0.066) (0.009) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018) (0.021) 
Regulation -0.028** 0.016 0.005 -0.025 -0.028* -0.027* -0.018 
 (0.013) (0.041) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Sustainability 0.013 0.035 0.001 0.015 0.017 0.011 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.028) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
ALS/GNI per capita 0.003 -0.018 0.006** 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.027) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Individual lending -0.027 -0.018 0.015* -0.026 -0.016 -0.021 -0.028 
 (0.017) (0.047) (0.009) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Mandatory savings -0.005 0.006 -0.001 -0.012 -0.008 -0.018 -0.011 
 (0.017) (0.050) (0.008) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) 
Voluntary saving -0.032* 0.021 0.008 -0.029 -0.029 -0.043** -0.025 
 (0.019) (0.066) (0.010) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.016) 
(ln)GDP per capita 0.141** -0.008 -0.001 0.156** 0.186** 0.157*** 0.150** 
 (0.056) (0.031) (0.008) (0.062) (0.072) (0.058) (0.066) 
Economic freedom -0.001 0.002 0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Political instability 0.069 -0.011 -0.011** 0.071 0.042 0.077 0.090 
 (0.089) (0.009) (0.004) (0.085) (0.150) (0.087) (0.104) 
Democracy 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ODA 0.169 -0.256 -0.296*** 0.132 0.140 0.162 0.202 
 (0.142) (0.213) (0.081) (0.150) (0.167) (0.149) (0.153) 
Subsidized debt 0.205** 0.448***      
 (0.086) (0.167)      
Debt equity ratio    0.000    
    (0.000)    
Assets growth     0.000***   
     (0.000)   






      (0.008)  
Financial crisis       -0.060 
       (0.099) 
Time dummies No no No No No No Yes 
Constant -1.032** 0.032 0.041 -1.167** -1.400*** -1.102** -1.176** 
 (0.422) (0.307) (0.073) (0.468) (0.534) (0.444) (0.541) 
Model statistics        
Observations 842 842 842 829 673 827 842 
Number of MFOs 250 250 250 245 226 246 250 
R2 Within 0.427   0.408 0.393 0.414 0.422 
R2 Between 0.0663   0.0163 0.0279 0.0186 0.0150 
R2 Overall 0.112  0.324 0.0518 0.0514 0.0496 0.0461 
Wald χ2 / F statistic 15.76 265.2 21.52 13.22 13.38 15.47 17.61 
Prob > χ2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Method  FE GMM OLS FE FE FE FE 
Table 8 shows the fixed effects regression results for the influence of governance on subsidized debt. Details of the governance 
dimensions are reported in Table 2. Refer to Table 3 for definition of variables of all other variables, with the exception of debt 
equity ratio, assets growth, market competition and financial crisis which are defined in the supplementary analysis. The 
dependent variable is measured at time t whiles the explanatory variables are measured at tine t-1. Standard errors are clustered 
at the MFO level and shown in parentheses. GMM statistics: Arellano-Bond AR(1) = -2.48 (p=0.013), Arellano-Bond 
AR(2)=0.01 (p= 0.991), Hansen test = 104.11 (p = 0.923).  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
6. Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate the influence of governance on the level of subsidies that flow 
to social enterprises. Relying on factor analysis, we summarized the impact of fourteen 
governance characteristics by five meaningful factors representing director skills, gender 
diversity, audit, internationalization and independence. Next, we used the identified factors 
to explain two types of subsidies, donations and subsidized debt, granted to MFOs. 
Unexpectedly, with the estimations involving donations, none of the governance factors were 
significant. In contrast, the results for subsidized debt are aligned with the theory that views 
good governance practices as signaling devices for effective management and subsequently 
for mission fulfilment. 
How to rationalize the apparent lack of sensitivity of donations to governance dimensions?  
First, it could be that, instead of considering governance characteristics, donors screen MFOs 
based on social outreach by directly observing the social performance of MFOs. Indeed, our 
analyses show a positive association between social outreach performance (measured with 
average loan size, proportion of female clients and rural market) and the level of donations 






to support the social activities of social enterprises (D’Espallier et al., 2013b; D’Espallier et 
al., 2017b). By implication, MFOs ought to show higher social results if they wish to attract 
higher donor funds. Secondly, providers of donations might find more immediate rewards 
(e.g., status enhancement and “warm glow”) from giving, which require collecting less 
information (Andreoni, 1990; Glazer & Konrad, 1996). Third, unlike the case of traditional 
nonprofits, donor support is not an everlasting endeavour for social enterprises. From both 
practical and theoretical standpoints, social enterprises out to graduate into self-sustaining 
institutions. Thus, it is possible that as MFOs become more professional through formal 
governance, donor support dwindles.  All the same, we invite future studies to probe the 
drivers of donations flows into social enterprises if governance is irrelevant for this 
discussion. Particularly, it would be insightful to investigate how social enterprise strategize 
to sustain continued donor support. In any case, our results highlight that implementing good 
governance helps attract subsidized debt. Moreover, the relevance of effective governance 
transcends the benefit of increased subsidization. For instance, good governance enhances 
transparency, encourages internationally best practices, yields effective board oversight and 
safeguards organizational assets, by preventing asset diversion and fraud (Beasley, 1996; 
Harris et al., 2017). 
Our study has limitations. Admittedly, good governance involves a wide-ranging list of 
normative prescriptions, obviously beyond the limits of a single study’s scope. Though we 
have made effort to cover several key governance factors, our study does not cover all 
governance possibilities that might impact donor decisions and subsidy flows to social 
enterprises such as executive compensation and incentives (Balsam & Harris, 2013; Balsam 
& Harris, 2018). This can be a fruitful subject for future research 
As a second potential limitation, our analyses do not address the effectiveness of governance 
dimensions neither do they show whether the various governance variable are mere nominal 
representations to build legitimacy. Having knowledge of donor expectations, MFOs may 
install certain “ideal” governance set ups to attract subsidy support while those governance 
mechanisms are just symbolic in reality. Future studies could investigate how governance 
interacts with certain organizational processes and outcomes⎯such as financial reporting 
(Krishnan et al., 2006; Yetman & Yetman, 2012)⎯to influence the giving decisions of 






qualitative evidence on how governance decisions are made in social enterprises and how 
this is shaped by the pressure to balance multiple bottom lines, plural logics and the 
incoherent demands and expectations of multiple stakeholders (Varendh-Mansson et al., 
2020; Mersland et al., 2019). These nuances would enlighten our understanding on how 
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CHAPTER 3:  
Gender Discrimination and Lending to Women: The Moderating 
Effect of International Founder 
Abstract 
Much of the microfinance rhetoric revolves around fighting female poverty, which is often 
the result of discriminatory gender norms and traditions. Since its inception, the microfinance 
industry has been subject to much influence from foreign actors, who according to the 
literature promote female financial inclusion. Yet, little is known about how the female 
targeting strategy of microfinance institutions (MFIs) is affected by the interplay between 
societal norms and internationalization. In response, this study investigates the influence of 
gender discrimination on microfinance outreach to women and tests the moderating effect of 
an international founder. Using data on 213 MFIs from 65 countries, the results show that 
microfinance outreach to women is low in contexts where women face much discrimination. 
The results further show that this relationship is moderated by having an international 
founder. This study highlights the role of international actors in driving the focus on women 
in microfinance and opens several avenues for future research. 
Keywords: Microfinance, International founder, Internationalization, Gender 
discrimination, Societal norms, Women’s empowerment  
JEL codes: G21, F23, J17, O50, P36 
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1. Introduction  
In this paper, I investigate the influence of gender discrimination on microfinance’s outreach 
to women and test the moderating effect of an international founder. Microfinance emerged 
as a poverty-combating intervention (Morduch, 1999). Specifically, microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) support the income-generating activities of the poor and the 
disadvantaged through the provision of financial and non-financial services to these less 
privileged groups (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Women, a group that over-represents the 
world’s poor, have been the focus of microfinance since the inception of the industry in the 
1970s. Some of the early MFIs lent exclusively to women and, today, women still dominate 
the clientele base of most MFIs.14 Mersland and Strøm (2012) regard the focus on women as 
one of the main innovations of microfinance and Morduch (1999) attributes the success of 
microfinance to its deliberate targeting of women.  
Evidence shows that female poverty results from gender-based discrimination against 
women. Such discrimination is fueled by broadly shared societal beliefs, customs, or 
traditions that portray women as inferior to men (Kabeer, 2005; Sanyal, 2009). Studies have 
established that gender discrimination explains the low participation of women in 
mainstream banking systems (Fay & Williams, 1993; Drori, Manos, Santacreu-Vasut, & 
Shoham, 2019). Stated differently, gender stereotypes and prejudice restrict women’s access 
to formal financial services. Although fighting gender discrimination and female poverty is 
key to the microfinance mandate (Garikipati, Johnson, Guérin, & Szafarz, 2017), it remains 
the case that the deep-seated societal norms that create these social ills can suppress outreach 
to women by frustrating the redress efforts of MFIs (Zhao & Wry, 2016).  
Recently, scholars have begun to investigate how pro-social organizations (particularly 
MFIs) are affected by societal norms that create social problems, such as the marginalization 
of individuals (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016; Drori, Manos, 
Santacreu-Vasut, Shenkar, & Shoham, 2018; Drori et al., 2019; Manos & Tsytrinbaum, 
2014; Wry & Zhao, 2018; Zhao & Wry, 2016). With regard to outreach to women, Drori et 
al. (2019) show that the gender-targeting strategy of MFIs is contingent on prevailing gender 
norms in the local environment and that MFIs target women in contexts where women are 
 
14 An estimated 70% of the over 200 million clients of today’s microfinance industry are women (Microcredit Summit 
Campaign, 2012; World Bank, 2015). In a recent study, Mersland, Nyarko and Szafarz (2019) find that even MFIs 






likely to face discrimination in accessing financial services. However, the analysis of Drori 
et al. (2019) does not address whether gender norms affect the degree of outreach to women. 
In this regard, the earlier work of Zhao and Wry (2016) found that patriarchy, a societal logic 
that discriminates against women by prioritizing male attributes and interests over those of 
women, manifests in the family, religion, and state to suppress MFIs’ outreach to women. 
Intuitively, in countries with high gender discrimination, interventions that foster women’s 
empowerment are less likely to obtain local acceptance and support because such 
interventions run counter to prevailing societal norms (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). In some 
cases, such interventions may trigger new forms of male dominance and increased violence 
against women (Rahman, 1999; Schuler, Hashemi, & Badal, 1998).  Moreover, women-
focused interventions can be costly in unfriendly gender environments, as studies have 
shown that deep-rooted societal norms (e.g., inter-group discrimination) amplify the trade-
off between social outreach and financial performance (Wry & Zhao, 2018). To elaborate, 
MFIs with deep social outreach struggle to be financially viable when they operate in 
discrimination-prone contexts, a constraint that may discourage MFIs from reaching larger 
numbers of costly-to-serve vulnerable minorities such as women. According to Zhao and 
Wry (2016), due to the unlikely local support, MFIs that desire to serve women in highly 
patriarchal cultures ought to focus on attracting foreign support. Interestingly, over the past 
decades, the microfinance industry has witnessed heavy influence from foreign actors such 
as international capital providers, international initiators, and international networks 
(Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011). Building on Zhao and Wry (2016), I investigate how 
internationalization moderates the relationship between gender discrimination and 
microfinance outreach to women. By investigating this relationship, I extend previous 
research (e.g., Drori et al., 2019; Zhao & Wry, 2016) and heed Drori et al.’s (2019) call for 
studies that explore how internationalization interacts with local societal norms to impact the 
gender-targeting strategy of MFIs. 
Outreach to women in microfinance seems to be significantly driven by international players. 
Studies have shown that internationalization enhances the social outreach performance of 
MFIs, and particularly their outreach to women (Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland & Urgeghe, 
2013; Mori, Golesorkhi, Randøy, & Hermes, 2015). Funding is one of the channels through 






form of donations and soft loans help MFIs to absorb the high cost of lending to women. 
Supporting this argument, available evidence shows that subsidized MFIs serve more women 
(D’Espallier, Hudon, & Szafarz, 2013). Female clients take smaller loans than their male 
counterparts do (Agier & Szafarz, 2013a; Agier & Szafarz, 2013b; D’Espallier, Guerin, & 
Mersland, 2013). Small loans are costly for MFIs because monitoring and other 
administrative costs are fixed regardless of loan size (Hermes et al., 2011). Cheaper foreign 
funds could help MFIs to bear the already high cost of serving women plus the costs induced 
by crossing culturally ingrained gender barriers (D’Espallier et al., 2013; Wry & Zhao, 
2018). In fact, case study evidence shows that international agencies support women-focused 
microfinance projects in patriarchal cultures (Sanyal, 2009). Women-focused MFIs may gain 
other benefits from international actors, such as technical services, knowledge transfer, and 
international best practices (Golesorkhi, Mersland, Piekkari, Pishchulov, & Randøy, 2019; 
Golesorkhi, Mersland, Randøy, & Shenkar, 2019; Mersland et al., 2011). Based on these 
insights, I test the following hypotheses: (1) there is a negative relationship between gender 
discrimination and microfinance outreach to women, (2) there is a positive relationship 
between an international founder and microfinance outreach to women, and (3) an 
international founder moderates the relationship between gender discrimination and 
microfinance outreach to women. 
I use an original dataset that covers 213 MFIs that operate in 65 countries. The unbalanced 
panel consists of data from 2008 to 2015. The data was analyzed using random effects 
generalized least squares after running Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test. The 
study employs the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) as a meaningful proxy for 
gender discrimination (Branisa, Klasen, & Ziegler, 2013). SIGI tracks four sources of gender 
discrimination: discrimination in the family, restricted physical integrity, restricted access to 
productive resources, and restricted civil liberties.  
Confirming the hypotheses put forward above, the analyses reveal that microfinance 
outreach to women is significantly lower in countries where gender discrimination is high. 
The findings suggest that discriminatory societal norms, which hinder women’s access to 
formal banking services, undermine MFIs’ redress efforts. The findings also show that an 
international founder interacts with gender discrimination to enhance outreach to women. 






establishing MFIs in developing countries and they support MFIs with a mission to reach 
more women in contexts where women face much discrimination. More generally, these 
findings suggest that international players in the microfinance industry are committed to 
supporting and prioritizing underprivileged and vulnerable groups such as women. This 
study contributes to the literature by highlighting the interplay between cultural and 
international factors in determining MFIs’ outreach to women.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theory and hypotheses, 
Section 3 presents the data and methodology, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 
concludes.   
 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1 Microfinance and Outreach to Women  
Microfinance, an anti-poverty intervention, predominantly supports the income-generating 
activities of impoverished and marginalized people who lack access to formal banking 
services (Mersland & Strøm, 2012; Morduch, 1999). Globally, millions are stuck in poverty 
due to their lack of access to credit and other banking services from traditional financial 
institutions (Morduch, 1999). According to World Bank, about 75% of the world’s poor 
population are unbanked (World Bank, 2012). In contrast to conventional banks, which 
neglect the poor―classifying them as risky and unprofitable―MFIs supply financial and 
non-financial services to the economically active poor and other unbanked persons 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010).  The services provided by MFIs are meant to strengthen 
the income-generating activities of these vulnerable groups, thereby emancipating them from 
poverty. The question of whether microfinance has a transformative impact on clients and 
communities is still controversial and debated in the literature (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, 
& Kinnan, 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015). Yet, today, it is estimated that 
microfinance reaches over 200 million borrowers worldwide and the growth prospects of the 
industry remains favorable (World Bank, 2015). 
Much of the microfinance story has centered on empowering women and eradicating female 






to its deliberate focus on women (Morduch, 1999). Indeed, women are less likely than men 
to participate in traditional banking systems.15 By the same token, women are more likely 
than men to be victims of poverty (Duflo, 2012). Female poverty is a global concern and has 
been high on the agenda of development agencies as well as national and supranational 
bodies. As traditional victims of social exclusion, oppression, and discrimination (Kabeer, 
2005), women are favorite targets of any poverty-eradicating intervention including 
microfinance (Duflo, 2012).  
Why do MFIs prefer lending to women? Studies have shown that compared to men, women 
are more likely to invest in the wellbeing of their households, especially in areas such as 
education and health (e.g., Haddad & Hoddinott, 1994; Kabeer, 1997).  In light of this 
evidence, lending to women is perceived to achieve overall greater impact on households 
than lending to men. This rationale for female targeting was well articulated by Nobel 
laureate Muhammad Yunus during his 2006 Nobel lecture: “We focused on women because 
we found giving loans to women always brought more benefits to the family” (Yunus, 2006).  
It is important to note that, thanks to women’s high repayment rates, MFIs reap efficiency 
gains by lending to this customer segment. Generally, women entrepreneurs are compliant 
and are noted for higher levels of honesty and discipline compared to men (D’Espallier et 
al., 2013b; Rahman, 1999). Moreover, women are cautious with investment decisions due to 
their risk-averse nature. As a result, women take loans that are well within their repayment 
capacity and hence are less likely to be in default (Boehe & Cruz, 2013; D’Espallier, Guérin, 
& Mersland, 2011; Sharma & Zeller, 1997). High repayment rates are crucial for the 
operation of microfinance business, because, as historical accounts show, microfinance 
emerged as a response to many government credit programs that failed due to low repayment 
rates (Hulme & Mosley, 1996). Nevertheless, it is still unestablished in the literature why 
MFIs target women: namely, it is unclear whether this targeting is to fight female poverty, 
to bridge gender gaps, or to benefit from women’s high repayment rates and compliant 
behavior (D’Espallier et al., 2013b). 
 
15 Women constitute a significant proportion of the world’s financially excluded poor. It is estimated that women are 
28% less likely than men to own a bank account and one out of every three women has no access to banking services 






Many empirical works have investigated outreach to women and other gender-related issues 
in microfinance. They have dealt with issues such as repayment (e.g., Boehe & Cruz, 2013; 
Sharma & Zeller, 1997), impact of serving women on performance (e.g., D’Espallier et al., 
2013b), impact of microlending on women’s empowerment (e.g., Banerjee et al., 2015a 
Banerjee et al., 2015b; Kabeer, 2001), female leadership (e.g., Strøm, D’Espallier, & 
Mersland, 2014), and economic effects of serving women (e.g., Kevane & Wydick, 2001). 
Conventionally, outreach to women is a recognized social mission in the microfinance 
literature (Mersland et al., 2019b) and MFIs that are biased in favor of women are generally 
regarded as more social than their counterparts that have less of a focus on women 
(D’Espallier et al., 2013b; Hermes et al., 2011). Accordingly, empirical studies on 
microfinance regularly employ the proportion of female clients and the total number of 
women served by MFIs as standard metrics for gauging MFIs’ social performance (Mersland 
et al., 2019b). According to D’Espallier and Goedecke (2018), the proportion of female 
clients is arguably the best predictor of MFIs’ social performance compared to other 
indicators such as average loan amount and proportion of rural clients.  
As demonstrated in the literature, lending to financially excluded women is a source of 
legitimacy for microfinance because of the industry’s mission orientation. Yet, little is 
known about the factors—especially those beyond the purview of MFIs such as societal 
norms—that affect this outreach. At the level of MFIs, studies have shown that commercially 
oriented MFIs target women to a lesser extent than their non-commercial counterparts. 
Notably, outreach to women declines rapidly after MFIs transform from NGOs to 
shareholder-owned firms (Wagenaar, 2014; Frank, 2008). Female-led MFIs are also 
associated with a higher share of female borrowers (Strøm et al., 2014; Mori et al., 2015; 
Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015). Recently, scholars have begun to probe broadly shared 
institutional factors that affect MFIs’ outreach to women (Cobb et al., 2016; Drori et al., 
2018; Drori et al., 2019; Manos & Tsytrinbaum, 2014; Wry & Zhao, 2018; Zhao & Wry, 
2016). However, this strand of the literature is still scant, and moderating mechanisms such 
as internationalization have yet to be investigated empirically. By taking dual perspectives, 
I demonstrate how societally ingrained logics interact with internationalization to affect 







2.2 Gender discrimination and Microfinance Outreach to Women 
Across the globe, gender discrimination, driven by restrictive societal norms and 
discrimination against women, contributes to the low rate of women’s participation in 
traditional banking systems (Drori et al., 2019; Kabeer, 2005). Societal norms that prioritize 
male interests over those of females reduce the physical mobility of women as well as 
militate against women’s financial freedom (Kabeer, 2001). In restrictive cultures, most 
women even lack access to information about financial products and services. In effect, 
discrimination against women results in financial exclusion of women, which subsequently 
leads to female poverty (Garikipati et al., 2017). Accordingly, it is logical for MFIs to operate 
in contexts where gender discrimination, and for that matter female poverty, is 
commonplace. Indeed, a recent study shows that MFIs are likely to target women in contexts 
where women are likely to face discrimination in accessing banking services (Drori et al., 
2019).  
Yet, restrictive societal norms can frustrate the efforts of MFIs to reach women (Zhao & 
Wry, 2016). Societal norms are shared by societal members and thus largely influence 
people’s daily lives and interactions (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). For 
conventional firms, acting in alignment with societal norms is a pragmatic and beneficial 
way to earn legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The opposite is true for microfinance and other 
pro-social organizations whose operations redress social ills created by societal norms. When 
MFIs target women in unfriendly gender environments, their actions may be perceived as 
inappropriate by people who share in the prevailing institutionalized societal norms. In 
discriminatory cultures, women are seen as inferior to men and women’s roles are limited to 
childbearing and performing household chores such as cooking, cleaning, and laundry 
(Kabeer, 2005). Therefore, providing financial services to women would be resisted as it 
would be perceived as a contradiction to established social conventions. For example, studies 
have shown that empowering women through microfinance can generate new forms of male 
dominance as well as increased violence against women (Rahman, 1999; Schuler et al., 
1998).  
Additionally, women may self-exclude themselves from microfinance since they are likely 
to share in and internalize the existing cultural norms of their societies. Consequently, they 






thereby willfully exclude themselves not only from market-based activities (Mair, Marti, & 
Ventresca, 2012) but also from microfinance services (D’Espallier et al., 2013b).  After all, 
women may not be the direct users of loans they receive since studies have reported that 
more than half of loans to women end up in the hands of their husbands and male relatives 
(Balasubramanian, 2013; Garikipati, 2008; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Pitt, Khandker, & 
Cartwright, 2006; Rahman, 1996). Balasubramanian (2013) argues that women’s lack of 
control over loans and incomes from their enterprising ventures is the consequence of their 
weak bargaining position in the household. 
Furthermore, while having females in leadership positions and as credit officers increases 
outreach to women (Labie, Meon, Mersland, & Szafarz, 2010; Mori et al., 2015; Périlleux 
& Szafarz, 2015; Strøm et al., 2014), MFIs may fail to attract female professionals in 
countries where gender stereotypes are strong (Zhao & Wry, 2016). Thus, all else equal, in 
patriarchal cultures, men are likely to dominate microfinance boards, management teams, 
and staff, an occurrence that may diminish outreach to women.  
My final argument relates to the cost of serving women. D’Espallier et al. (2013b) report that 
serving women is costly due to the small loan amounts they require and the lending method 
(i.e., group lending) through which they are served. However, there are other reasons why it 
may be more expensive to serve women in male-dominated societies. First, women may 
require additional costly services that are tailored to their specific needs, such as nutrition, 
health, education, door-to-door services, business development services, and gender-
awareness training of staff (Goldmark, 2006; Lensink, Mersland, Vu, & Zamore, 2018). 
These may be needed to help the businesses of women and to boost their self-worth, because 
many women in discriminatory environments lack basic skills, training, and education 
(Kabeer, 2005; Lensink et al., 2018). Second, crossing cultural barriers to reach marginalized 
women can result in further costs due to relationship problems (e.g., mistrust between male 
loan officers and female clients) as well as coordination and communication challenges (Wry 
& Zhao, 2018). In effect, these costs not only threaten the sustainability of MFIs, but also, 
given that local funding support for female targeting is low, deter MFIs from serving women 
in unfriendly gender contexts. Based on these arguments, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between gender discrimination and 






2.3 Internationalization of Microfinance Institutions and Outreach to Women 
The microfinance industry is heavily influenced by foreign actors such as international fund 
providers (commercial and non-commercial) and international networks (e.g., Opportunity 
International and Women’s World Banking) (Brière & Szafarz, 2015; Cobb et al., 2016; 
Golesorkhi et al., 2019a; Golesorkhi et al., 2019b; Dorfleitner, Röhe, & Renier, 2017). Also, 
many international players (both individuals and development agencies) set up MFIs in 
developing countries with the object of promoting financial inclusion (Golesorkhi et al., 
2019a; Golesorkhi et al., 2019b; Mersland et al., 2011). International players are instrumental 
in providing MFIs with financial and technical solutions and are an important source of 
knowledge transfers (Golesorkhi et al., 2019b; Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland, Nyarko & 
Sirisena, 2019). The robust growth observed in the industry in the past decade is attributable 
to the influx of foreign funds (Reille, Forster, & Rozas, 2011; Soursourian, Dashi, & Dokle, 
2015).   
Evidence suggests that internationalization enhances the social performance of MFIs and 
particularly outreach to women. Mersland et al. (2011) found that three sources of 
international influence—namely, international network membership, international initiation, 
and access to international subsidized debt—are associated with higher outreach to women. 
Similarly, Dorfleitner et al. (2017) and Mersland and Urgeghe (2013) document a positive 
relationship between access to foreign funding and the proportion of women served by MFIs. 
According to the latter study, international subsidized debt providers follow a positive 
screening approach that prioritizes financially weak MFIs that are disposed to targeting 
women. Mori et al. (2015) report a positive effect of international directorship on outreach 
to women. These findings seem to suggest that international players seem to be concerned 
about fighting gender discrimination and female poverty by empowering disadvantaged 
women. 
Internationally oriented MFIs are able to exhibit high social outreach performance possibly 
because of their access to cheaper resources. According to Mersland et al. (2011), 
international initiators have access to cheaper funding⎯grants, donations, and concessionary 
loans⎯that is meant to advance the social mission of the MFIs they set up. In fact, evidence 
shows that subsidized MFIs reach more women and perform socially better than their 






whom are also founders of MFIs, enhance outreach to women through effective policing of 
management as well as the transfer of knowledge and international best practices (Golesorkhi 
et al., 2019a; Golesorkhi et al., 2019b; Mersland et al., 2011). Such policies may include the 
adoption of positive organizational ethical codes that internally institutionalize (within MFIs) 
ethical treatment of female clients (Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014). 
As established in the previous section, women-focused MFIs in discriminatory cultures are 
less likely to obtain local support including funding. At the same time, serving women in 
such cultures is costly, thereby posing sustainability challenges to MFIs. On this basis, I 
conjecture that foreign connections and assistance—financial and technical—is crucial to 
support high female outreach in discriminatory cultures (Zhao & Wry, 2016). In this regard, 
Sanyal (2009) provides evidence of how international agencies support women-focused 
microfinance programs in patriarchal societies. Moreover, because fighting female poverty 
and gender discrimination are high on the agenda of international players, they are more 
likely to establish women-focused MFIs in discriminatory cultures than in gender-friendly 
cultures and to channel resources toward women’s financial inclusion in these cultures. This 
argument is in line with many studies in the international development literature that link 
bilateral aid to enhancements in gender parity and women’s empowerment (e.g., Asongu, 
2016; Elgström, 2000; Grown, Addison, & Tarp, 2016; Pickbourn & Ndikumana, 2016). The 
argument is that driving down inequality between men and women accelerates economic 
development, which in turn drives inequality down in a virtuous cycle (Duflo, 2012). 
Besides, international founders are less likely than locals to share in societal norms that 
discriminate against women (De Beule, Klein, & Verwaal, 2019). Tukamushaba, Orobia, & 
George (2011) theorize that individuals and organizations that engage in international social 
entrepreneurship initiate or support social initiatives beyond their national borders out of a 
sense of social responsibility and empathy with less privileged persons beyond the borders 
of their native countries. According to these authors, such a feeling is characterized by 
“identifying with another person and feeling and understanding what that person is 
experiencing, for instance, identifying with the orphans or rural poor” (p. 290). I conjecture 
that international founders in the microfinance sector have pro-social motivations that 
include empowering impoverished and disadvantaged women. Therefore, it is expected that 






discrimination than in cultures where gender discrimination is low. In light of the above 
arguments, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between an international founder and 
microfinance outreach to women. 
Hypothesis 3: An international founder moderates the relationship between gender 
discrimination and microfinance outreach to women.  
 
3. Method and Data  
3.1. Method  
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the percentage of female clients, computed as the total number of 
women served by an MFI out of the total number of clients served. Previous studies have 
mainly employed this proxy to gauge the female outreach performance of MFIs (Mersland 
et al., 2019b; Périlleux & Szafarz, 2015; Hermes et al., 2011; D’Espallier et al., 2013b). 
Independent Variables 
This study includes two independent variables. The first, the Social Institutions and Gender 
Index (SIGI), is obtained from the database of the development center of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (https://www.genderindex.org). This 
index captures four types of gender discrimination arising from discriminatory social 
institutions and norms, including discrimination in the family, restricted physical integrity, 
restricted access to productive and financial resources, and restricted civil liberties. A 
strength of the SIGI is its focus on the root causes of gender discrimination by systematically 
integrating indicators for societal norms, traditions, and family customs that discriminate 
against women (Branisa, Klasen, Ziegler, Drechsler, & Jütting, 2014; Jütting, Morrisson, 
Dayton‐Johnson, & Drechsler, 2008). As such, SIGI is employed as a standard proxy for 
gender discrimination in the literature (Branisa et al., 2013; Jütting et al., 2008; Klasen & 






SIGI range from “0” to “1,” with higher values signifying higher gender discrimination and 
vice versa. 
The second independent variable is international founder (Golesorkhi et al., 2019a; 
Golesorkhi et al., 2019b; Mersland et al., 2011). This is a binary variable that takes the value 
of one if the MFI was founded by foreigners, and zero otherwise. Like other social enterprises, 
MFIs are usually founded by a socially motivated individual entrepreneur (e.g., Nobel 
laureate Muhammad Yunus of the Bangladeshi Grameen Bank) or by an existing pro-social 
organization (e.g., Women’s World Banking), which can be local or international (Randøy, 
Strøm, & Mersland, 2015). Because founders are present at the formation stage of 
organizations, the international founder variable is exogenous, making it statistically suitable 
for  drawing causal inferences. Imprinting effects links internationally founded MFIs to other 
sources of internationalization such as international network membership (Mersland & 
Urgeghe, 2013).   
Control Variables 
Consistent with the literature, I include in the research model control variables for MFI-
specific and contextual factors that might influence MFIs’ outreach to women. The MFI-
specific control variables include, age, size, regulation status, business model (main lending 
method), sustainability, loan size, and ownership type (whether an MFI is a non-profit 
organization or otherwise). The measurement of sustainability follows Zhao and Wry’s 
(2016) approach and this is a confirmatory factor analysis of three financial indicators: 
operational self-sufficiency (extent to which operating revenues cover costs), return on assets 
(net income as a percentage of average assets), and write-off ratio (proportion of loan 
portfolio deemed irrecoverable and written off).  Older, smaller, and more sustainable MFIs 
are more likely to target women (Zhao & Wry, 2016). Individual lending methods reach 
fewer women than group-based methods (Cull et al., 2007). Women are often targeted with 
smaller loan amounts (D’Espallier et al., 2013b). NGOs and unregulated MFIs are more 
likely to target women than their shareholder-owned and regulated counterparts (Frank, 
2008; Roberts, 2013). 
Outreach to women is also influenced by the macroeconomic condition of the countries in 






demand for microfinance services in that country and indeed, countries in which MFIs 
operate are in diverse macroeconomic situations (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011). To account for 
diverse macroeconomic conditions, I use contextual control variables. Specifically, 
following Zhao and Wry (2016), I use five macroeconomic control variables. The first is 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity), which 
controls for wealth at the country level.  The second is economic freedom index, which 
controls for the degree of economic liberalization in the countries in which MFIs operate. 
The third macroeconomic variable, official development assistance (ODA) (expressed as a 
percentage of gross national income), controls for the amount of aid received by developing 
countries from developed partners that is earmarked for fighting female poverty (Asongu, 
2016; Elgström, 2000; Grown et al., 2016). The fourth and the fifth macroeconomic variables 
are political instability and democracy. Regional dummies are included as additional controls 
to account for possible effects that stem from the heterogeneous geographical provenance of 
MFIs.  
Empirical Strategy  
The regression models use generalized least squares (GLS) to analyze the female outreach 
performance of MFIs per year. A Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test favored 
random effects over pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) (χ2 = 481.00, p < 0.000). The 
random effects regression is the main method used as it enables one to estimate the 
coefficients of time-invariant regressors such as the international founder and business model 
variables. Time dummies are included in the models to address unobserved temporal effects. 
Serial correlations and heteroscedasticity are tested and subsequently addressed with robust 
standard errors clustered at the MFI level. 
I conclude this section with a brief discussion on endogeneity. It is possible that MFIs’ 
outreach to women, their internationalization, and the measure of gender discrimination are 
simultaneously determined. Yet, such endogeneity concerns arising from reverse causality 
are minimized by the fact that the two main explanatory variables are exogenous. The first 
is gender discrimination (measured by SIGI). It is exogenous by virtue of the fact that the 
cultural values on which it is based—societal norms, traditions, and familial laws that 
discriminate against women—are enduring and remain stable over time (Johnson, 2004; 






are present from the inception of the organization, this variable is constant over time and 
predates all performance metrics—social or financial—as well as any other organization 
outcomes. These mitigating factors notwithstanding, I conduct supplementary analyses to 
address possible endogeneity concerns (see Section 4.1). 
3.2. Data  
For this study, all data on MFIs is hand-collected from the rating reports of five leading 
microfinance rating agencies: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, M-CRIL, and 
CRISIL. The sample consist of 213 MFIs that operate in 65 countries worldwide. Rating 
agencies rely on historical information and hence, in addition to data from the rating year, 
there are additional firm-year observations per MFI for periods prior to the rating year. The 
unbalanced panel data consists of observations over an eight-year period from 2008 to 2015, 
with the majority of the data relating to the first half of this period. Many MFIs underwent 
multiple ratings during this period. 
Rating data has several merits. It undergoes auditing and verification during the rating 
process and, as a result, such data is trustworthy and of high quality compared to other public 
sources of microfinance data that are usually voluntarily self-reported by MFIs (Hudon & 
Traca, 2011). Additionally, rating data is arguably the most representative of the 
microfinance industry as it embodies both small and large institutions globally (D’Espallier 
et al., 2013b). Most MFIs that undergo rating are usually international since rating reports 
have high appeal to international fund providers. Thus, rating data supplies variables that are 
instrumental for capturing the internationalization of MFIs. Additionally, using information 
from institutions that have undergone institutional and social ratings yields a homogeneous 
sample of transparent double bottom line MFIs. A possible weakness of the dataset is the 
low representation of member-based cooperatives, though these are by definition national as 
they are member-based. 
The country-level data is obtained from the following sources: SIGI is obtained from the 
OECD database (https://www.genderindex.org), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
and the ratio of official development assistance (ODA) to gross national income (GNI) are 
obtained from the World Bank Database (https://data.worldbank.org/), the economic 
freedom index is obtained from the Heritage Foundation (https://www.heritage.org/index/), 






Transitions dataset (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html), and data on political 
instability is obtained from the State Failure Problem dataset of the Political Instability Task 
Force (http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html). 
Summary Statistics 
Table 1 defines the variables and presents the summary statistics. Women constitute 55.4% 
of the total clients served by the average MFI. This shows that women are favorite clients of 
many MFIs. On the other hand, the minimum value of 6% shows that some MFIs serve very 
few women. The mean value for SIGI is 0.192, indicating that most MFIs operate in gender-
unfriendly countries. Internationally founded MFIs constitute 30% of the total sample of 
institutions in the dataset. Such a high percentage attests to the high essential participation 
of international players in the microfinance industry. 
Similar to recently studied MFIs (Liñares-Zegarra & Wilson, 2018), the typical MFI in the 
dataset has been operating for about 14 years and controls US$ 29.9 million worth of assets 
(logarithm of total assets is 16.154). Regarding the business model, 73.6% of the MFIs use 
individual lending as their main lending method, though most of them do so in parallel with 
solidarity group lending or village banking. All the same, this finding confirms recent trends 
in lending methods where MFIs are shifting from group-based to individual lending 
(Kodongo & Kendi, 2013).  
In the sample, 55.7% of the MFIs are subject to local banking regulations in the countries in 
which they operate. 31.2% of the MFIs in the dataset are NGOs. The mean logarithm of GDP 
per capita is 8.570, equivalent to US$ 7,457.8. The typical country in the dataset has an 
economic freedom score of 0.583 and receives ODA that is approximately 4.3% of its GNI. 
The mean values of political instability and democracy are 0.966 and 3.844, respectively. 
Like other datasets, the Latin America and Caribbean region hosts the highest fraction of 
MFIs (44.1%) while the Middle East and North Africa region hosts the lowest (4.8%). The 
remainder is distributed as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa (26.7%), Europe and Central Asia 
(15%), and Southeast Asia and the Pacific (9.4%). 
In Table 2, the highest correlation is between the international founder variable and the 
interaction between SIGI and the international founder variable (0.732). Though somewhat 






(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Kenedy, 2008)16. To guarantee that multicollinearity 
is not a serious concern, I compute the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable. As 
shown in Table 2, the highest VIF is 4.16, which is below the cutoff point of 10 (Hair et al., 




16 To confirm that the high correlation poses no problem to the estimations, I include the independent variables 






Table 1: Definition of variables and summary statistics      
Variable Definition  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent variable       
Female client (%) Percentage of female clients served by MFI 641 0.554 0.203 0.060 1 
Independent variables      
SIGI Social Institutions and Gender Index 641 0.192 0.146 0.002 0.6011 
Int. founder 1 if MFI was founded by an international organization or an 
international private individual and 0 otherwise 
641 0.300 0.458 0 1 
Control variables       
Age Number of years the institution has been in microfinance business 641 14.415 8.901 0 52 
Size Logarithm of total assets  641 16.154 1.509 10.728 19.869 
Total assets (‘$’ mil) Total assets controlled by MFI 641 29.900 53.300 0.0456 426.000 
Regulation 1 if MFI is subject to local banking regulations and 0 otherwise 641 0.557 0.497 0 1 
Business model 1 if MFI mainly uses individual lending method and 0 otherwise 641 0.736 0.441 0 1 
Sustainability Measure of the financial sustainability of MFIs 641 -0.027 0.172 -1.670 0.506 
ALS/GNI per cap Average loan outstanding scaled by GNI per capita 641 0.322 0.646 0.011 11.852 
NGO 1 if MFI is a Non-Governmental Organization and 0 otherwise 641 0.312 0.464 0 1 
(ln)GDP per capita Logarithm of Gross Domestic Income per capita 641 8.570 0.917 6.422 10.501 
GDP per capita (‘$’) GDP per capita of the country in which MFI operates 641 7457.800 5544.220 615.278 36347.340 
Economic freedom The heritage index of the country in which MFI operates 641 0.583 0.064 0.414 0.722 
ODA Official Development Assistance received as a percentage of GNI  641 0.043 0.057 -0.002 0.463 
Political instability A measure of the degree of political instability of the country in 
which MFI operates 
641 0.966 0.746 0.000 3.326 
Democracy A measure of democracy of the country in which MFI operates 641 3.844 10.261 -88 10 
SSA 1 if MFI is in Sub-Saharan Africa and 0 otherwise 641 0.267 0.443 0 1 
LAC 1 if MFI is in Latin America and Caribbean and 0 otherwise 641 0.441 0.497 0 1 
ECA 1 if MFI is in Europe and Central Asia and 0 otherwise  641 0.150 0.357 0 1 
MENA 1 if MFI is in Middle East and North Africa and 0 otherwise 641 0.048 0.215 0 1 







Table 2: Correlation matrix          
 No. VIF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
SIGI 1 1.78 1.000 
        
Int. founder 2 3.390 -0.171 1.000 
       
SIGI × Int. founder 3 3.070 0.184 0.732 1.000 
      
Age 4 1.35 -0.122 -0.173 -0.130 1.000 
     
Size 5 1.64 -0.163 0.050 -0.051 0.348 1.000 
    
Regulation 6 1.70 0.159 0.103 0.143 -0.048 0.216 1.000 
   
Business model 7 1.50 0.050 -0.250 -0.254 0.091 0.200 0.172 1.000 
  
Sustainability 8 1.26 0.065 -0.217 -0.168 0.151 0.212 0.025 0.229 1.000 
 
ALS/GNI per cap 9 2.10 0.299 -0.218 -0.092 0.032 0.130 0.390 0.354 0.107 1.000 
NGO 10 1.80 -0.129 -0.051 -0.034 0.156 -0.091 -0.511 -0.308 -0.001 -0.391 
(ln)GDP per capita 11 2.29 -0.275 -0.093 -0.249 0.071 0.162 -0.135 0.176 0.076 -0.327 
Economic freedom 12 1.30 -0.168 -0.003 -0.054 -0.047 0.110 -0.009 0.121 0.019 -0.129 
ODA 13 2.14 0.331 0.094 0.192 -0.221 -0.282 0.228 -0.061 -0.182 0.366 
Political instability 14 1.50 0.221 0.024 0.043 -0.121 -0.027 0.005 -0.131 0.013 -0.071 
Democracy 15 1.23 -0.133 -0.099 -0.160 0.131 0.050 -0.119 0.036 -0.046 -0.082 
SEAP 16 1.96 -0.188 0.117 -0.010 0.059 -0.022 -0.102 -0.124 0.035 -0.202 
LAC 17 4.16 -0.270 -0.321 -0.356 0.317 0.237 -0.301 0.147 0.094 -0.147 
ECA 18 2.28 -0.035 0.251 0.122 -0.195 0.023 0.278 0.211 0.106 0.131 












 No. 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
NGO 10 1.000          
(ln)GDP per capita 11 0.077 1.000 
        
Economic freedom 12 -0.103 0.205 1.000 
       
ODA 13 -0.209 -0.559 -0.227 1.000 
      
Political instability 14 -0.115 -0.213 0.135 0.203 1.000 
     
Democracy 15 0.080 0.161 0.135 -0.199 -0.085 1.000 
    
SEAP 16 0.026 -0.028 0.015 -0.128 0.284 0.042 1.000 
   
LAC 17 0.256 0.352 0.059 -0.448 -0.302 0.296 -0.286 1.000 
  
ECA 18 -0.283 0.292 0.218 0.000 -0.120 -0.223 -0.135 -0.373 1.000 
 









4. Empirical findings  
The results of the empirical investigation are displayed in Table 3. In models 1 to 4, the 
percentage of female clients is regressed on the independent variables only, without any 
control variables. The remaining models, 5 to 8, include all control variables.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that outreach to women is lower in countries with high gender 
discrimination than in countries with low gender discrimination. This hypothesis is 
supported by the results shown in Table 3 as SIGI is significantly negative in all models, 
with or without control variables (p<0.01). Thus, high gender discrimination significantly 
reduces the share of women served by MFIs. This finding concurs with Zhao and Wry (2016) 
who report that patriarchy manifests in family, religion, and state to reduce outreach to 
women by MFIs. It is also in line with the position of several scholars who argue that gender 
discrimination precludes women from market-based activities and could frustrate exchanges 
between MFIs and women (e.g., Chakrabarty & Bass, 2014; Kabeer, 2005; Mair et al., 2012; 
Rahman, 1999; Schuler et al., 1998).  
Relating this finding to Drori et al. (2019) reveals a notable twist: though MFIs are likely to 
focus on women in discriminatory contexts, the extent of their outreach could nevertheless 
be restricted by societal norms. Drori et al. (2019) found that the gender-targeting strategy 
of MFIs is context-dependent and that MFIs declare it their mission to target financially 
excluded women in contexts where women face discrimination in accessing banking 
services. Thus, according to their findings, MFIs adapt their targeting strategy to the needs 
of the local environment. Yet the findings of the present study show that gender 
discrimination restricts MFIs’ actual outreach to women. Overall, the findings complement 
Drori et al. (2019) and enlighten our understanding of the complexity of fighting poverty. It 
also reopens the debate on whether microfinance is a quick remedy for gender discrimination 
(Garikipati, 2008; Hunt & Kasynathan, 2001). 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that internationally founded MFIs exhibit higher female outreach 
performance than their locally founded counterparts. In Table 3, the coefficient of the 
international founder variable is significantly positive in all models where it is present 
(p<0.01). Thus, MFIs that are founded by international actors have more women among their 
clients than their locally founded counterparts. This result supports the second hypothesis 




of internationalization and outreach to women (Dorfleitner et al., 2017; Mersland et al., 2011; 
Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013; Mori et al., 2015). It appears that international founders have a 
strong preference for female clients. It nevertheless remains an open question whether this 
extensive outreach to women is motivated by international founders’ inclination to achieve 
the developmental goal of fighting female poverty or by women’s high repayment rate.  
Hypothesis 3 predicted that an international founder moderates the relationship between 
gender discrimination and microfinance outreach to women. To test this hypothesis, an 
interaction between the international founder and gender discrimination variables was 
included in models 4 and 8. It was found that the coefficient of the interaction term in both 
models is positive and significant. Thus, the test confirmed the hypothesis that an 
international founder combines with gender discrimination to increase the proportion of 
women served by MFIs. Stated differently, internationally founded MFIs reach more women 
than locally founded MFIs do in contexts where women face much discrimination. These 
results are consistent with Sanyal (2009), who document internationally supported pro-
women microfinance projects in male-dominated societies, and with Zhao and Wry (2016), 
who stress the need for MFIs to attract foreign support when serving women in patriarchal 
countries. More generally, the findings also corroborate De Beule et al. (2019), who show 
that international social enterprises outperform their local counterparts when local 
institutions are unsupportive. The reasons for this, according to the authors, are that 
international social enterprises leverage their internal capabilities, are less reliant on host 











Table 3: SIGI and percentage of female clients: moderating effect of international founder 
 Dependent variable: Percentage of female clients 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
SIGI -0.215***  -0.210*** -0.272*** -0.294***  -0.273*** -0.308*** 
 (0.050)  (0.049) (0.059) (0.064)  (0.062) (0.068) 
Int. initiator  0.232*** 0.218*** 0.181***  0.229*** 0.206*** 0.180*** 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)  (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
Int. initiator × SIGI    0.231***    0.172** 
    (0.086)    (0.085) 
Age     -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size     0.000 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
     (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Regulation     -0.021 -0.031** -0.022 -0.018 
     (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) 
Business model     -0.073** -0.056** -0.054** -0.056** 
     (0.033) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Sustainability     0.002 0.019 0.011 0.010 
     (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
ALS/GNI per cap     -0.027*** -0.021** -0.019** -0.019** 
     (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
NGO     0.034** 0.029** 0.033** 0.034** 
     (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
(ln)GDP per capita     -0.020 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 
     (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
Economic freedom     0.028 0.118 0.045 0.030 
     (0.147) (0.169) (0.144) (0.139) 
ODA     -0.009 0.029 -0.037 -0.031 
     (0.165) (0.170) (0.153) (0.154) 
Political instability     -0.032** -0.025* -0.017 -0.013 
     (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Democracy     -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.610*** 0.492*** 0.535*** 0.548*** 0.947*** 0.662*** 0.769*** 0.778*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.177) (0.194) (0.179) (0.179) 
Time dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics         
Observations 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 641 
# of MFIs 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 213 
R2 Overall 0.164 0.268 0.344 0.386 0.465 0.524 0.601 0.624 
R2 Between 0.216 0.273 0.353 0.390 0.490 0.536 0.607 0.627 
Wald χ2 statistic 18.17 68.62 89.04 96.41 160.2 311.7 338.2 347.5 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 3 shows the regression results for the relationship between outreach to women by MFIs (measured by percentage of female clients) 
and gender discrimination (measured by SIGI). The table also shows the moderating effect of internationalization (measured by 
international founder). Models 1 to 4 include no controls while models 5 to 8 include all controls. Refer to Table 1 for definition of 






Figure1: The moderating effect of international founder on the relationship between 
outreach to women and gender discrimination 
  
 
This significant interaction is plotted in Figure 1. In the figure, two observations are apparent. 
First, internationally founded MFIs reach out to more women than their local counterparts 
do regardless of the level of gender discrimination in the culture. Second, while the 
relationship between gender discrimination and outreach to women is negative for both 
internationally and locally founded MFIs, the slope is steeper for the latter than for the 
former. Thus, internationalization lessens the negative influence of gender discrimination on 
microfinance outreach to women.  
Some of the control variables show results that are worth mentioning. As expected, MFIs 
that use individual lending as their main lending method reach fewer women compared to 
those that use group-based lending methods (Cull et al., 2007; D’Espallier et al., 2013b). It 
appears that group-based lending models⎯village banking and solidarity group 
lending⎯are compatible with the female outreach strategy of MFIs. It is easier to organize 
women into groups than men and moreover most women rely on the social collateral 
associated with group-based lending methods since they often lack physical collateral 
(Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). The coefficient of average loan size is significantly 




(Agier & Szafarz, 2013a; Agier & Szafarz, 2013b; D’Espallier et al., 2013b). Consistent with 
Frank (2008), the results show that MFIs that are organized as NGOs serve more women. 
Given the commercialization trend observed during the past decade (D’Espallier, Goedecke, 
Hudon, & Mersland, 2017), a natural question is whether targeting women is evolving into 
a specialized niche for NGO MFIs. 
 
4.1. Further analyses and robustness checks 
In addition to the models discussed above, I conducted several supplementary analyses to 
assess the robustness of the findings.  
Alternative estimation methods: The random effects GLS regression assumes that the 
unobserved time-invariant MFI characteristics are uncorrelated with the regressors. This 
assumption could be problematic if any of the regressors is endogenous. I addressed this 
endogeneity concern in two ways. First, I included a lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable in the model. This procedure controls for the effects of all time-invariant 
heterogeneity across MFIs. The results reported in column (1) of Table 4 match those 
reported in Table 3. Second, I estimated Hausman–Taylor regressions. The Hausman–Taylor 
method is an instrumental variable estimator that uses the exogenous regressors in the model 
as instruments for the endogenous ones and allows for the coefficient of time-invariant 
regressors to be estimated. The results are robust to this alternative specification (see column 
(2) of Table 4). I also implemented a dynamic panel data model, namely, a system-
generalized method of moments (GMM), to deal with other potential sources of endogeneity 
such as simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity (Ullah, Akhtar, & Zaefarian, 2018). The 
results, reported in column (3) of Table 4, remain unchanged. Also, a cross-sectional 
estimation technique (pooled OLS) produced the same results as those reported in Table 3 
(see column (4) of Table 4). Finally, in an unreported analysis, I used Mahalanobis’ distance 
matching technique to select MFIs that have international founders and a control group of 
MFIs that have local founders. Of the resulting sample of 124 MFIs, 63 had international 
founders and 61 had local founders. Regression results on this reduced sample confirm those 
reported in Table 3.   
Alternative dependent variable: Instead of the proportion of female clients, another proxy 




2016). I investigated whether the results hold when this dependent variable is used. The 
findings are similar to those reported in Table 3, with the coefficients of SIGI, Int. founder, 
and Int. founder × SIGI being statistically significant with the expected signs (see column 
(6) of Table 4).  
Additional control variables: To reduce the risk of omitted variable bias, I added additional 
control variables. First, in line with the argument that mission determines outcome (Mersland 
et al., 2019b), I controlled for whether an MFI pursues a women’s empowerment mission. 
This is a variable that takes the value of “1” if an MFI’s mission statement has an explicit 
focus on women and “0” otherwise. In the dataset, mission statements are available for only 
socially rated MFIs and hence this analysis covers a reduced sample of 143 MFIs. Second, I 
controlled for female leadership and board gender diversity (see, Gregorič, Oxelheim, 
Randøy, & Thomsen, 2013; Gregorič, Oxelheim, Randøy, & Thomsen, 2017). MFIs that 
have women at the helm of management are likely to target women (Périlleux & Szafarz, 
2015). In line with this argument, I checked whether the results are robust to the addition of 
two female leadership variables: female board chairperson (binary) and proportion of female 
directors. The results (unreported) remain unchanged after adding these controls. Third, I 
included origin and founder fixed effects to account for other possible effects, e.g., colonial 
history and bilateral relations between the home countries of the international founders and 
the countries where they invest (Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Weiler, Klöck, & Dornan, 2018). 
The results are robust to the addition of these fixed effects (see column (5) of Table 4). 
Separate analyses for non-profit and for-profit MFIs: Although the reported results support 
the hypothesis that an international founder moderates the relationship between gender 
discrimination and microfinance outreach to women, I ran additional analyses to probe the 
sensitivity of the findings to the commercial orientation of the institutions. Studies have 
shown that non-profit MFIs serve more women than their for-profit counterparts do (Roberts, 
2013; Zhao & Wry, 2016). Against this backdrop, one would expect the findings to be more 
pronounced in non-profit MFIs than in for-profit MFIs. To test this, I split the sample into 
non-profit and for-profit MFIs and re-ran the models on each subsample. As expected, the 
interaction between gender discrimination and international founder has a significant and 
positive association with the percentage of women served by non-profit MFIs. For for-profit 




Using non-female social performance measures as dependent variables: In untabulated 
analyses, I investigated whether the results on female outreach performance are merely 
accidental, by substituting the dependent variable, percentage of female clients, with two 
non-female social performance proxies often used in microfinance research: average loan 
size (scaled by GNI per capita) and percentage of rural clients. Average loan size measures 
the poverty level of an MFI’s clientele, also called depth of outreach, and is therefore a 
typical proxy for poverty alleviation (Cull et al., 2007; Mersland et al., 2019b). Percentage 
of rural clients measures the degree of rurality of an MFI’s clientele and is a standard proxy 
for rural outreach performance (Mersland et al., 2019b). In both cases, SIGI, Int. Founder, 
and Int. founder × SIGI are insignificant. This confirms that the findings reported in Table 3 
are specific to the female outreach strategy of MFIs. 
 
Table 4: SIGI and microfinance outreach to women: moderating effect of international founder 
VARIABLES Percentage of female clients  Number of 
female clients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
        
SIGI -0.047** -0.194*** -0.242*** -0.642*** -0.318***  -1.452*** 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.089) (0.037) (0.068)  (0.322) 
Int. initiator -0.005 0.448*** 0.089 0.061*** 0.101***  0.283** 
 (0.006) (0.101) (0.097) (0.019) (0.039)  (0.130) 
Int. initiator × SIGI 0.060** 0.120** 0.267** 0.704*** 0.183**  1.037*** 
 (0.028) (0.059) (0.117) (0.102) (0.086)  (0.334) 
Age -0.000 -0.003* 0.002 0.001* 0.001  0.007 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.006) 
Size -0.001 0.002 -0.027* -0.014*** -0.007  0.783*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.014) (0.004) (0.005)  (0.081) 
Regulation -0.001 -0.031** -0.021 0.016 -0.015  0.198** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.031) (0.011) (0.015)  (0.085) 
Business model -0.005 -0.034** -0.005 -0.054*** -0.054**  -0.205** 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.043) (0.014) (0.027)  (0.089) 
Sustainability 0.000 0.012 0.028 -0.031 0.007  0.252* 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.043) (0.035) (0.017)  (0.138) 
ALS/GNI per cap -0.003 -0.009 -0.011 -0.035*** -0.018**  -0.747*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008)  (0.097) 
NGO 0.002 -0.001 0.066 0.061*** 0.032**  0.148* 
 (0.004) (0.018) (0.078) (0.012) (0.014)  (0.081) 
(ln)GDP per capita 0.001 0.049 -0.008 -0.026** -0.003  -0.822*** 
 (0.003) (0.032) (0.017) (0.012) (0.018)  (0.118) 
Economic freedom -0.016 0.064 0.036 -0.197** -0.003  0.474 
 (0.030) (0.087) (0.116) (0.081) (0.137)  (0.518) 
ODA -0.001 0.055 -0.120 -0.420*** -0.035  -0.679 




Political instability 0.001 -0.011 0.004 0.001 -0.015  0.058 
 (0.002) (0.020) (0.011) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.069) 
Democracy -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.000  -0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.005) 
Female clients (%) t-1 0.937***  0.543***     
 (0.018)  (0.084)     
Constant 0.071* 0.065 0.711** 1.178*** 0.809***  1.303 
 (0.041) (0.276) (0.285) (0.129) (0.176)  (1.503) 
Time dummies Yes No Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Origin dummies No No No No Yes  No 
Founder dummies No No No No Yes  No 
Model statistics        
Observations 540 641 542 641 641  621 
# of MFIs 207 213 208 213 213  212 
R2 Overall 0.976   0.693 0.672  0.840 
R2 Between 0.989    0.688  0.851 
Wald χ2 / F statistic 40322 135.4 910.5 54.80 18984  961.1 
Prob > χ2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
Method RE HT GMM OLS RE  RE 
This table shows the regression results for the relationship between gender discrimination and outreach to women by MFIs. 
Percentage of female clients is the dependent variable for models 1 to 5 while number of female clients is the dependent 
variable in model 6. Refer to Table 1 for definition of variables. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. GMM statistics: 
Arellano-Bond AR(1) = -2.73 (p=0.006), Arellano-Bond AR(2)= 0.539 (p= 0.590), Hansen test = 87.15 (p = 0.835).  *, ** 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, I investigate the relationship between gender discrimination and microfinance 
outreach to women. Then, I test whether an international founder moderates this relationship. 
Based on arguments from existing studies, I hypothesized that, all else equal, gender 
discrimination reduces microfinance outreach to women and that this relationship is 
moderated by the origin of the founder (international versus local). A random effects 
generalized least squares regression was employed to analyze data on 213 MFIs from 65 
countries. 
Confirming the hypotheses, the findings show a significant negative relationship between 
gender discrimination and female outreach performance of MFIs, suggesting that MFIs serve 
fewer female clients in contexts where women face much discrimination. Thus, societal 
norms that promote male dominance militate against the redress efforts of MFIs to provide 
women with microfinance services. Consistent with the existing body of research, the 




founded counterparts do. Finally, the findings also show that the international founder and 
gender discrimination variables interact to increase the share of women served by MFIs. In 
other words, MFIs that are set up by international actors support women’s financial 
inclusion, especially in contexts where women are confronted with barriers to accessing 
banking services.  
This study contributes to the literature by highlighting how the interplay between societal 
norms and internationalization affects the women-targeting strategy of MFIs. It improves 
our understanding of cultural influences on financial exclusion of women and how such 
influences can be mitigated by internationalization. The findings of the study also highlight 
the critical role of international actors in driving the focus on women in microfinance.  
A limitation of this study is the lack of data on the underlying mechanisms through which 
societal norms limit women’s access to microfinance services. For example, I lack data on 
the loan application processes of MFIs. Consequently, it is unclear from the findings whether 
the negative effect of gender discrimination on outreach to women is the result of 
discriminatory lending practices by MFIs or the result of women’s own self-exclusion from 
microfinance services. Using data from a Brazilian MFI, Agier and Szafarz (2013a) report 
that loan denials are not gender-biased. Nevertheless, a direct focus on the mechanisms 
underlying loan denials from a cross-cultural perspective could be a fruitful avenue for future 
research. Specifically, qualitative insights would be useful in exposing these mechanisms in 
ways that enhance our understanding on how discriminatory societal norms affect 
microfinance outreach to women.  
Indeed, the empirical findings show that internationally founded MFIs reach more women 
than do locally founded ones, especially in contexts where women face much discrimination 
in accessing financial services. While this is an indication of high social outreach 
performance, it should not be necessarily interpreted that loans to women constitute a 
significant proportion of the total value of MFIs’ gross loan portfolio (Crabb & Keller, 2006). 
This is because women take smaller loans (in dollar value) than men. Thus, the proportion 
of the dollar value of gross loan portfolio attributable to female clients may be less than that 
attributable to men even if women constitute the majority of an MFI’s clientele. 
More generally, a related question is whether the high outreach to women means that 




for the female clients themselves. It appears that women are good for the microfinance model 
but the question of whether microfinance is good for women is still controversial as the 
literature is divided on the effect of microfinance on women’s empowerment (e.g., Banerjee 
et al., 2015a; Banerjee et al., 2015b; Garikipati, 2008; Kabeer, 2001). Several scholars have 
reported that in patriarchal societies, women are compelled to transfer loans to their husbands 
who eventually become the users of the money (Garikipati, 2008; Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Pitt 
et al., 2006; Rahman, 1996). Moreover, women often bear the burden of repaying the loans 
from their personal resources when husbands fail to honor loan obligations, a situation that 
may leave women worse off than before (Balasubramanian, 2013).  
From an internationalization perspective, future studies could further investigate the 
influence of microfinance on women’s welfare. Further research is also needed to establish 
whether internationally founded MFIs’ extensive outreach to women comes at the expense 
of financial sustainability and whether there are moderating institutional factors. This is 
because significant costs associated with the process of empowering women with 
microfinance services can influence the ability of these organizations to achieve their bottom 
lines (D’Espallier et al., 2013).  
Why do internationally founded MFIs seek to reach more women in settings where women 
face discrimination. One reason is obvious: to fight discriminatory societal norms through 
women’s empowerment. Whether the provision of microfinance services alters the direction 
of societal norms is an open question. Studies have shown that lending is unlikely to liberate 
women in terms of affecting their position in the household (Garikipati, 2008; Hunt & 
Kasynathan, 2001). Thus, women may still suffer discrimination even after being 
economically empowered. For example, husbands can appropriate loans to women (Goetz 
& Gupta, 1996; Pitt et al., 2006; Rahman, 1996) or coerce women to take microfinance loans 
on their behalf (Hunt & Kasynathan, 2001). It is thus legitimate to ask whether international 
bodies really impact societal norms. To answer this, future microfinance studies need to take 
a more fine-tuned approach to the obvious complexity of societal norms by studying how 
international agencies address women’s rights and gender relations in areas such as decision 
making and control over loan use, business-related decisions, marriage, divorce, and 
bargaining in the household (Balasubramanian, 2013; Hunt & Kasynathan, 2001). 
If international organizations do impact local societal norms, then a related question is 




this subject by exploiting the parallels between international assistance (financial and non-
financial) to MFIs (Mersland et al., 2019a) and foreign aid to developing countries 
(Bodenheimer, 1971; Hayter, I971). This line of research would provide further insights into 
how internationalization interacts with gender norms to empower women. 
Finally, future research needs to address how international founders adapt to local systems 
in order to reach women, including the process of overcoming local barriers. From a 
theoretical standpoint, one would expect higher social outreach to come with some level of 
local embeddedness (Dacin, Dacin, & Tracey, 2011). For example, how do international 
founders deal with local regulations and possible liabilities of foreignness? Qualitative 
studies are also needed on the process of acquiring and leveraging knowledge and experience 
(e.g., value co-creation with clients), adoption of positive organizational ethics, and 
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A Hybrid Approach to International Market Selection: The Case of 
Impact Investing Organizations17 
Abstract 
Social enterprises are hybrid organizations that concurrently pursue social and economic 
goals and hence are mid-way between conventional capitalistic firms and non-profit 
organizations. Many social enterprises are becoming international; delivering services across 
borders. With the objective of understanding the internationalization of these unconventional 
organizations, this paper examines their international market selection decision based on host 
countries’ macroeconomic conditions. Generally, we hypothesize that the international 
market selection decision of social enterprises is tied to their hybridity, an overarching 
characteristic that sets them apart from other types of organizations. We build an original 
dataset with information on 41 European and North American impact investing organizations 
and 153 developing countries. Largely, our findings support the hypothesis, suggesting that 
social enterprises operate in foreign countries that offer a desirable balance between their 
social and financial goals. However, they avoid contexts with high country risk, factors that 
could cause a shortfall in expected returns. 
 Key words: Cross-Border Investments, Internationalization, Social Enterprises, 
International Market Selection, Macroeconomic Factors, Hybrid Organizations  
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‘The business of doing good,’ or what Miller, Grimes, McMullen, and Vogus (2012, p. 616) 
term “venturing for others with heart and head,” has become popular. Across the globe, 
social enterprises are gaining momentum. In the Netherlands, for example, the social 
enterprise sector grew by more than 70% during the period 2010 to 2015 (Keizer, Stikkers, 
Heijmans, Carsouw, & Aanholt, 2016). Faced with demographic changes and financial 
crises, governments and the general public have high hopes in social enterprises because 
these firms promise to address social problems without the need for long-term public (or 
private) subsidies (Zahra, Gedajlovic, Neubaum, & Shulman, 2009). According to Doherty, 
Haugh, and Lyon (2014), social enterprises are organizations that strive to achieve desirable 
social goals, e.g., reducing unemployment, hunger and poverty eradication, while 
maintaining their financial sustainability. Thus, by pursuing social and financial goals at the 
same time, social enterprises are hybrid organizations that couple dual institutional 
logics―social and economic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).  
Three characteristics distinguish social enterprises from pure philanthropic organizations and 
capitalistic firms. The first is their hybridity which stem from the simultaneous pursuit of 
social and financial objectives (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). This is perhaps the most 
overarching and distinct feature of social enterprises as both social and economic value 
creation is core to them (Peredo & McLean, 2006). Hybridity is also the main source of 
tension in social enterprises since social and financial logics often conflict (Wry & Zhao, 
2018). Second, social enterprises must be financially self-sustainable, implying that they 
must be able to generate income to cover their costs without donor support (Mair & Marti, 
2006; Townsend & Hart, 2008). Social enterprises do so by operating with conventional 
business models in the delivery of their products and services at the marketplace. Due to their 
mission orientation and the low economic status of their clients (less privileged people), 
social enterprises may not charge competitive prices for their products and services. Yet, 
prices must be high enough to break even at least. This explains why achieving financial 
sustainability is tricky for most social enterprises (Doherty et al., 2014). Third, social 
enterprises fill institutional voids that are unattended by governments and the market (Zahra 
et al., 2009). Thus, social enterprises supply products and services that are unavailable in 




actors. Such voids are usually costly and unprofitable to fill, a reason for their neglect by the 
market. 
In addition to the global popularity of social enterprises, we have in recent years observed a 
significant increase in cross-border operations by these hybrid firms (Porter & Kramer, 
2011). These cross-border activities can be global or regional (McKague, Menke, 
Arasaratnam, 2014; Wang, Alon, & Kimble, 2015). In some instances, pro-social 
organizations incorporated in western countries expand their developmental interventions 
into developing countries either directly or through support-based partnerships with local 
organizations (Golesorkhi, Mersland, Piekkari, Pishchulov, & Randøy, 2019; Golesorkhi, 
Mersland, Randøy, & Shenkar, 2019). In most cases, such collaborations involve the transfer 
of personnel, knowledge and international best practices. 
Despite the burgeoning literature, the internationalization of social enterprises has received 
only a paucity of scholarly attention (Pless, 2012; Zahra, Rawhouser, Bhawe, Neubaum, & 
Hayton, 2008) and until now, no study has, to the best of our knowledge, investigated the 
international market selection decisions of social enterprises. We aim to contribute to the 
literature by explaining the international market decision of social enterprises based on the 
macroeconomic conditions of host countries. The study also contributes to our understanding 
of hybrid firms, an understanding which has been a standing call in many previous studies 
(e.g. See, Battilana et al., 2015; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013; Smith et al., 
2013). We set out to address the following research question: Into which macroeconomic 
environment do social enterprises go when investing abroad? We argue that host country 
macroeconomic conditions have a direct bearing on the ability of hybrid firms to balance the 
trade-off between their social and financial goals (Ault & Spicer, 2014; Hermes, Lensink, & 
Meesters, 2011; Smith, Gonin, & Besharov, 2013). For hybrid organizations, the core need 
to make a social impact distinguishes their internationalization process from those of 
mainstream firms. Therefore, conventional theories on internationalization may not be 
sufficient to understand the cross-border operations of social enterprises (Peredo & McLean, 
2006).  
To answer the research question, we use an original dataset comprising of data from 41 
impact investing organizations that originate from Europe and North America. Generally, 
impact investing organizations invest with a dual motive: generating social impact and 




impact investing firms are faced with trade-offs because these polar goals can conflict (Glac, 
2009). For their desired social goal, the impact investing organizations in our dataset 
contribute to fighting global poverty by providing finance as well as a wide range of non-
financial assistance to local microfinance institutions (MFIs) in developing countries. MFIs 
are specialized organizations that are known for alleviating poverty through the provision of 
banking services to marginalized and disadvantaged persons with income generating 
activities (Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010). Previous studies have shown that many MFIs rely 
on their partners in the global North―mostly impact investing organizations―for financing 
and technical solutions (Mersland, Randøy, & Strøm, 2011; Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). At 
the same time, being double bottom line organizations, the impact investors in our dataset 
equally aim at earning financial returns on their investments in the MFIs. In addition to the 
data on the impact investing organizations, we also gather macroeconomic data on 153 
developing countries.  
Based on existing literature on hybrid organizations, we generally hypothesize that social 
enterprises, in our case impact investing organizations, are likely to internationalize into 
countries where they have the opportunity to balance the competing demands of their dual 
institutional logics. Thus, social enterprises will target countries that are less developed, 
institutionally weak, and risky, but not countries where these macroeconomic indicators are 
at the worst levels. Largely, our empirical investigation supports this hypothesis. 
In sum, it appears that when going abroad, the average impact investing organization makes 
an optimum choice by selecting countries that offer a desirable balance in the trade-off 
between social and economic opportunities. We claim that impact investing organizations 
adopt this strategy to balance their often conflicting social and financial institutional logics. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual and theoretical framework. 
Section 3 outlines the methodological approach and the data while Section 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 presents our conclusions. 
2. Conceptual Framework: The International Market Selection of Social 
Enterprises 
We rely on existing literature on hybrid organizations to build a conceptual framework for 
our empirical work. We acknowledge that hybrid organizations are not restricted to only 




existing works have mainly focused on social enterprises. Therefore, we primarily rely on 
the social enterprise literature to develop our conceptual model and to formulate the research 
hypotheses. More so, our sample organizations, impact investing organizations, combine 
same institutional logics―social and business―as other social enterprises do.  
2.1. Social Enterprises 
Social enterprises are hybrid firms that fill institutional voids, left unattended by 
governments and the market, with business-based models (Pache & Santos, 2013; Stevens, 
Moray, & Bruneel, 2015). Therefore, in regions and societies where government and market 
failures are commonplace, social enterprises represent important rays of hope (Doherty et 
al., 2014). A unique characteristic of social enterprises is their hybridity that stems from their 
subscription to dual institutional logics: social welfare and financial sustainability (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013). Being 
hybrids, social enterprises are neither typical for-profit firms nor typical non-profit firms, but 
share characteristics of both types of firms (Peredo & McLean, 2006). Social enterprises are 
often subject to tension in maintaining their hybridity (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, & Model, 
2015; Smith et al., 2013). This tension is a direct consequence of balancing the conflicting 
demands of the dual institutional logics of social welfare and economic viability (Battilana 
& Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014). Often, failure to strike a desirable balance between them 
results in a trade-off, a situation where social enterprises sacrifice the prescriptions and 
outcomes of one logic in favor of those of the other (Hermes et al., 2011; Jay, 2013; Smith 
et al., 2013; Wry & Zhao, 2018). Nevertheless, social enterprises endeavour to achieve a 
satisfactory balance between the two logics since the definition of success encompasses 
excellence in both logics (Mair & Marti, 2006; Townsend & Hart, 2008). Stated differently, 
a social enterprise is said to be successful if it attains the feat of creating social value while 
at the same time being financially self-sustainable (Battilana & Dorado, 2010). 
On the international scene, social enterprises are confronted with this social-economic 
tension and need to strike a desirable balance. We demonstrate this using the three host-
country macroenvironmental factors—level of development, institutional strength, and 
country risk―discussed in the next section. We argue that the international market selection 
decision of social enterprises is largely shaped by their hybridity rather than the prescriptions 




2.2. International Market Selection and Host-Country Macroenvironmental Climate 
International market selection is one of the most salient as well as complex decisions an 
organization has to make during its expansion across borders (Clark, Li, & Shepherd, 2018; 
Papadopoulos, Martín Martín, & Gaston‐Breton, 2011). For social enterprises, this decision 
is highly bounded rational and complex due to inherent operating challenges in developing 
economies (Papadopoulos & Martín, 2011). Despite the seeming complexity, cross-border 
activities characterize many hybrid organizations (Zahra et al., 2009).  
The international market selection of an organization is mainly influenced by factors at two 
levels: target country-level factors and firm-level factors (Kim & Aguilera, 2016). Target 
country-level factors include market potential, competition, economic factors, political 
factors, and social factors, while firm-level factors include resources (human, financial, etc.), 
competencies (technical, managerial, etc.), and organizational goals (Brewer, 2001; Kim & 
Aguilera, 2016). The present study sheds light on how social enterprises select international 
markets based on the host-country’s macroeconomic conditions―level of development, 
institutional strength, and country risk (Bailey, 2017).  
Level of development of host country 
Market potential is a key determinant of international market selection by traditional firms 
(Brouthers, Mukhopadhyay, Wilkinson, & Brouthers, 2009; Brouthers & Nakos, 2005). 
Naturally, greater market potential is associated with higher profits, both in present and 
future terms (Head & Mayer, 2004). To excel, social enterprises require markets with good 
potential. Although market potential is necessary to guarantee the long-term profitability and 
growth of social enterprises, it is greater in more developed countries (Hanson, 2005). At the 
same time, social enterprises have a mandate to tackle diverse societal challenges, such as 
unemployment, financial and social exclusion, and hunger (Pache & Santos, 2013; Stevens 
et al., 2015; Townsend & Hart, 2008). These societal challenges and institutional voids are 
prevalent in most developing countries. As a result, developing countries provide attractive 
settings and opportunities for social enterprises to create deep social impact (Edwards & 
Hulme, 1996b).  In sum, developed countries offer promising climate to create economic 
value but less opportunities for creating social value (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b). The reverse 
is true for poor countries (Edwards & Hulme, 1996a). This is a clear manifestation of the 
trade-off thesis (Austin, Stevenson, & Wei‐Skillern, 2006; Doherty et al., 2014). Faced with 




social and economic objectives (Mair, Mayer, & Lutz, 2015). Pache and Santos (2013) term 
this response “selective coupling.” Against this backdrop, we formulate our first hypothesis 
as follows. 
Hypothesis 1: In selecting international markets, social enterprises target less 
developed countries but not the least developed ones.  
 
Strength of institutional environment 
Institutions explain economic growth and the general business environment in a given 
country, and it has been argued that institutions define the “rules of the game” (North, 1990, 
p. 3). The purpose of institutions is to protect property rights, enforce contracts between 
individuals and firms, and provide physical and regulatory infrastructure (Bailey, 2017; 
North, 1990). Stronger institutions facilitate business transactions and increase the quality of 
life of individuals by reducing transaction costs (Chen, Saarenketo, & Puumalainen, 2018; 
North, 1990; Roy & Oliver, 2009). Therefore, countries with stronger institutions seem to 
provide conducive environments for economic exchange (North, 1990; Verbeke & Kano, 
2013). This explains why profit-maximizing firms prefer countries with stronger institutions 
(Chen et al., 2018; Dau, 2013; Murtha & Lenway, 1994).  
By contrast, countries with weaker institutions are often prone to developmental challenges. 
In such countries, the by-products of weak institutions, such as corruption, create inequality, 
deprivation, poverty, poor health care, and various societal ills, are prevalent (Aidt, Dutta, & 
Sena, 2008). Because of their social objects, social enterprises regard such developmental 
challenges stemming from weak institutions as opportunities and the associated countries as 
natural markets to enter (Koch, Dreher, Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2009). On the other hand, 
these same institutional weaknesses could potentially prevent social enterprises from 
becoming financially viable, thus posing a threat to their sustainability (Fowler, 1996). Thus, 
we posit that social enterprises target countries that are positioned somewhere in between, 
i.e., countries that offer social enterprises the opportunities to earn sufficient profits to pursue 
social goals. This leads to our second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: In selecting international markets, social enterprises target countries 





Country risk refers to all factors in a host country that could cause a shortfall in the expected 
returns from a foreign investment (Meldrum, 2000). This risk is outside the purview of 
investors and is usually the consequence of imbalances in socio-economic, political, 
geographic and structural factors between countries (Cosset & Roy, 1991; Meldrum, 2000). 
Because of country risk, cross border transactions carry incremental risks that are absent in 
domestic transactions (Meldrum, 2000).  
In the mainstream management literature, it is theorized that the extent of risk in a target 
country negatively impacts market selection strategies (Andersen & Buvik, 2002; Brouthers 
& Nakos, 2005). This is primarily due to the volatile relationship between profitability and 
risk. Scholars have identified several sources of country risk; e.g., political, social, economic, 
operational, and transfer and exchange rate risk (Cosset & Roy, 1991; Meldrum, 2000; Root, 
1987; Schneider & Frey, 1985). Yet, as far as social enterprises are concerned, the impact of 
country risk is probably different due to their hybridity. In high-risk countries, vulnerable 
people and communities are prevalent, thus providing greater opportunity for social 
enterprises to fulfill their social utility functions (Porter & Kramer, 2011; Teasdale, 2010). 
At the same time, however, social enterprises need to achieve some level of economic 
breakthrough in order to advance their social welfare mission. For this reason, high-risk 
environments may be shaky grounds for social enterprises. Therefore, a country risk level 
that is unfavourable to the realization of one objective may be favorable to the realization of 
the other objective, and vice versa (Austin et al., 2006). To balance this trade-off, the optimal 
choice for social enterprises may be to opt for countries where risk is neither too high nor 
too low. This brings us to our third hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: In selecting international markets, social enterprises target countries 







3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Context  
The present study focuses on European and North American impact investing organizations 
that operate in developing countries. 18  These organizations are incorporated as non-
governmental (NGOs), get their income from the services they render rather than from 
donations, and mainly work in developing countries to promote financial and social inclusion 
through partnership with local MFIs (Salamon & Anheier, 1992). The microfinance industry 
offers a natural context for this study since most industry players satisfy the principal 
criterion for defining a social enterprise, namely, the coupling of social and business logics 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Peredo & McLean, 2006). Moreover, the microfinance industry 
is globally known and acknowledged for its commitment to developmental issues. For 
instance, the United Nations declared 2005 as the year of microcredit and the 2006 Nobel 
Peace Prize was awarded to microfinance pioneer Mohammad Yunus who founded the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (one of the first MFIs). Finally, microfinance is a very 
internationalized industry where international lenders, donors, investors, and technical 
assistance providers offer their services (Mersland et al., 2011; Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). 
Principally, the increasing internationalization of microfinance is largely driven by an 
infusion of international funds (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). The microfinance industry is 
thus a suitable testing ground for analyzing patterns of international market selection by 
social enterprises.  
3.2. Sample and data sources 
The dataset was created by us with data from multiple sources. Our sample of social 
enterprises consists of impact investing organizations listed in the 2013 directory of the 
European Microfinance Platform (e-MFP). These impact investing organizations, also called 
microfinance investment vehicles (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013), channel funds from 
suppliers (donors and other fund providers) to country-based MFIs, with the aim of achieving 
mutually beneficial goals (Mersland & Urgeghe, 2013). The relationship between providers 
of funds in the global north and recipients of credit from MFIs is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
18 The sample of developing countries in the dataset are those classified by the World Bank as upper middle-income, 
lower middle-income and low-income countries. High-income countries are excluded since they fall outside the 





Besides financial resources, microfinance investment vehicles, especially those incorporated 
as non-governmental organizations, often provide other non-financial support to their partner 
MFIs (Mersland et al., 2011). Figure 2 illustrates the financial and non-financial assistance 
offered by impact investing organizations to their local partners, the country-based MFIs. 
 









Figure 1 illustrates how funds flow from suppliers in developed countries to microentrepreneurs in developing countries. 





















































Figure 2 illustrates the financial and non-financial assistance that are offered by International impact investing 
organizations to locally MFIs in developing countries. 
Source: Adapted from European Microfinance Platform (2013). 
 
The European Microfinance Platform (e-MFP) has 114 members: 104 are organizations, out 
of which 64 are non-governmental impact investing organizations that provided information 
for the 2013 directory. However, not all the 64 organizations serve the purposes of this study 
and therefore we implement a selection procedure that results in a fine-grained sample of 41 
impact investing organizations that provide funding and/or technical assistance to MFIs. The 
filtering of the organizations was done based on two criteria: international presence and type 
of intervention. Regarding the international presence criterion, only organizations that listed 
activities in at least one foreign country were selected, leading to the exclusion of 2 
organizations that operate solely in their country of origin.  For the type of intervention 
criterion, 4 universities, the United Nations, and 6 oversight organizations were excluded to 































organizations. The e-MFP directory’s information was verified from the websites of the 
respective organizations. In cases of discrepancies and missing information, the 
organizations were contacted by e-mail for clarifications. After all these, data relating to the 
operating locations of 11 organization were still missing. After excluding these 11 
organizations, the final sample consists of 41 impact investing organizations 19  offering 
financial and/or non-financial assistance to MFIs in at least one foreign country20. Country-
level macroeconomic data were collected from public sources mentioned in the subsections 
below. 
3.3. Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is a binary variable that indicates whether a given organization 
operates in a given country: the impact investing organization takes a value of 1 if it operates 
in the country and 0 otherwise (Coeurderoy & Murray, 2008; Koch et al., 2009).  
3.4. Independent Variables  
For the independent variables, three commonly used macroeconomic factors that explain the 
internationalization of firms are employed: level of development, institutional strength, and 
country risk. 
Level of development – The Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United 
Nations Development Programme, is employed as a proxy for a country’s level of 
development. According to the United Nations Development Programme, HDI is a 
compound index that measures a country’s standing in three basic aspects of human 
development, namely, long and healthy life, schooling, and decent standard of living. Several 
internationalization studies have approximated the overall level of development of countries 
based on the HDI (Dow, 2000; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). To avoid biases resulting from 




19 The 41 organizations in the sample are headquartered in the following 17 European and North American countries: 
Italy, Luxembourg, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, Monaco, France, Norway, Switzerland, 
Denmark, United Kingdom, Liechtenstein, Canada and United States of America. 
20 List of all 41 impact investing organizations, their years of establishment, countries of origin, type of intervention, 




Institutional strength – This is proxied by the rule of law score, as published by the World 
Bank (Du, Lu, & Tao, 2008; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). The rule of law “captures 
perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2011, p. 4). Rule of law scores range from -2.5 to +2.5, representing lower to higher 
perceptions, respectively. As with the HDI, the average rule of law score for the years 2000, 
2004, 2008, and 2012 is used.  
Country risk – This is the risk emanating from socio-political, economic and structural 
factors in a host country that adversely affects the expected returns or the value of a cross-
border investment (Meldrum, 2000). The Euler Hermes Risk Index (EHRI) (Euler Hermes, 
2014) is the proxy for country risk (Moser, Nestmann, & Wedow, 2008). The EHRI 
combines five dimensions in determining country risk, including macroeconomic status of 
the economy, structural soundness of the business environment, political environment, 
financial flows and cyclical risk indications (Euler Hermes, 2014). The index has values that 
range from 1 to 4, where higher values represent higher country risks and vice versa. For this 
indicator, only data relating to the year 2014 are available.  
3.5. Control Variables 
We control for the effects of nine factors: organizational experience, organizational size, 
distance between home and host countries, type of intervention, bilateral relations between 
home and host country, bilateral trade, size of host country, religion and host country’s 
natural resource endowment.  
Experience – This is regarded as one of the most important factors in internationalization 
literature (Davidson, 1980; Kim & Aguilera, 2015). Experienced firms have a better 
understanding of, and ability to predict, market conditions, thereby reducing their risk and 
uncertainty (Davidson, 1980). Experience is operationalized by two variables. The first is 
the age of the organization and the second is international experience which is measured by 
the total number of countries in which a given organization operates (Dowell & Killaly, 
2009; Lu, Liu, Wright, & Filatotchev, 2014; Mersland et al., 2011).  
Firm size – A firm’s size, reflected in the amount of resources it controls, plays an important 




theory perspective, large firms are able to harness and deploy the required resources that 
guarantee their internationalization success in a more effective and efficient way than small 
firms do (Canabal & White, 2008;). In this study, size is measured by the total number of 
employees in the organization (Dang, Li, & Yang, 2018).  
Type of intervention – Studies in the internationalization literature have shown that specific 
firm characteristics―such as product and service offerings, technology, and management 
attributes―influence the internationalization decisions and processes of firms (e.g., Li, 2018; 
Ramón-Llorens, García-Meca, & Duréndez, 2017). Thus, two additional binary variables are 
included to control for the effects of type of intervention: the provision of financial assistance 
and non-financial assistance. 
Geographical distance – Long distance discourages trade between two countries (Dow, 
2000; Malhotra, Sivakumar, & Zhu, 2009). Intuitively, firms more easily extend their 
operations to neighboring countries than to distant ones (Dow, 2000). Moreover, using data 
on international alliances in the microfinance industry, Golesorkhi et al., 2019b) report a 
clear negative relationship between geographical distance between international partners and 
the MFI’s performance. Geographical distance is operationalized by the direct distance 
between the capital of the home country and the capital of the host country. Distance data 
were obtained from two websites that provide distance data between countries: Date and 
Time (2014) and Geo Bytes (2006).  
Bilateral relations – The flow of investment and social services (such as aid) from developed 
to developing countries is much influenced by bilateral relations and political 
arrangements―for example, bilateral investment treaties (Neumayer & Spess, 2005). 
Accordingly, two controls are included to account for the effects of bilateral relationships 
between the home and host countries. These include; colonial ties and voting patterns at the 
United Nations (Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Weiler, Klöck, & Dornan, 2018). 
Bilateral trade – Charity flows may follow patterns of existing economic ties between 
countries (Berthélemy & Tichit, 2004; Younas, 2008; Maizels & Nissanke, 1984; Nowak-
Lehmann, Martínez-Zarzoso, Klasen, & Herzer, 2009). We account for this in our 
estimations by controlling for bilateral trade between home and host countries. We use the 




& Tichit, 2004; Metzger, Nunnenkamp, & Mahmoud, 2010).  This data is obtained from the 
database of the International Trade Centre (http://www.intracen.org/). 
Host country size – The proxy for this control is the total population of the respective 
countries, contained in the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book (2014). Scholars 
have argued that populous countries attract more foreign investments thanks to their greater 
market potential (Nielsen, Asmussen, & Weatherall, 2017).  
Religion – Many organizations involved in microfinance are motivated by Christian faith 
(Mersland, D’Espallier & Supphellen, 2013). Hence, following Alesina, and Dollar (2000) 
and Clist (2011), we control for the effects of religion in our models. Religion data is obtained 
from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World Fact Book. 
Natural resource endowment – Social interventions and aid to developing countries may be 
driven by the selfish interests of donors rather than the needs of recipient countries. These 
interests may include the quest to gain access and to exploit resources in recipient countries 
or what Naim (2007) calls ‘rogue aid’. To control for this possible effect, we include a binary 
variable that indicates whether a host country is an oil and gas exporter (Alesina & Dollar, 
2000; Clist, 2011). Oil and gas data is obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency’s World 
Fact Book. The definitions and summary statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1. 
3.6. Econometric Models 
First, we conduct a two-sample t-test to compare macroeconomic conditions in countries 
where impact investing organizations operate and countries where they have no operations. 
We perform this test on four samples (full sample, upper middle-income countries, lower 
middle-income countries, and low-income countries) to assess if there are univariate 
differences. The reason why we also run the test on the sub-samples is to better identify the 
hybridity proposed in the hypotheses. Then, we proceed to a multivariate setting where we 




𝑃𝑟(𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒) = 𝛽0  +  𝛽1𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑔𝑒
+  𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡. 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽6𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
+ 𝛽8𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛. 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽9𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦 + 𝛽11𝑈𝑁 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔
+ 𝛽12𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑒 +  𝛽13𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽14𝐶ℎ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 
+ 𝛽15𝑂𝑖𝑙/𝐺𝑎𝑠  𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 +  𝜀 
To capture the non-linear relationship implied by the hypotheses, we test and run the model 
on the full sample and three sub-samples. The sub-samples are based on the World Bank’s 
income classification of countries. The first sample, upper middle-income (UMI), are 
countries with gross national income (GNI) between $4,086 and $12,615. The second sample 
consist of lower middle-income (LMI) countries with GNI values ranging from $1,036 to 
$4,085 and the third sample consist of low-income (LI) countries with GNI values lesser 
than $1,035. Descriptive statistics of each sample are reported in Table 3. 
4. Empirical Findings and Discussion 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. The average impact investing 
organization in the dataset operates in 14.8% of the total sample of countries, corresponding 
to an approximate number of 23 countries per impact investing organization. The mean level 
of country development corresponds to an HDI score of 0.580. The mean institutional 
strength, measured by the World Bank’s Rule of Law index, is negative (-0.432). Thus, most 
of the countries in the dataset are characterized by weaker institutions. Similarly, the average 
country risk of 3.159 is high as it gets closer to the maximum possible value of 4. On average, 
an impact investing organization in the dataset is 28 years old and has about 42 employees. 
The share of impact investing organizations that offer financial and non-financial services 
are 73.2% and 95.1% respectively with most organizations combining both interventions. 
The average distance between the home and host countries is 7042 km. 5.8% of the total 
sample of developing countries were previous colonies of the countries from which the 
impact investing organizations originate. Regarding voting patterns at the United Nations, 
averagely, the countries of origin of the impact investing organizations and the 153 




volume of exports from home to host countries is valued at approximately US$ 761.4 
million. The mean value of country size, measured by total population, is 37.5 million. 
Christianity is the main religion in 60.9% of the host countries. For natural resources, 27.2% 
of the host countries are exporters of oil and/or gas. 
In Table 2, the correlations between the independent variables are presented. 
Multicollinearity is a common problem in studies that use macroeconomic data (e.g., 
Metzger, Nunnenkamp, & Mahmoud, 2010). Multicollinearity is detected when the variance 
inflation factor of a variable is greater than 5 or when the correlation between two 
explanatory variables exceeds 0.9 (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Nonetheless, the 
numbers in Table 2 dispel any concerns of multicollinearity. The correlation coefficients and 
the variance inflation factor values reported in the table are lower than the aforesaid upper 
bounds. The highest correlation coefficient is 0.500 (the correlation between development 





Table 1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics      
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable 
     
Operate “1” if the impact investing organization operates in a given country, 
“0” otherwise  
6,273 0.148 0.355 0 1 
Independent variables      
Development Country’s Human Development Index score 5,453 0.580 0.152 0.270 0.880 
Institution Country’s score on the World Bank’s measure of rule of law 6,027 -0.432 0.749 -2.450 1.720 
Country risk Country’s score on the Euler Hermes Risk Index 5,658 3.159 1.105 1.000 4.000 
Control variables       
Age Age of organization 6,273 28.196 20.124 1.000 72.000 
Int. experience Number of developing countries in which organization operates 6,273 22.682 18.871 2 99 
Org. size Number of Employees 6,120 41.644 136.995 1 874 
Fin. Assistance “1” if the impact investing organization offers financial assistance 
and “0” otherwise 
6,273 0.732 0.443 0 1 
Nonfin assistance “1” if the impact investing organization offers non-financial 
assistance and “0” otherwise 
6,273 0.951 0.215 0 1 
Distance Geographical distance (in km) between the home and host countries 6,273 7042.382 3885.378 157 49446 
(ln)Distance Logarithm of geographical distance between the home and host 
countries 
6,273 8.670 0.690 5.056 10.809 
Colony “1” if host country was a colony of home country and “0” 
otherwise 
6,273 0.058 0.234 0 1 
UN voting Percentage of agreement between home and host country during 
voting at the United Nations  
5,735 0.582 0.147 0.014 1 
Export from home Volume of export from home to host country (in US$ million) 6,035 761.387 4750.376 0 240000.000 
(ln)Export from home Logarithm of volume of export from home to host country 6,035 10.619 3.253 0 19.297 
Country Size Total population of country (in millions) 6,273 37.50 150.000 0.00986 1350.00 
(ln)Country Size Logarithm of total population of country 6,273 15.244 2.429 9.196 21.024 
Christianity “1” if Christianity is the main religion in the host country and “0” 
otherwise 
6,144 0.609 0.488 0 1 








Table 2: Correlations and Variance Inflation factor        
 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 VIF 
Development 1 1.000 
         
1.68 
Institution 2 0.500 1.000 
        
2.09 
Country risk 3 -0.324 -0.444 1.000 
       
1.59 
Age 4 0.003 0.003 -0.001 1.000 
      
1.18 
Int. experience 5 -0.023 -0.031 0.011 0.056 1.000 
     
1.04 
Org. size 6 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.267 -0.007 1.000 
    
1.08 
Fin. Assistance 7 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.097 -0.150 0.067 1.000 
   
1.13 
Nonfin. assistance 8 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.176 0.103 0.048 -0.100 1.000 
  
1.14 
Distance 9 -0.199 -0.093 -0.039 0.028 0.000 -0.018 -0.018 0.025 1.000 
 
1.38 
Colony 10 -0.080 -0.009 -0.006 -0.081 -0.057 -0.019 0.086 0.041 0.045 1.000 1.05 
UN voting 11 0.330 0.289 -0.150 0.097 0.031 0.016 -0.095 0.054 -0.389 -0.140 1.52 
(ln)Export from home 12 0.182 0.068 -0.217 0.157 -0.012 0.025 0.189 0.209 -0.235 0.017 1.57 
(ln)Country Size 13 -0.280 -0.420 -0.086 -0.003 0.029 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.023 1.91 
Christianity 14 0.085 0.138 -0.213 0.001 -0.017 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.193 0.028 1.26 




No. 11 12 13 14 15 
UN voting 11 1.000 
    
(ln)Export from home 12 0.151 1.000 
   
(ln)Country Size 13 -0.032 0.353 1.000 
  
Christianity 14 0.142 -0.079 -0.241 1.000 
 




Table 3 gives a brief description of the characteristics of the developing countries in the 
dataset. A total of 153 developing countries are represented in the dataset. These are 
countries categorized as upper middle income, lower middle income, or low income by 
the World Bank21. Of the 153 countries, 132 host impact investing organizations. The 
World Bank’s classification of the 132 countries are as follows: 45 are upper middle 
income, 44 are lower middle income, 34 are lower income, and 9 are unclassified. 
Naturally, the more developed countries according to the World Bank classification are 
characterized by higher HDI, better institutions and lower country risk.  
The one-way ANOVA results reported in the table reveal that the differences observed 
between the macroeconomic conditions of the respective income categories are 
statistically significant (p < 0.01). Thus, we show that as one moves from upper middle-
income through lower middle-income to low-income countries, the macroeconomic 
indicators significantly deteriorate, and the countries become more problematic 
environments for businesses. We rely on this received knowledge to capture the non-
linear relationship implied by the hypotheses and to show the international market 
selection decisions of impact investing organizations and more generally, that of double 
bottom line firms. We achieve this by performing the analysis on the total sample and the 
three sub-samples of countries as outlined in the methods session. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of macroeconomic conditions of countries in the respective income 
categories using One-Way Analysis of Variance 










Development  0.580 0.700 0.558 0.398 4912.77**
* Institution  -0.432 -0.200 -0.541 -0.939 787.68*** 
Country risk  3.159 2.766 3.326 3.758 451.56*** 
The table shows the characteristics of the sampled countries. There is a total of 153 developing countries in 
the dataset, classified by the World Bank into upper middle-income (UMI), lower middle-income (LMI), and 




21 Of the 153 countries, 50 are upper middle-income, 46 are lower middle-income and 34 are low-income A total 
of 23 countries are not classified by the World Bank into any of the income brackets. Impact investing 





In the following, we present the main findings of the study. First, we present initial 
evidence by means of a t-test whereby we compare the microeconomic factors of 
countries where the impact investing organizations in our sample are present with those 
of countries where they are absent. Next, we present the probit regression results.  
Mean comparison t-tests and graphical illustration 
Table 4 presents the mean comparison t-test results. In panel A of Table 4, the test is 
performed on the full sample of developing countries in the dataset. In panels B and C, 
the comparison is performed on the sample consisting only of countries in the upper 
middle-income and lower middle-income categories, respectively. Panel D shows the 
results of the comparison among countries in the low-income bracket. 
In panel A, the results show that impact investing organizations generally operate in 
countries that are significantly less developed and institutionally weaker than the 
countries where they do not operate. The opposite, however, holds true for the country 
risk indicator. This finding also holds true in panel B where we consider only upper 
middle-income countries. In panel C, the mean value of development of countries where 
impact investing organizations are present is higher than that of countries where they are 
absent but the difference in means is too small to be statistically significant. Further, the 
institutions in the countries where impact investing organizations are present are weaker 
than the institutions in the countries where they are absent, but similar to development, 
the difference is not statistically significant. The results also show that impact investing 
organizations invest in lower middle-income countries where country risk is significantly 
lower. In panel D, the results show that countries in which impact investing organizations 
operate have stronger institutions but have similar level of development as countries 
where they are absent. Again, the risk in the countries where impact investing 








Table 4: T-test comparison of macroeconomic of countries where impact investing 
organizations operate and countries where they do not operate 
Variables  Operate = 1 Operate = 0 t-value 
    
Panel A: Full sample of developing countries   
Development 0.536 0.589 9.729*** 
Institution  -0.637 -0.395 9.066*** 
Country risk 3.081 3.175 2.354** 
    
Panel B: Upper middle-income countries   
Development 0.687 0.702 2.853*** 
Institution  -0.384 -0.175 4.693*** 
Country risk 2.317 2.830 6.383*** 
    
Panel C: Lower middle-income countries   
Development 0.561 0.557 -0.494 
Institution  -0.579 -0.533 1.518 
Country risk 3.029 3.388 6.199*** 
    
Panel D: Low-income countries   
Development 0.402 0.396 -1.314 
Institution  -0.809 -0.982 -6.934*** 
Country risk 3.583 3.818 7.795*** 
In this table, we employ two sample t-tests to compare the microeconomic factors of countries where impact 
investing organizations operate and countries where they do not operate.  *, **, and *** show statistical 
significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. 
 
In line with the hybridity hypothesis, it appears that impact investing organizations 
internationalize into developing countries that are poor and institutionally weak but keep 
away from the poorest countries and those with the weakest institutions. The results also 
suggest that impact investing organizations always avoid high-risk countries. We posit 
that impact investing organizations approach their international market selection 
decisions in this way in order to simultaneously “do social good” and be financially self-
sustainable.  
Is there a tipping or turning point in economic conditions where impact investing 
organizations are most likely to invest? To answer this, we fit a quadratic plot to each of 
the macroeconomic conditions and the operating tendencies of impact investing 
organizations. Graphs A, B, and C of Figure 4 show the quadratic plots for level of 




Figure 3 shows clearly the tipping point of each of the macroeconomic factors. In graph 
A, the tipping point corresponds to an HDI score of 0.436; in graph B, the tipping point 
corresponds to a rule of law index of -0.929; and in graph C, the tipping point maps to a 
Euler Hermes risk index of 2.206. Thus, above or below these points, the probability of 
investment diminishes.  
 
Figure 3: Quadratic plot of macroeconomic conditions and operating tendencies 




Turning point: Development (HDI) value of 0.416  Turning point: Institution (Rule of law) value of -0.779 
   
Graph C: Country risk   
  





Figure 3 illustrates quadratic plots for each of the macroeconomic factors. Graphs A, B, and C are the plots for 






We run a probit regression first on the full sample consisting of all developing countries 
in the dataset (1); second, on the sample of upper middle-income countries (2); third, on 
the sample of lower middle-income countries (3); and finally on the sample of low-
income countries (4). 
Table 5 shows the probit regression results of the macroeconomic determinants of the 
international market selection decisions of impact investing organizations. The results 
displayed in the table confirm the univariate differences observed in Table 4 and largely 
support the formulated hypotheses. Social enterprises internationalize into poor and 
institutionally weak countries but avoid the most problematic countries22. At the same 
time social enterprises always avoid risky countries. This later finding is counter to our 
hypothesis.  
In the full sample of developing countries (1), the coefficient of development is negative 
and significant (p < 0.01). Thus, impact investing organizations are more likely to target 
and operate in developing countries that are characterized by low levels of development. 
In the sample consisting of upper middle-income countries (2), the coefficient of 
development changes to positive but insignificant. It appears that level of development is 
not a priority for impact investing organizations in upper middle-income countries. In the 
sample of lower middle-income countries (3), the development variable has a positive 
significant coefficient (p < 0.05). In this income category of countries, impact investing 
organizations prefer to operate in countries with good development. Similarly, in the 
sample consisting of low-income countries (4), the coefficient of development is positive 






22 In an unreported analysis for robustness checks, we employ alternative proxies for each of the macroeconomic 
factors. Specifically, development is proxied with the gross domestic product per capita retrieved from the World 
Bank database, institutional strength is proxied with Transparency International’s corruption perception index 
(CPI), and country risk is proxied with the country risk classification published by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Overall, the results are analogous to those reported in the text and hence 





Table 5: International market selection and host-country macroeconomic condition 
SAMPLE UMI, LMI & LI UMI LMI LI 
 Dependent variable: Operate; 1=Yes, 0=No 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Development -1.235*** 1.049 1.207** 1.432** 
 (0.207) (0.739) (0.485) (0.572) 
Institution -0.111* -1.050*** 0.067 0.444*** 
 (0.060) (0.265) (0.105) (0.131) 
Country risk -0.117*** -0.416*** -0.119** -0.536*** 
 (0.031) (0.112) (0.046) (0.121) 
Age 0.002 0.008** 0.006** -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Int. experience 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Org. size 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fin. Assistance -0.023 -0.052 -0.271** 0.238* 
 (0.080) (0.178) (0.136) (0.140) 
Nonfin. assistance 0.015 -0.292 -0.116 -0.054 
 (0.199) (0.421) (0.388) (0.315) 
Distance 0.091* 0.125 0.075 -0.206 
 (0.052) (0.105) (0.089) (0.177) 
Colony 0.453*** 0.502** 0.321* 0.723*** 
 (0.102) (0.252) (0.174) (0.174) 
UN voting -0.406 -1.519* -0.905** -0.907 
 (0.279) (0.880) (0.429) (0.650) 
(ln)Export from home -0.007 0.006 0.038* -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022) 
Country size 0.244*** 0.245*** 0.160*** 0.254*** 
 (0.020) (0.065) (0.033) (0.049) 
Christianity 0.184*** -0.094 0.136 0.085 
 (0.056) (0.163) (0.110) (0.095) 
Oil/Gas exporter -0.245*** -0.330* -0.076 -0.772*** 
 (0.059) (0.186) (0.097) (0.249) 
Constant -5.194*** -6.272*** -5.119*** -1.353 
 (0.641) (1.664) (1.070) (1.654) 
Origin dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,736 1,635 1,517 1,265 
Pseudo R2 0.223 0.348 0.207 0.246 
LR χ2 958.4 340.9 306.9 361.7 
Prob> χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table shows the probit regression results of the macroeconomic determinants of the international market 
selection decisions of impact investing organizations. UMI = upper middle income, LMI = lower middle 
income, and LI = low income. Observations = product of total number of impact investing organizations and 
number of countries in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** show statistical 





Overall, the regressions show that impact investing organizations internationalize into 
less developed countries but not the least developed countries. This confirms our first 
hypothesis. Social enterprises prefer to invest in countries where they can create some 
social value (Edwards & Hulme, 1996b) without hurting their economic viability 
(Hanson, 2005).                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The second macroeconomic factor, institution, is significantly and negatively related to 
impact investing organizations’ decision to operate in the full sample of developing 
countries (p < 0.05). Therefore, in general terms, social enterprises are drawn to countries 
with weak institutional environments (Aidt et al., 2008). The same results are obtained, 
and conclusions drawn, after running the model on the sample of upper middle-income 
countries. In the remaining samples―lower middle-income and lower-income 
countries―the sign of the coefficient changes to positive. Thus, in these income 
categories, impact investing organizations avoid countries with the weakest institutions. 
However, the observed positive relationship is only significant in the sample of low-
income countries (p < 0.01). Thus, in the quest to maintain their economic viability, social 
enterprises avoid low-income countries with the weakest institutions (Dau, 2013; Murtha 
& Lenway, 1994). Again, this result supports the trade-off hypothesis (Hermes et al., 
2011; Jay, 2013; Smith et al., 2013; Wry & Zhao, 2018) and confirm our second 
hypothesis that social enterprises balance their conflicting objectives by generally 
entering countries with weak institutions but avoiding those countries with the weakest 
institutions (Mair & Marti, 2006; Pache & Santos, 2013; Townsend & Hart, 2008). 
The coefficient of the third macroeconomic variable, country risk, is significantly 
negative in all estimations. This is interesting because it shows that the organizations in 
our sample always consider country risk as something negative when entering an 
international market. In essence, the impact investing organizations in our sample behave 
as conventional firms do when it comes to a host country’s risk (Andersen & Buvik, 2002; 
Brouthers & Nakos, 2005; Rothaermel et al., 2006). What kind of country risk could these 
organizations be avoiding? Indeed, most country risk measures are composite indices of 
multiple risk components. In a further analysis (unreported), we examine the effects of 
six (6) components of country risk which we obtained from the database of the 
Economists Intelligence Unit (http://country.eiu.com/AllCountries.aspx). These include 
financial risk (e.g. devaluation risk, marketable debt), foreign trade payments risk (e.g. 
discriminatory tariffs, trade embargo risk), infrastructure risk (e.g. port facilities, 
transportation and communication network), macroeconomic risk (e.g. exchange rate 




security risk (e.g. armed conflict, violent crime). Results of this supplementary analysis 
closely match the main results. It appears that the impact investing organizations in our 
dataset avoid country risk, regardless of the source. However, we conjecture that this is 
probably because these organizations are involved in financial intermediation. All the 
same, the third hypothesis is only partly supported by this result. 
Some of the control variables yield interesting, significant results. For example, the size 
of the host country seems to matter when impact investing organizations go global. 
Populous countries are preferred, as the country size variable is significant in all 
estimations. This corroborates many other extant studies on mainstream firms (Brouthers 
et al., 2009; Brouthers & Nakos, 2005). The international experience variable is 
significantly positive in all regressions, suggesting that the decision to operate in a given 
county is influenced by the past internationalization experience of the organizations 
(Davidson, 1980; Kim & Aguilera, 2015). The coefficient of age is mostly positive but 
significant in models (2) and (3). Intuitively, experienced organizations are more 
knowledgeable than inexperienced ones. Hence the findings on international experience 
and age concurs with existing studies that theorize the internationalization process as a 
function of organizations’ knowledge and their internationalization experience (Johanson 
& Wiedersheim‐Paul, 1975; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). The results also show that impact 
investing organizations are influenced by bilateral relations between countries when 
selecting their foreign markets (Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Weiler et al., 2018). This is 
evidenced by the high significance of Colony in all estimations. Surprisingly, the effect 
of UN voting is contrary to our expectation as it is negative in all regressions, though 
significant only in (2) and (3). Perhaps, impact investing organizations’ decision to invest 
in a country is influenced by the need in the host country as well other forms of bilateral 
relations (e.g., colonial ties) rather than mere commonalities during UN voting.  
The finding on geographical distance is particularly interesting. Impact investing 
organizations do not seem to bother about distance when deciding where to invest. This 
is contrary to the preference of mainstream firms, which tend to opt for shorter distances 
when going international (Dow, 2000; Malhotra et al., 2009). A possible explanation for 
this is that countries classified as developing are far away from Europe and North 
America; thus, whether a social enterprise enters Uganda or Bolivia does not matter. In 
any case, it is far away from home (Golesorkhi et al., 2019b). The effect of religion is 
significantly positive in model (1), suggesting that the organizations in our sample 
generally invest in countries where Christianity is the main religion. This finding is 




American countries, where the impact investing organizations originate. However, the 
effect of religions vanishes in the models estimated on the sub-samples. Lastly, oil/gas 
exporter is significantly negative in all regressions, except in (3). This result is 
unsurprising since oil exporting countries may be well resourced to combat social 
challenges than others.  
5. Conclusions 
In this article, the international market selection of social enterprises is examined based 
on the macroeconomic conditions of the host countries. By investigating this relationship, 
our aim is to shed light on the location preferences of social enterprises, in terms of 
macroeconomic conditions in the host country, when they go international and whether 
this is tied to their hybridity. This phenomenon is explored using data from 41 impact 
investing organizations that on average operate in 23 developing counties.  
The empirical results reveal that impact investing organizations that expand their 
activities across borders target less developed and institutionally weak countries. 
However, they do not target the least developed countries and those with the weakest 
institutions. We argue that this is because social enterprises must balance their social and 
financial logics (Mair & Marti, 2006; Mair et al., 2015; Pache & Santos, 2013). Thus, 
social enterprises fulfill their social obligation by targeting poorly developed countries 
with weak institutions, but at the same time they ensure their financial sustainability by 
not entering the most problematic countries. The study further shows that impact 
investing organizations avoid high-risk countries, a finding that may be related to the type 
of services, namely, financial intermediation, that they provide. Overall, the optimal 
choice for social enterprises seems to be to internationalize into countries that offer a 
desirable balance between social and economic opportunities.  
We highlight two practical implications of our findings. First, managers of MFIs in 
developing countries that wish to attract foreign investors (that originate from the global 
north) should understand and be aware of their own macroeconomic context. This may 
be an important step to develop the right strategy to mitigate macro-environmental risk. 
For example, MFIs that operate in weaker economies could attract foreign investors 
through their commitment to financial sustainability, by showing good social outcomes 
or by promising higher returns (Cobb, Wry, & Zhao, 2016). Second, foreign investors 
should endeavour to look beyond factors at the macro level by considering firm level 
risks whenever possible. By doing so, foreign investors can assess whether conditions at 




Our study contributes to the nascent literature on the internationalization of social 
enterprises and more generally to the literature on hybrid organizations. The study 
identifies the host-country macroeconomic factors that social enterprises consider 
important in their international market selection decisions. In particular, our study sheds 
light on the hybridity approach that social enterprises adopt in selecting their international 
markets. Our study provides empirical evidence that social enterprises target foreign 
markets that enable them to balance their dual institutional logics and thus preserve their 
hybridity. Based on these findings future studies are encouraged to be mindful of the 
hybridity of social enterprises when theorizing the internationalization of these firms. 
Moreover, the hybrid approach to internationalization needs further investigation. Do 
social enterprises cross-subsidize between countries with good macroeconomic outlook 
and those with inferior macroeconomic conditions? Do social enterprises initially enter 
strong economies before weaker ones or vice versa? These possible nuances could be 
fruitful avenues for future research. 
Evidence on the specific organizational characteristics of social enterprises that motivate 
their internationalization could shed further light on the discussion (Brewer, 2001; 
Nielsen et al., 2017). An example is the role of knowledge (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). 
Even though we infer the effect of knowledge through our measures of experience, this 
approach does not exhaustively capture the role of knowledge (e.g. in mitigating risk) 
during the internationalization process of social enterprises. Finally, in this paper, we use 
data from only organizations involved in financial intermediation. Financial institutions 
that provide credit facilities are concerned about the repayment capacities of their 
investees. Consequently, such institutions may avoid organizations which operate in 
countries that have high chances of default. This might be related to why the impact 
investing organizations in our dataset strongly avoid risky countries regardless of income 
category. Additionally, the universe of social enterprises is complex and diverse, 
involving a wide range of players with heterogenous social interventions (Defourny & 
Nyssens, 2010; Young & Lecy, 2014). Consequently, future studies on other types of 
social enterprises, i.e., those not involved in financial intermediation, and their 
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Across the globe, social enterprises are gaining grounds and their significance span both 
academic and practitioner domains. For example, in the Netherlands the social sector 
grew by over 70% between 2010 and 2015 (Keizer et al., 2016). By blending the 
efficiency and innovation of commercial ventures and the passion and social commitment 
of the third sector, social enterprises present the possibilities of tackling several societal 
and ecological problems⎯e.g., extreme poverty, hunger, poor healthcare, 
unemployment, pollution⎯that confront humanity and the planet in a sustainable way 
(Battilana & Lee, 2014; Doherty et al., 2014; Seelos & Mair, 2005; Smith et al., 2013). 
The global relevance of social enterprises is attested by their lasting solutions to social 
and environmental problems that have been high on the agenda of major national and 
supranational bodies, e.g., the United Nations, World Bank and the European 
Commission. These issues form the core of the sustainable development goals (SDG) 
promulgations.23 Seelos and Mair (2005) link the social purpose of social enterprises to 
the realization of these sustainable development goals. 
Social enterprises tackle societal challenges with conventional business models, hence 
their hybrid nature. They seek to create both social and economic value. As community-
embedded organizations, most social enterprises operate locally, addressing social 
problems within their national borders (Defourny & Nyssens, 2010; Mair & Marti, 2006). 
Recently, however, more and more social enterprises engage in operations beyond their 
national borders (Xing, et al., 2018; Zahra et al., 2008; Zahra et al., 2009). While some 
social enterprises attract commercial funds, both locally and internationally, most of them 
cannot survive without subsidization (Cull et al., 2018).  
Even though social enterprises have existed for long, their nature and operations are still 
poorly understood (Seelos & Mair, 2005). More particularly, the social mission, which is 
one aspect of their hybridity, is less understood. The definition of what can be considered 
social often involves normative classifications of value generating activities (Santos, 
2012). This dissertation contributes to the literature by shedding light on social 
enterprises’ hybridity and how it impacts strategic decisions from three interrelated 
perspectives: performance assessment (chapters 1 and 3), subsidization (chapter 2) and 
 
23 These are universal goals adopted by member states of the United Nations to protect the planet, end poverty 
and promote peace. Further information can be obtained from the website of the United Nations Development 




internationalization (chapters 3 and 4). The four studies build on data from the 
microfinance industry. Below, we summarise the findings and offer suggestions for future 
research. 
2. Key findings and directions for future research 
The results of the first paper show strong coherence between social missions and social 
performances, suggesting that MFOs fulfil faithfully the mission(s) they state in their 
mission statements. The results also show that MFOs are unconcerned about other 
missions. Therefore, assessing social enterprises based on their own stated mission(s) 
seems to be more adequate than using a unified industry-based mission. We argue that 
this approach is fairer as it considers the diversity among the organizations as well as their 
strategic preferences (Smith et al., 2013).  
Our findings are in line with the recommendation of Varendh-Mansson, Wry, & Szafarz 
(2020) to theorize organizations’ raison d’être before theorizing about their outcomes. 
Yet the question on the boundaries of what qualifies as “social” and what does not remain 
open for future research (Santos, 2012; Seelos & Mair, 2005). To understand the hybridity 
of social enterprises, there is the need for a better understanding of ‘social’, an 
understanding that overcomes normative connotations (Santos, 2012). Future studies 
could connect the current discourse to the trade-offs debate by digging deeper into 
possible compromises between logics that might surface because of mission–
performance misalignments. Each social mission has unique resource constraints and 
perhaps some missions are challenging to accomplish (i.e. resource-demanding) than 
others. Thus, the intensity of the social-financial trade-off may well contingent on the 
specific social mission an organization pursues and the peculiar values it wishes to 
uphold. Further studies in this direction may provide new insights that would deepen our 
understanding of social enterprise’s hybridity and add nuances to the conceptualization 
of trade-offs between social and financial goals. 
In the paper, we theorize social mission and associated outcomes as attributes of 
organizational actions that can be studied in isolation from stakeholder judgements and 
perceptions (Grimes, Williams, & Zhao, 2020). Yet, from the standpoint of organizational 
legitimacy, the link between mission and outcomes can equally be theorized as a social 
construct that is influenced by stakeholders’ perception and judgement (Bart & Baetz 
1998; Grimes et al., 2019; Grimes et al., 2020). Afterall, organizations craft their mission 
statements to signal their values and to establish their legitimacy (Moss, Short, Payne, & 




stakeholder perspectives―perceptions, judgements and divergent interests―in our 
mission – performance framework. Additional work could focus on contextualizing 
organizational mission and outcomes in social enterprises with respect to unique 
institutional factors in social enterprises’ operating contexts, e.g., norms and traditions, 
macroeconomic factors (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011; Wry & Zhao, 2018).   
The second study shows that subsidies taking the form of concessionary loans are 
positively associated with indicators of good governance while these indicators seem to 
have no significant effect on donations, suggesting that donors are unconcerned about 
governance. More generally, there is sufficient room to investigate the financing of social 
enterprises and particularly how managers use the various financing instruments: 
commercial vs. non-commercial and internal vs. external. These financing instruments 
are associated with different logics based on which holders connect with social 
enterprises (Smith et al., 2013). The decision to use and when to use any of these 
instruments can be investigated in more detail. The pecking order theory can be a useful 
theoretical basis. Particularly, this theory can be extended to cover donations and other 
subsidized funding sources (Bowman, 2002).  
Further studies could investigate the dimensions of governance that encompass normative 
prescriptions (Larcker et al., 2007), such as executive compensation (Balsam & Harris, 
2013). Apart from being a potential predictor of subsidies (Balsam & Harris, 2018), 
executive compensation provides an avenue to explore how social enterprises deal with 
tensions between their social and financial objectives. For example, how do social 
enterprises set managers’ salaries in a way that attracts talented candidates and at the same 
time send positive signals to pro-social investors and the public? On the one hand, social 
enterprises compete with other organizations for executive talent and must offer 
competitive compensation packages. On the other hand, higher salaries can trigger public 
outrage and negative judgements from stakeholders who often perceive executives of pro-
social organizations as motivated agents who are less sensitive to extrinsic rewards 
(Handy & Katz, 1998).   
While we document the effect corporate governance on the subsidization of social 
enterprises, we do not investigate whether corporate governance improves the 
organizations’ actual social and financial outcomes. Though extant studies have 
contributed to aspects of this discourse (e.g., Dato et al., 2018; Hartarska, 2005; 
Hartarska, & Mersland, 2012), additional studies may be needed to examine the role of 




governance amplifies or lessens the trade-offs between social and financial outcomes. 
This is particularly needful since increased subsidization is just one specific benefit of 
good corporate governance. Because corporate governance decisions are strategic in 
nature and involve rigorous cost-benefit analysis (Harris et al., 2015), it would be 
insightful for future works to probe how corporate governance impacts other 
organizations processes and outcomes in social enterprises. Finally, future research could 
provide qualitative evidence on how corporate governance decisions are made in social 
enterprises by exploring  the salient drivers and particularly how such decisions are 
shaped by the complex blend of institutional logics, pressure to balance double bottom 
lines,  and the need to address incoherent demands and expectations of their multiple 
stakeholders (Varendh-Mansson et al., 2020; Mersland et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2013).  
The findings of the third study support the hypotheses that: (1) societal norms that 
prioritize males over females create barriers for MFOs to reach women and (2) 
international founder moderates the relationship between gender discrimination and 
microfinance outreach to women. These findings suggest that the social mission of social 
enterprises is contextually contingent on local culture and that social outreach is enhanced 
by the interplay between local and international players. Specifically, the findings show 
that internationalization is instrumental in driving outreach to women in patriarchal 
societies. These findings concur with those of De Beule, Klein, & Verwaal (2019), 
showing that international actors leverage their expertise and resources to out-perform 
their local counterparts when local institutions are unsupportive. However, the 
microfinance literature suggests that serving women is costly and in discriminatory 
cultures, such costs can be higher (for example, see D’Espallier, Guérin, & Mersland, 
2013; Wry & Zhao, 2018). It is unclear from the findings whether internationally founded 
MFOs extensively focus on women at the expense of financial sustainability. Extending 
the current research, further studies can examine how internationalization influences the 
trade-off between social and financial goals as well as how this phenomenon may vary 
from one social context to another. An investigation into other macro-level contingencies 
such as state fragility (Ault & Spicer, 2014) could also animate the discourse and provide 
new clues that helps us to understand the women targeting strategy of MFOs.  
The process of female exclusion from microfinance services in patriarchal societies 
should also be addressed in future works. The question on whether MFOs turn women 
away or women self-exclude themselves can usefully inform stakeholders about the 
relevant incentive schemes to build in order to trigger female participation. One way to 




using qualitative research techniques. Another promising area for further research is how 
international founders get locally embedded to establish their legitimacy and empower 
women in patriarchal societies. Since being pro-social organizations confer legitimacy on 
social enterprises (Dacin et al., 2011; Doherty et al., 2014), identifying the key 
stakeholders and the needed experience is crucial (Johanson & Wiedersheim‐Paul, 1975; 
Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Ultimately, the questions are: what are the (dis)advantages of 
being foreign and how to work on them to further the agenda of women’s empowerment 
in patriarchal societies (Zaheer, 1995). 
The findings in our last chapter show that international market selection of social 
enterprises is related to their hybrid nature. Specifically, social enterprises expand into 
foreign countries where they have the opportunity to create both social and economic 
value. Further work could investigate whether social enterprises cross-subsidize between 
countries. It could be that operating in countries with profitable business helps to further 
social programs in problematic countries. Alternatively, social enterprises may first 
expand into “good” countries before venturing in other ones. Related questions include 
how this process differ between incremental and rapid approaches to internationalization 
(Xing, et al., 2018; Wanng et al., 2015) and whether there are institutional contingencies 
(e.g., societal norms). Field research coupled with macroeconomic data could bring 
fruitful insights on these issues. Though the findings suggest social enterprises 
internationalize into countries where they have the opportunity to achieve both social and 
financial objectives, we are unable to assess whether these organizations actually achieve 
these goals in their foreign markets or whether they are faced with trade-offs in those 
markets. As data become available, future research can investigate whether country level 
factors that influence the international market selection of social enterprises also affect 
the realization of their bottom lines. 
3. Final remarks  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to understanding social enterprises, especially their 
hybridity which stem from the concurrent pursuit of social and financial objectives. It 
offers nuanced perspectives to the conceptualization of the social "lever" of the hybridity 
of these organizations by highlighting underlying diversity and the influence of 
contextual factors such as societal norms. We have also engaged with the discourse on 





We have documented our contributions to the literature from the three perspectives: 
performance assessment, subsidization and internationalization. On performance 
assessment, we have demonstrated the usefulness of mission statement as information 
transmitting devices to capture heterogeneities among social enterprises and how this can 
be leveraged in assessing social performance in a way that overcomes the bias of 
assuming a singular mission. This approach breaks away from normative connotations of 
what is considered as “social” and embraces the variety that is often driven by the 
deliberate strategy of the organizations and institutional factors in the local context. On 
subsidization, we have demonstrated that donors and soft loan providers accord varied 
attention to governance signals from social enterprises. Thus, it appears that different 
subsidy instruments are driven by different factors and the implication is for organizations 
to be aware of their own needs and send the right signals to attract the right kind of 
subsidies. Finally, on internationalization, we have shown that the foreign market 
selection decisions of social enterprises―i.e. where they go when they invest abroad―as 
well their targeting strategy is influenced by the need to balance their hybridity. Thus, 
hybridity is not only a characteristic of social enterprises but also a driver of strategy.  
Covering the three perspectives, we have suggested several avenues for future research 
that we hope would help in pushing the body of knowledge in the field forward. In this 
regard, we have directed future studies to investigate other mechanisms such as 
stakeholder perception and judgements, institutional factors and macroeconomic factors 
that work hand-in-hand with factors at the organizational level to influence the mission, 
outcomes, strategy, general operations and trade-offs in social enterprises. We hope our 
contributions would spur further research that will bring new insights and advance the 
frontier of knowledge in the field, especially in enhancing our knowledge about the social 
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